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Abstract
Providers of widely used services offer various tariff plans to consumers, such
as different cell phone contracts for mobile communication or train tickets for
public transport services. The service prices are thus dependent not only on
the consumption but also on the underlying tariff plan. Comparisons of these
service prices are commonly biased because tariff plans are not implemented
correctly.
This thesis offers new concepts to compare service prices among providers and
time periods. Since tariff plans and data structures are unique in most services,
customised approaches are required. For mobile communication, a hedonic
price index based on monthly bills is employed. The price development in public
transport is measured by average travelled kilometers. Basic service prices
across municipalities are compared via household consumption profiles.
The concepts are motivated practically, described formally and illustrated em-
pirically.
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Chapter 1
Comparing Service Prices
among Providers and Tariff
Plans
1.1 General introduction and motivation
The real income of consumers, and consequently their consumption and wealth,
are influenced by prices. Likewise, firms’ profits depend on prices. Especially
in monopolistic or oligopolistic competition, firms tend to have price-setting
power. This is particularly unfavourable for consumers, but is also a prob-
lem for the entire allocation. The markets of numerous important services
such as, for example, mobile communication or public transport, are not per-
fectly competitive. For that reason, prices are monitored and compared among
service providers by governments, independent regulators and other organisa-
tions.
Prices of goods are measured or compared among providers via price indexes.
Especially when prices for ’complex’ services are analysed, these indexes usu-
ally have one issue in common: tariff plans. The tariff plans of the services
analysed in this thesis and the resulting issues for price statistics are illus-
trated below. First and most importantly, if there are different tariff plans,
consumers can choose how to pay for a service. This results in different prices
for the same service. Consider, for example, fare systems in public trans-
1
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port. A consumer can decide how to pay for a journey. The consumer may
pay for one or multiple journeys with a travelcard or single tickets. Depend-
ing on the chosen tariff plan, the price paid for each journey is different. A
second example is mobile communications services. Multiple providers offer
different telecommunication tariffs or contracts to consumers. The price for
mobile communication services, which for consumers is the monthly invoiced
amount, is not only dependent upon the consumption of multiple units, such
as minutes called, text messages sent or data used. The specifications of the
selected contract influence the price as well. Prices that result from tariff plans
are therefore not only dependent upon the consumption of service units, but
also on contract specifications. The third example is prices for basic services,
such as water supply, electricity or waste management. In this case, it is not
only a few providers, but all municipalities that may offer proper tariff plans,
which requires efficient methods for comparing prices. Generally, tariff plans
are in use for a large number of services. Their diversity and complexity pose
problems for price comparisons.
To compare service prices resulting from tariff plans among providers, inde-
pendent regulators or organisations such as the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) currently use methods based on con-
structed consumption profiles. Usually, a few profiles for different consumption
intensities, such as small, medium or large, are defined. In these constructed
profiles, quantities for several consumed service units, such as the number of
calls or text messages, are specified. Then, the price to be paid for each pro-
file and provider is determined. Thus, service prices for different, standardised
consumption intensities are compared among providers. Fixed, standardised
profiles are used because observed service prices of different consumers and
providers cannot be compared directly. Different quantities of consumed units
result in incomparable service prices. Similarly, standard price index formulas,
which use quantities and unit prices, can hardly be applied. Implicit unit prices
cannot be deducted directly from tariff plans. Normally, only explicit marginal
unit prices are directly observable. For example, while the explicit marginal
price per additional minute called is indicated in the contract, it is not the
implicit unit price paid. The effective or implicit unit price is dependent upon
the specifications of the tariff plan (for example, fixed cost or flat rates), as
well as the consumption of other units.
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The application of consumption profiles to compare service prices among
providers poses several problems. First and most importantly, the presence
of multiple tariff plans per provider is crucial. As long as one single tariff plan
per provider exists, one unique service price per profile and provider can be
determined. As soon as a provider offers multiple tariff plans for one service,
it is not unambiguously clear which tariff plan should be chosen to determine
the service price for a profile. Therefore, several possible service prices per
provider and constructed consumption profile exist, as illustrated in figure 1.1.
Hypotheses about consumer behaviour must be made in order to select one
tariff plan to determine the service price to be compared. In the case of mo-
bile communication prices, for example, the OECD suggests that one should
always select the contract that minimises the price per profile and provider.
This method implies rational and perfectly informed consumers. It is not clear
at all if consumers really possess these optimal contracts for their individual
profiles. Price indexes and comparisons should reflect the prices paid in the
real world, and not those which are theoretically optimal.
Figure 1.1: The problem of multiple tariff plans per provider
Provider's single 
tariff plan 
Service price 
Provider's multiple 
tariff plans 
Single tariff plan, unique service price per profile 
Multiple tariff plans, different possible service prices per profile 
Multiple possible 
service prices 
Constructed 
consumption profile 
Constructed 
consumption profile 
Besides the central issue of multiple tariff plans, comparing service provider
prices with consumption profiles poses additional problems. The four major
problems are listed below:
• Tariff plans may contain a large number of specifications. Consider, for
example, discounts for students or young people on public transport or
mobile communication. Consumption profiles usually don’t specify the
age of consumers. Therefore, the prices actually paid by a large number
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of consumers cannot be determined accurately by profiles.
• It is impossible to reflect a complete consumption distribution with only
a few profiles. A service may contain different units, such as in mobile
communication minutes, text messages or megabytes all of which have
to be specified. With, for example, three profiles, only a few specific
consumption patterns can be considered.
• As for most other price indexes, adjusting prices to account for service
quality is difficult. Again, profiles become too complex and specific if
different quality levels are specified.
• Service providers may adapt their tariff plans to the profiles if they are
announced in advance and not changed frequently.
For these reasons, using consumption profiles to compare provider prices result-
ing from tariff plans is not a satisfying approach. Nevertheless, service-specific
technical manuals from independent regulators, statistical organisations or of-
fices predominantly suggest the application of profiles; see, for example, OECD
(2010) for mobile communication or Federal Electricity Comission (2012) and
Price Control (2012) for basic services in municipalities. On the other hand,
the general problems for price statistics caused by tariff plans are rarely dis-
cussed. Tariff plans have very distinct characteristics across different ser-
vices, so it is difficult to suggest general solutions. All service prices analysed
in this thesis are included in consumer price indexes (CPI) through elemen-
tary indexes in the lower levels of aggregation. In the CPI manual of the
International Labour Office (2004) - which is one of the major manuals in
price statistics - problems related to tariff plans for mobile communication ser-
vices are identified. Possible solutions, such as using profiles, comparing unit
prices or sampling phone bills, are briefly mentioned, but not specified. In the
rather theoretical general price statistics literature, tariff plans are not men-
tioned, e.g. Diewert (2002). The issue is also too specific for statistical text
books and therefore not contained, e.g. Fahrmeir et al. (2007). The (scien-
tific) literature research indicates that tariff plans are analysed in other fields,
for example, in marketing or microeconomics, with a focus on consumer be-
haviour. However, as the central issue of this thesis is to measure and compare
service prices among different providers, this literature is not described here.
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Service-specific literature is introduced in the corresponding chapters.1
The contribution of this thesis is to present and apply alternative methods for
comparing provider prices that result from tariff plans accurately. The general
approach is to evaluate observed service prices with regard to the correspond-
ing consumption. To this end, observed explicit service prices as they are paid
by consumers are evaluated according to the units of a service actually con-
sumed. As a result, implicit unit prices are obtained, as illustrated in figure 1.2.
When implicit unit prices can be estimated, nearly every statistical method is
applicable to weight and aggregate them to obtain an average implicit service
price for a provider. Finally, this average implicit service price reflects the av-
erage price paid with respect to actual consumption. To sum up, the central
difference with the profile method is that it allows evaluating explicit service
prices according to actually consumed units, instead of determining hypothet-
ical service prices with the help of constructed consumption profiles and tariff
plans.
Figure 1.2: Determining the implicit service price of a provider
Units actually 
consumed by 
consumers  
Tariff plans actually 
chosen by 
consumers 
Explicit service 
prices for consumers 
Provider's average 
implicit unit prices 
Average implicit 
service price of 
the provider 
At first glance, it may seem that not including tariff plans in the price compari-
son is a loss of information. However, in the end, there is no need to implement
the complex and diverse tariff plans directly. Tariff plans are still incorporated
1The literature researches were carried out on ideas.repec.org, webofknowledge.com
and scholar.google.com with a wide variety of keywords and the corresponding combina-
tions. General keywords were for example ’price’, ’price statistics’, ’price index’, ’tariff’, ’tariff
plan’, ’tariff scheme’, ’price plan’, ’price comparison’, ’provider’, ’service’, ’service provider’,
’service price’ etc.
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indirectly in the observed, explicit service prices needed to estimate implicit
unit prices. No hypothesis about consumer behaviour is required to select the
optimal tariff plan. Because all consumption (or at least an estimation of it),
and not only a few constructed profiles, are considered, a provider’s average
service price can be determined accurately. In addition, there is no utility for
providers to adapt tariff plans to the consumption profiles of statistical of-
fices. As a result, the suggested methods allow to compare provider prices
much more precisely than with constructed consumption profiles. In contrast
with the profile method, all and, more importantly, different tariff plans can be
implemented consistently.
This thesis suggests and applies three different methods to compare prices
from different providers and tariff plans. They are applied to mobile communi-
cation, public transport and basic service prices in Swiss municipalities. All of
these services are frequently purchased by most households and therefore have
a certain relevance. Firstly, mobile communication services are purchased by
most citizens. The tariff plans are complex, especially when analysed as ag-
gregates of providers. Secondly, public transport prices are not only relevant
to consumers, but also in politics. The whole infrastructure is dependent
upon government subsidies. Hence, prices for consumers are influenced by
fiscal decisions. Finally, basic services, like electricity, water supply and waste
management, are consumed by all households. Administered prices for basic
services are rarely analysed in the literature. For all services mentioned above,
markets are not perfectly competitive or even regulated. In the latter case,
markets are influenced by politics or governments. Consumers are a weak col-
lective in the political process as stated by Olson (1965). In this light, prices
should be monitored even more intensively. The aim of this thesis is to of-
fer alternative and consistent price index concepts to compare services prices
among different providers and tariff plans.
1.2 Thesis outline
To address the problems that emerge with the use of consumption profiles, this
thesis offers and applies service-specific index concepts. Analysed tariff plans,
suggested index concepts and empirical applications for each field are intro-
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duced in the second section of the general introduction. They are summarised
in table 1.1. For every service, prices are measured and analysed with a partic-
ular, independent approach. In chapter 2, hedonic price indexes are introduced
for mobile communication services. In chapter 3, a Laspeyres-type price index
is suggested to evaluate public transport price development. Chapter 4 con-
tains a profile-based index for basic service prices in Swiss municipalities. The
most important findings of each project, the issues to be addressed in further
research and general insights are summarised in chapter 5.
The concepts for mobile communication and public transport are new applica-
tions based on already existing, but greatly modified index concepts. Contrary
to the profile approach, both are able to provide precise and theoretically un-
biased estimators for provider prices. Both concepts require very high data
quality to perform well. Contrariwise, the profile approach for basic services
in municipalities does not. Service prices for specific consumption profiles can
more easily be collected. Here, consumption profiles can be applied because
for basic services, there is only one tariff plan per municipality and service.
The contribution of the last chapter lies in the fact that the prices of multi-
ple services are compared jointly. In addition, the magnitudes of the prices are
analysed and partially explained by several relevant municipality characteristics,
such as tax rates and rents.
Each chapter is divided into four sections: 1 introduction, 2 index concept,
3 empirical application or analysis and 4 summary. The tariff plans analysed,
new price index concepts introduced and the empirical applications of each
chapter are summarised below.
Mobile Communication
Tariff plans are offered by communications service providers to consumers in
the form of mobile communication contracts. These contracts differ widely.
Fixed cost, flat rates, marginal cost, discounts for special groups of consumers
or discounts on the price of mobile phones are just some specifications. The
OECD method presently used compares minimal cost contracts for fixed con-
sumption profiles among providers. This method is not capable of including
most specifications of tariff plans, which results in overly simplified and biased
price comparisons.
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Table 1.1: Thesis outline
Chapter / Content Tariff plans Price index concept Empirical analysis
2 Mobile Communication - Service providers’ mobile com-
munication contracts
-Contracts transform consumed
units into invoiced amounts
-Hedonic price indexes (double-
imputation, chaining)
-Price for average, aggregate con-
sumption
-Price comparison of mobile com-
munications service providers
-Data: 415 phone bills from 2012
and 2013 (Swisscom, Orange)
-Basic evaluation of model speci-
fications and indexes
3 Public Transport -Tickets and travelcards of trans-
port companies and tariff unions
-Identical trips can be purchased
with different tickets
-Laspeyres-type price index
-Price development of an aver-
agely travelled kilometer
-Analysis of SBB price develop-
ment from 2007 to 2011
-Data: Aggregates of kilometers
and revenue per ticket type
-Comparison to ticket based price
indexes
4 Basic Services -Municipality-specific tariffs for
basic services
-Electricity, waste management,
water supply and sewer water
-Price index based on household
consumption profiles
-Price level for a representative
household
-Service price comparison across
the 324 largest Swiss municipali-
ties in 2012
-Data: Service prices for three
standard households
-Focus on economies of scale, tax
rates, rents, institutional control
and capitalisation
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To address this issue, hedonic price indexes are introduced to adjust prices for
consumed services. Hedonic price indexes are generally used to adjust prices
for quality, predominantly for housing, but also for technology goods. Here,
they are modified to adjust explicit service prices to actually consumed units.
The hedonic model is based on data from phone bills, which contain explicit
prices (monthly invoiced amounts) and consumed quantities of units, such as
minutes called, text messages sent and data used. Monthly invoiced amounts
are evaluated according to observed consumption. More precisely, implicit
unit prices for minutes, text messages and data are estimated by regressing
the invoiced amount on these units. Then, based on the implicit unit prices,
invoiced amounts for the average consumption of different providers can be
predicted and then be used to compare aggregated service prices. The theo-
retical section is mainly about how to specify the hedonic function and which
index formula best fits this case. The hedonic approach solves nearly all of the
problems inherent in the use of consumption profiles. Most importantly, no as-
sumptions about consumer behaviour have to be made. As a result, real-world
prices are compared.
In the empirical section, the method is illustrated using data from 415 phone
bills. Model specifications are estimated by different methods, and indexes
are subsequently constructed. Because the sample contains only phone bills
from employees and students of the University of Fribourg, the results are
not representative for Switzerland. However, this first application provided a
great deal of theoretical and practical insights about hedonic price indexes for
mobile communication services. Interestingly, the obtained results contradict
the official statistics, according to which Orange is cheaper than Swisscom,
especially for small consumption profiles. If this difference is caused by the
non-representative sample or, if tariff plan specifications, such as student dis-
counts, do influence implicit unit prices so strongly is an open question for
further research. However, it is shown unambiguously that mobile commu-
nication prices cannot be measured and compared accurately through a few
consumption profiles.
Using hedonic price indexes to compare service prices from tariff plans is a very
promising alternative to consumption profiles. Besides the fact that the re-
sulting implicit service prices are adjusted to consumption, a hedonic approach
also allows additional analyses of service prices, as demonstrated at the end
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of the empirical section.
Public Transport
The third chapter is about public transport fares or prices. Consumers can
pay for their trips with single tickets, travelcards or a combination of both.
The very extreme case is the GA travelcard (Generalabonnement, abonnement
général) which is a flat-rate tariff. In this tariff plan, there is no relation
between price and consumption. Measures currently used to describe price
development in public transport are based on tickets and consequently on
tariff plans. Given the importance of public transport in Switzerland, which
shows an increasing demand (number of kilometers travelled) and increasing
explicit ticket prices, an index that reflects implicit prices is needed.
As a solution, a modified Laspeyres price index is suggested. Kilometers trav-
elled are used as basic goods, instead of tickets or travelcards. Based on
revenue and the aggregated kilometers travelled with a specific ticket type,
the average price per kilometer travelled can be determined. The resulting
index describes the price development of an average travelled kilometer and
reflects several important issues, such as increasing consumption.
The data to illustrate this index concept are provided by the Swiss Federal
Railways (SBB, CFF). Revenue and kilometers travelled per ticket type are
the basic variables. They describe monthly aggregates for the SBB from 2007
to 2011. With this data, the price development of an average SBB-kilometer
from 2007 to 2011 is described. Compared to given price indexes, which are
based on ticket prices, price increases are estimated to be significantly lower.
In years without any tariff changes, the estimated implicit service prices may
even fall, which is never indicated by existing indexes, which use the explicit
prices of tickets and travelcards.
Basic services in Swiss municipalities
Prices for electricity, water supply, sewer water and waste management services
are analysed in the fourth chapter. The prices for these services are admin-
istered on a municipal level and differ quite a bit. Two major contributions
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are proffered through this analysis. First, based on data from the Swiss Price
Control and the Federal Electricity Commission, an index that describes prices
for multiple services, and not only a single service, is constructed. Although it
is based on consumption profiles, thus far it represents the best way to anal-
yse basic service prices in Swiss municipalities. Secondly, an analysis of basic
service prices corresponds to the household perspective on user charges and
consequently a part of non-tax government revenue. If user charges are anal-
ysed in the literature, then they are mostly implemented as aggregates, which
does not necessarily reflect the effective burden of households. By analysing
service prices as they are paid by households, findings about user charges can
be discussed and verified from an alternative perspective.
The indexes for administered prices estimate the total and individual cost for all
selected services in a municipality. The cost for a representative Swiss house-
hold is approximated by using three different household consumption profiles.
Consumption profiles can be used in this case because, for most services, there
is only one tariff plan per municipality. The structure of this chapter differs
slightly from the others. The empirical results of the indexes have already been
presented in the second section, along with the index concept. Service prices
from 2012 are analysed descriptively across the 324 largest municipalities in
Switzerland. For the identical set of services, the aggregated administered
price in the most expensive municipality (Le Locle) is approximately 2.5 times
higher than in the least expensive municipality (Lugano).
An attempt to provide economic explanations for service price differences
across municipalities is made in the empirical section. In a cross-sectional
analysis, the administered price indexes are related to different municipality
characteristics like those generally used in public economics. The most robust
result is that tax burden and administered prices are related positively across
municipalities. Municipalities with high tax rates have typically higher (admin-
istered) service price levels. Another, but not highly robust, result is that, in
cantons with strong finance commissions, service prices are lower. No evi-
dence is found for capitalisation of service prices in rents. Economies of scale
with respect to population and agglomeration size are not present in service
prices.
Chapter 2
Hedonic Price Indexes for
Mobile Communication
Services
In chapter 2, hedonic price indexes are introduced to compare communications
service providers. A sample consisting of 415 bills is used to illustrate the
indexes.
After an introduction to mobile communication in Switzerland and the presently
used method to measure prices in section 2.1, the hedonic model and indexes
are created in section 2.2. The method is applied in section 2.3. Section 2.4
consists of a summary, an outlook and a discussion of practical issues.
2.1 Comparing communications service providers
Prices for mobile communication services vary significantly across countries,
providers and individual consumers. Providers compete mainly by offering dif-
ferent contracts or tariff plans to consumers. Consumers try to minimise mo-
bile communication cost. They choose a provider and contract accordingly.
However, these contracts usually include a large number of specifications that
cannot be fully addressed through price comparisons.
Price comparisons between different providers are usually made by independent
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regulators, statistical offices or private companies. They are even more com-
plex than the comparisons of single tariff plans as done by consumers. Commu-
nications service providers offer entire systems of tariff plans, different service
qualities and also different levels of customer care. By introducing hedonic
price indexes for mobile communication, this analysis provides a convincing
and - compared to current price comparisons - more accurate method.
In Switzerland, the Federal Office of Communications is both, regulator and
the statistical authority for mobile communication services. The price compar-
isons of the Federal Office of Communications (2013) base on recommenda-
tions of the OECD (2010) to use so-called ’minimal cost consumption profiles’.
More concretely, three basic profiles for small, medium and strong consump-
tion are constructed. For all three profiles and for every provider, the monthly
minimal cost tariff plan or contract is selected for comparison.2 Minimal costs
are compared because multiple tariff plans per provider exist, and one must
be selected for each profile. Therefore, prices are compared as if consumers
always used the tariff plan with the lowest cost. If consumers were rational,
perfectly informed and completely flexible in their choice of contract, consump-
tion profiles could be applied in this way. However, this is not the case.
First and most importantly, consumers are not necessarily perfectly rational
in terms of minimising their communication cost. For example, discounts on
phone prices for subscribing a new contract are often more important in their
selection of a certain tariff plan than the expected total communication cost.
Secondly, the complete information hypothesis is violated because people do
not know ex ante their own consumption. Consumption cost is not only de-
pendent upon consumed units, but also upon the specifications of the contract
or tariff plan. It is very difficult for consumers to pay attention to all specifi-
cations, like flat rates or discounts received for subscribing. The minimal cost
approach neither verifies that consumers are well informed by the provider so
that they can effectively select the lowest cost tariff plan for their consump-
tion. Thirdly, consumers cannot switch between providers flexibly. A minimal
contract duration of one or two years is standard. Additionally, consumers
are often faced with rollover contracts, which are automatically extended af-
2Minor method changes were implemented in November 2013, which were motivated by
new recommendations from the OECD (2012). The major change was the addition of data
traffic to the profiles.
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ter the basic duration, unless explicitly terminated. Changing contracts with
a specific provider is usually possible, but only if a more expensive contract
has been chosen. Besides the three principle problems discussed, the Federal
Office of Communications has identified other problems with the minimal cost
approach:
• All special services such as, for example, roaming packages, cannot be
implemented.
• Price discounts on phones that are given for subscribing a contract are
not considered.
• Demographic discounts such as, for example, for students, cannot be
considered.
• Network quality and coverage are not included.
The method used by the Federal Office of Communications is a simple way
to create a price comparison, but it neglects major aspects of mobile commu-
nication tariffs. The greatest obstacles to develop the profile approach to an
accurate method are the quickly changing, complex and diverse tariff plans. A
method that is independent of tariff plans solves most of these problems. This
is why hedonic price indexes can significantly improve price comparisons across
providers. Hedonic price indexes are usually used to adjust prices to account
for quality. They are applied for housing, computers, mobile phones or cars;
see, for example, Triplett (2004), Hill (2011), Berndt and Rappaport (2001),
Dewenter et al. (2007) or Beer (2007). However, hedonic price indexes are
rarely applied for communication services. In the U.S. CPI, hedonic price in-
dexes are used to adjust communication prices to account for improved call
quality over time (for example, the clarity of calls), see Fixler et al. (2001).
But they are not used to identify quantities consumed and prices paid with tar-
iff plans. In addition, they are not adjusted to compare prices among mobile
communications service providers, which yields different problems than an in-
dex used to describe the general price development over time. Deligiorgi et al.
(2007) used a hedonic approach to identify price-relevant characteristics of
ADSL connections in Europe. Finally, the fact that tariff plans pose problems
for consumers in their selection of the optimal tariff plan for mobile commu-
nication services has been discussed by Xavier (1998) or Miravete (2003).
However, none of these articles has focused on price comparisons among mo-
2.1. COMPARING COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS 15
bile communications service providers.
In this project, hedonic price indexes are introduced to compare prices among
different mobile communications service providers. They are used to evaluate
explicit communication service prices according to actual observed consump-
tion. Different tariff plan specifications from all providers can be implemented
identically, and the limits of the consumption profile method are surpassed. All
tariff plans can be compared identically, because the index evaluates explicit
invoiced amounts according to units actually consumed, which is something
every consumer has with every tariff plan.
To construct a hedonic index, first, invoiced amounts are regressed on con-
sumed units. Subsequently, implicit unit prices of the providers can be esti-
mated. Then, these implicit unit prices can be used to compare prices for
consumers’ actually observed consumption patterns among providers. More
precisely, for a given consumption pattern, the hypothetical price (invoiced
amount) for all providers can be predicted using the implicit unit prices. As
a result, the predicted invoiced amounts compared are adjusted to actually
consumed units. These imputed invoiced amounts are finally aggregated or
averaged through Fisher or Törnqvist price index formulas to compare the
providers. By adapting hedonic price indexes to mobile communication ser-
vices, most problems discussed above are completely resolved. Only the last
point, which has to do with network quality and coverage, is only partially
implemented. This method allows the comparison of mobile communication
service prices among providers over time with regards to effectively consumed
units, different tariff plans and customer service quality.
The hedonic model is presented and specified in the first part of section 2.2.
The model is based on information from the bills consumers receive. In the
basic hedonic function, the invoiced amount per month is explained by the
consumption of units as minutes, text messages, megabytes and the phone
received for signing the contract. The hedonic function can be specified in var-
ious ways. Therefore, four different specifications are suggested. The second
part discusses the index method and formulas used. The double-imputation
approach applied favours Fisher and Törnqvist price index formulas. It is mainly
the endogenous relation of consumption to tariff plans that has a crucial im-
pact on the choice of the index formulas. To compare multiple providers over
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multiple time periods, chaining is suggested.
In section 2.3, various estimation methods are applied to the model specifica-
tions in order to estimate implicit marginal unit prices. Based on the estimated
implicit unit prices, standardised invoiced amounts can be predicted. These
are required by the index formulas to compare the service prices of different
providers consistently. The hedonic price indexes are used to compare prices
of Swisscom and Orange. The data come from monthly bills, except for the
mobile phone received for signing a contract. The underlying sample contains
415 bills from 60 consumers between 2012 and 2013.
Finally, an extended conclusion follows in section 2.4. First, the key results are
summarised. In the second part, the outlook for further research is discussed.
The last subsection addresses practical aspects that have not been included in
any other part before, but which are still important in the creation of hedonic
price indexes for mobile communication.
2.2 Hedonic price index concept
The hedonic price indexes for mobile communication services are motivated
and formally described in this theoretical section. First, in subsection 2.2.1, the
newly developed idea for the general model and the resulting hedonic function
is introduced. Because this is the first application of hedonic price indexes for
mobile communication services, different specifications for the hedonic func-
tion are presented in subsection 2.2.2. The model specifications are needed
to estimate the implicit unit prices. A well-specified model forms the basis of
a hedonic price index and greatly influences its accuracy.
Two index concepts to compare providers are outlined in 2.2.3. Both require
implicit unit prices for all providers to be compared. A Fisher index describes
price levels from a market or producer perspective. This is complemented
by a modified Törnqvist index, which compares prices from a representative
consumer’s perspective. Again, two concepts are presented because there is
no prior literature that has suggested index formulas for mobile communica-
tion. In addition, different index formulas yield different interpretations of the
price comparisons. Then, the method for simultaneously creating indexes over
multiple time periods and providers is illustrated.
2.2. HEDONIC PRICE INDEX CONCEPT 17
Finally, in subsection 2.2.4, the choice of the double-imputation method and
the specific index formulas is motivated. Advantages, compared to other he-
donic price index types, are outlined. All presented specifications and index
formulas are known concepts from the hedonic price index literature. They are
usually applied to housing, and so they have been (quite notably) modified for
application to mobile communications services.
2.2.1 General approach and the hedonic function
A hedonic price index for mobile communication can be created in various ways.
The newly developed approach presented here is meant to model mobile com-
munication service prices as accurately as possible. Basic specifications of the
model and, consequently, the hedonic function must be made in the beginning.
It seems very reasonable to start with monthly bills as basic observations. A
consumer i receives a bill every month from its provider t. It contains the
price, or total cost, and the corresponding service units consumed. To keep
the notation as simple as possible, t denotes both, provider and correspond-
ing time period of an observation. Because index formulas are used later on,
specifying provider and time period separately is not necessary.
The price for communication services p corresponds to the monthly invoiced
amount, minus the cost of all services from third companies. Therefore, in
the price, only the services of the provider are considered. Other services, like
costly hotlines or train ticket purchases via text messages, for example, are
excluded from the model. The invoiced amount is dependent on the contract
and the consumed service units. The tariff plan, or contract c, transforms
vector x , containing all consumed units, into the invoiced amount. For every
consumer i and provider t, this relation holds.
pti = c
t
i (x
t
i ) (2.1)
The contract or tariff plan c can therefore be interpreted as a function that
transforms the consumed units x into a price p. This is the basic hedonic func-
tion. Keep in mind that consumed units are dependent upon the contract of
provider t. A consumer with a complete flat-rate tariff plan, for example, such
that the invoiced amount is independent of consumption, probably consumes
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more than he would without a flat rate. If all price-relevant consumption vari-
ables are captured by the consumption vector x , the hedonic function (2.1)
can be specified and estimated. Therefore, single contracts, and especially
their specifications, are no longer directly relevant. The ’average’ contract of
a provider t can be estimated. The precise model specifications to estimate c
are introduced in the following subsection. This subsection is closed by intro-
ducing all consumption variables considered price-relevant and thus included
in x .
The following consumption units are considered as relevant to the invoiced
amount:
• Minutes landline: minutes called on a fix net phone. These minutes can
be separated into on-net calls on the fix net of the provider with which
consumer i has a contract or off-net calls to a different one.
• Minutes mobile: minutes called on another mobile phone. These minutes
can also be separated into on-net and off-net calls.
• Short message services (SMS): number of SMS sent.
• Multimedia message services (MMS): number of MMS sent.
• Megabytes (MB): number of mobile data traffic consumed, measured in
MB.
• Roaming to other countries: all units, apart from MB and on-net calls,
can be made to another country and bring about special roaming tariffs.
These units are usually more expensive for the consumer in the end.
• Roaming abroad: if one of the units above is consumed abroad, special
tariffs are used, depending on country, involved providers and interna-
tional regulations. Calls received abroad are also included.
• Discount on the phone price: for signing a contract, providers sell mobile
phones with a discount. The longer in duration and the more expensive
the signed contract, the higher the discount. The discount is divided by
the minimal duration of the contract in months to obtain the discount
per month. More precise descriptions follow in the data subsection 2.3.1.
Another variable that might be considered is the number of calls. All minutes
are included as aggregates per month. This method does not completely
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describe the consumption, because for a given amount of minutes, the number
of calls varies. The more connections established, the higher the cost for a
given number of minutes consumed. Note that all variables observed appear on
most bills. Only the information about the discount on the mobile phone price
given for signing a contract does not. This additional information was gathered
through a consumer survey. The discount is price-relevant consumption, and
so it must be included. It is also very important for the choice of contract,
which is often motivated by the phone and thus, the discount. The magnitude
of the discount is usually indicative of the size of the fixed cost of a contract,
which is the second-most important factor in consumers’ choice.
That consumption can be influenced by the contract becomes a problem for the
estimations. For this analysis, it is assumed (for econometric reasons) that the
choice of the contract is dependent upon the fixed cost and is thus captured in
the discount on the phone price. Consequently, all other consumption variables
are assumed to be independent of the contract. Obviously, this assumption
and its implications can and should be discussed in further applications.
Finally, consumption not only contains explicitly billed units and quantities;
it is also a question of quality. Both geographical network coverage and the
speed of the data connection are crucial aspects. They are partially included
in the model, but only as cap for maximal consumption. The basic logic is
that with increasing network quality, potential consumption also increases. For
example, in a high-quality network, a consumer can have a lot of data traffic
in a month, whereas in a low-quality network, it is physically not possible. As
long as consumers in a good network have relatively high data traffic and those
in low-quality networks have small traffic, the hedonic approach can capture
the quality via the quantity consumed. However, if, for example, a consumer
likes a fast data connection but only uses a few megabytes, or vice versa,
a consumer has a weak connection but uses it continuously, the assumption
is violated. Precisely how the quality of a network should be included is not
discussed here. It is assumed that the quality of the networks is at least
partially indicated by the amount of units consumed.
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2.2.2 Model specifications for the hedonic function
After introducing the basic approach, specifications for the hedonic function
in equation (2.1) are presented. Four specifications are suggested, namely the
linear, a decreasing marginal price, a semi-log and a Box-Cox specification.
For a precise discussion of these specification forms in the context of hous-
ing, see Yu and Prud’homme (2010) or, more generally, Cropper et al. (1988).
Because mobile communication services have yet to be measured by hedonic
price indexes and differ greatly from houses, four specifications are considered
to start with. These are then evaluated in the empirical section 2.3. Again,
the specifications are important because they contribute an essential part of
the quality of the estimated implicit unit prices, the predicted or imputed prices
and, consequently, the price indexes.
Contrary to hedonic price indexes for houses or cars, the individual functions
that transform consumption variables into a price are known precisely through
the underlying contracts. At first glance, this might be a very strong indica-
tor for the specification of the hedonic function. The hidden aspect of the
problem is that these tariff plans are extremely varied. For example, a prepaid
contract can be a fully linear function of consumption, where every minute,
text message or megabyte consumed is paid exactly per unit, with a constant
marginal price. On the other extreme, a full flat-rate tariff plan, the invoiced
amount is completely independent of consumption, and the function would
contain merely a constant. However, in between these two extremes, there is
a wide variety of tariff plans. In the data, there is no pure form of both ex-
treme tariff plans. Tariff plans usually contain flat-rate elements to a certain
extent, often depending on the monthly fixed cost and demographic discounts.
Most flat-rate elements can be observed in data traffic. In contrast, roaming
is rarely covered by flat rates.
Besides the tariff plans, customer consultation to offer the client the optimal
contract is also relevant. A provider can offer very attractive tariff plans, but
if, for example, a lot of consumers with little consumption are in contracts with
a high fixed cost, they pay relatively more than they would in contracts with
a smaller fixed cost. This highlights the fact that, in the end, optimal model
specifications are no longer that easily identified. By relating the invoiced
amount directly to consumed units, customer consulting is also included in the
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evaluation of prices. The uncertainty about the optimal form generated by
the variation in tariff plans and customer consulting is the main reason that
several model specifications are tested in this analysis.
Linear
First, the linear specification in equation (2.2) is introduced. A linear model
is usually used if no further information for specification is available. The
wide variety of tariff plans and customer consulting, therefore, supports the
usage of a linear model. Prices or invoiced amounts p are modelled as a linear
function of all k units consumed by consumer i with a specific provider t.
The coefficients βj can be interpreted as the marginal implicit price of unit
j . The constant corresponds to the basic price of signing a contract with a
certain provider t. The equation is complemented by the stochastic error term
u.
An increase of 1 in the consumption of unit j raises the invoiced amount or
price by its marginal implicit unit price βj . Note that consumption x is in this
subsection described for a single good j , and not as a vector of all goods, as it
was before and will be later in the definition of indexes. Describing specifica-
tions is more convenient with single units, whereas the hedonic function and
the indexes can be better described with using vectors.
pti = β
t
0 +
k∑
j=1
βtj x
t
i j + u
t
i (2.2)
The linear model’s key benefit is that the levels of the estimated coefficients
can be interpreted as constant marginal unit prices. This helps to validate the
estimated coefficients. If the constant was suppressed, the coefficients could
be interpreted as average unit prices. However, they would be biased. Esti-
mations of specifications without a constant, which offer interesting insights
about the magnitudes of unit prices, are reported in appendix A.1.1.
Note that the marginal unit price in the linear specification for the first megabyte
is the same as for the thousandth, for example. It seems reasonable to differ-
entiate this problem.
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Decreasing marginal price
By discounting the consumption of unit j by 0 < θj ≤ 1, a decreasing marginal
unit price is introduced in equation (2.3). This specification is mainly moti-
vated by the general form of tariff systems. Consumers with low consumption
usually have a small fixed cost component and pay a relatively high marginal
price per unit. Consumers with high consumption have more flat-rate elements
in their contracts, and therefore have a higher fixed-cost component and a
relatively lower marginal price per additional unit consumed. By discounting
consumption, the predictive power can be increased.
pti = β
t
0 +
k∑
j=1
βtj (x
t
i j)
θj + uti (2.3)
This model approach can also be interpreted in other ways. Obviously, the con-
tribution of an additionally consumed unit to the invoiced amount decreases
over all tariff plans. All providers diversify their tariff plans such that the higher
the consumption, the lower the price per unit consumed. Nonetheless, it can
also be seen as a way of decreasing the marginal utility of an additionally con-
sumed unit. The most important megabyte consumed, for example, is proba-
bly worth much more than the thousandth. Maybe with the most important
megabyte, a very important email is received, whereas with the thousandth,
some additional seconds TV stream are consumed.
The interpretation of specification (2.3) is versatile. However, in this first
application, the interpretation of the decreasing marginal contribution of a
unit to the invoiced amount is used. Mixing utility and hedonic price functions
imposes a new framework, as discussed to some extent by Rosen (1974). As
this is a first encounter with hedonic price indexes for mobile communication,
utility functions are not used in any form.
After introducing two models that are mainly motivated by ’economic’ con-
cerns, the following two models are motivated by ’econometric’ benefits, pos-
sibly offering better prediction quality.
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Semi-logarithmic
The semi-logarithmic specification in equation (2.4) linearises the dependent
variable. This is motivated by the usual distribution of prices to obtain normally
distributed residuals. The coefficients can be interpreted as the semi-elasticity
of the invoiced amount. If consumption of unit j is increased by 1, the invoiced
amount p changes by 100 · βj%.
log(pti ) = β
t
0 +
k∑
j=1
βtj x
t
i j + u
t
i (2.4)
Note that a log-linear model (which also takes the logarithm of explanatory
variables) is not a useful approach in the mobile communication context. A
lot of consumption unit values are equal to 0, and its logarithm would be not
defined. Roaming units in particular are consumed erratically.
Box-Cox
The Box-Cox specification in equation (2.5) completes the set. The form is
dependent on the parameter λ, which can be estimated by maximum-likelihood.
If λ is not significantly different from 0, the semi-logarithmic model specifica-
tion is used. If it is, then the dependent variable is transformed as described
in equation (2.6). The main benefit of a Box-Cox specification is that usually
the residual distribution is closer to a normal distribution.
pti
(λ)
= βt0 +
k∑
j=1
βtj x
t
i j + u
t
i (2.5)
pti
(λ)
=

pλ−1
λ
if λ 6= 0
log(p) if λ = 0
(2.6)
The four specifications will be estimated in the empirical section. The trade-off
is between a simple model specification (linear) with a straight interpretation
of results, versus having better specified models that suffice to the most im-
portant assumptions of the ordinary least squares estimation (OLS). The goal
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for hedonic price indexes is generally to have a model with optimal predictive
power. However, as this is the first application, other aspects of the model
specifications (residual distribution, heteroscedasticity, specification) are also
analysed in the empirical section. Other functional forms, especially non-
linear models, may also be reliable. Additionally, prices could be predicted by
non-parametric methods, such as classification algorithms, but these are not
discussed here.
2.2.3 Hedonic price indexes
When the model specifications from the previous subsection are estimated,
then the resulting coefficients can generally be interpreted as implicit marginal
unit prices. Based on these implicit marginal unit prices, the indexes can be
constructed.
In the first part of this subsection, a Fisher index, which describes the price
development for aggregate consumption, is introduced. Then, in the second
part, a modified Törnqvist index, which measures the price for a representa-
tive consumer, is illustrated. Both indexes allow the comparison of the service
prices exclusively between two providers. Therefore, in the final part, an ap-
proach for comparing multiple providers over multiple time periods through
chaining is presented. In the applied double-imputed indexes, predicted prices
are used within standard price index formulas. The price predictions are based
on the model specifications from the previous subsection. The motivation
for the selection of the double-imputation method and the chaining follows in
subsection 2.2.4.
Fisher: aggregate consumption perspective
The Fisher price index P F0,1 in equation (2.7) describes the relative price be-
tween two providers t = 0, 1 for the total amount of units consumed. The
Fisher price index is the geometric mean between a Laspeyres PL0,1 and Paasche
P P0,1 index. The notation follows Hill (2011).
P F0,1 =
√
PL0,1 · P
P
0,1 (2.7)
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Price indexes are growth factors for price levels; thus, the geometric mean
is used. The Laspeyres price index, as one element of the Fisher index, is
defined in equation (2.8). This index measures how much the total amount
of consumed units with provider 0,
∑n0
i=1 x
0
i , would cost relative to provider
1. It contains all n0 observed consumption vectors belonging to provider 0.
Remember that x ti are again vectors of all consumed units of one consumer
i of provider t. Based on the model specifications described in subsection
2.2.2, unit prices for every provider can be estimated. By using the double-
imputation method, (hypothetical) invoiced amounts are then predicted for
all consumption vectors of provider 0 and denoted as p̂ti (x
0
i ). Finally, the
price or total cost for the aggregated consumption is compared between both
providers.
PL0,1 =
∑n0
i=1 p̂
1
i (x
0
i )∑n0
i=1 p̂
0
i (x
0
i )
(2.8)
Due to the double-imputation method, the effectively observed prices p0i of
provider 0 are not used. To compare both providers equally, predicted prices
p̂0i (x
0
i ) replace the actual observed prices. Note that the index is implicitly
weighted by expenditure shares. A large consumption vector generally results
in a larger predicted price and has subsequently more impact on the aggregate
than a small one.
The Paasche index (2.9) measures how much the total amount of consumed
units of provider 1,
∑n1
i=1(x
1
i ), would cost relative to provider 0. Again, due
to the double-imputation, it is not the observed prices p1i that are used, but
the predicted ones.
P P0,1 =
∑n1
i=1 p̂
1
i (x
1
i )∑n1
i=1 p̂
0
i (x
1
i )
(2.9)
The Fisher index, as geometric mean of Laspeyres and Paasche, describes the
price change of aggregated consumption between two providers. Aggregated
consumption and estimated unit prices of both providers are equally included.
If only a Laspeyres or Paasche index were used, then the consumption of only
one provider would be used as weights for the predicted prices. Even more
important is the fact that consumers adapt their consumption to tariff plans
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or contracts. If, for example, only the consumption vectors of provider 0 were
used, the predicted prices for provider 1 would become relatively high. Con-
sumers of provider 1 adapt their consumption to the tariff plans of provider 1
to minimise communication cost. If the tariff plans or contracts are different
between the two providers, a non-symmetric index would result in a signifi-
cant bias. Using symmetric indexes is essential for comparing communications
service providers. Additionally, the number of observations is allowed to differ
across providers and periods, which is a nice property to work with.
Modified Törnqvist: average consumer perspective
The Fisher index compares price levels for aggregated consumption. As dis-
cussed, expenditure shares are used. Consumers with high consumption have
more weight in the index. This can be a problem because the provider with
better tariff plans for intense consumption benefits. Therefore, an index that
describes the average price level change for a representative consumer serves
as an alternative. Here, all observations obtain equal weights, compared to
the expenditure share weights used before.
Like the Fisher index, the Törnqvist index P T0,1 is a geometric mean. But unlike
Fisher, it is the mean of the geometric Laspeyres PGL0,1 and geometric Paasche
PGP0,1 indexes, as formulated below in equation (2.10).
P T0,1 =
√
PGL0,1 · P
GP
0,1 (2.10)
Like in Fisher, both providers are treated equally. The geometric Laspeyres
index (2.11) is the geometric mean of the growth factors of all predicted
prices for consumption of provider 0. In the standard geometric Laspeyres
index, the growth factors are weighted by expenditure shares. But in order to
show the price development for a representative consumer, here every obser-
vation obtains equal weight. All n0 observations are weighted equally by 1/n0.
Therefore, no matter how great the consumption is, price changes for every
observation are included with the same weight. As in the basic Laspeyres index,
the price development of the consumption of provider 0 is described.
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PGL0,1 =
n0∏
i=1
(
p̂1i (x
0
i )
p̂0i (x
0
i )
) 1
n0
(2.11)
The geometric Paasche index (2.12) is also an average growth factor, but
for the prices of the consumption with provider 1. All growth factors of all
observations obtain again equal weights 1/n1. Note that double-imputation is
again applied. Observed prices pti are used neither in the geometric Laypeyres
nor in the geometric Paasche index. Instead, they are replaced by the pre-
dicted prices p̂ti (x
t
i ) in order to compare both providers in exactly the same
manner.
PGP0,1 =
n1∏
i=1
(
p̂1i (x
1
i )
p̂0i (x
1
i )
) 1
n1
(2.12)
The equal weights used here in the geometric Paasche, Laypeyres and sub-
sequently Törngvist index, could technically also be used in the Fisher index.
But the intention when applying the Fisher index is to measure the price of
the aggregated consumption. The modified Törnqvist index, in contrast, is
an average growth factor in which every observation, regardless of high or low
consumption, is included with equal weight. It describes the average price de-
velopment of a representative consumer. Both indexes describe the price levels
in a very similar manner. However, the resulting differences are significant, as
shown in the empirical part on indexes in subsection 2.3.3.
Note that it does not matter if the number of observations differs across
providers. Both indexes are symmetric and weight the consumption equally for
both providers. Nevertheless, the number of observations remains important
for the prediction quality. A large difference in the number of observations
may result in different prediction accuracies.
Chaining: multiple time periods and providers
The indexes presented in both previous parts describe the relative price level
between two providers. In the Fisher approach, the price for aggregated con-
sumption is described, while in the Törnqvist index, it is the price change for an
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average consumer. An index for mobile communication service prices should
be able to describe prices over multiple providers and time periods.
The focus of the method presented here lies in stability. Indexes should not
change ex post; they should describe prices of period- or provider-specific con-
sumption as precisely as possible and be flexible in terms of modification. This
can be achieved by chaining indexes over time, as illustrated with the example
below.
Consider as initial position three time periods s = a, b, c. The underlying
market contains three providers t = 1, 2, 3, where t = 0 denotes the com-
plete market, including all providers by their market shares. All providers are
compared to the entire market (base) within one period. There is no need
to introduce a market index, and any provider might be used as base. But if
every provider should be treated equally, a market index seems a fair tool for
avoiding the over-representation of one provider.
The chaining method applied to obtain indexes across all providers and time
periods can be described as follows:
1. In every single period s , price indexes for the complete market 0 and
every single provider t are created. As base period serves the complete
market 0. The period s-specific indexes Ps0,st are independent between
different time periods.
Table 2.1: Indexes with base period t
0 1 2 3
a 100 Pa0,a1 Pa0,a2 Pa0,a3
b 100 Pb0,b1 Pb0,b2 Pb0,b3
c 100 Pc0,c1 Pc0,c2 Pc0,c3
2. Indexes between markets for all subsequent periods Ps0,(s+1)0 are cre-
ated. In this three period example, two indexes result: Pa0,b0 and Pb0,c0.
3. All market indexes are chained through simple multiplication. With three
periods, only one index has to be chained.
Pa0,c0 = Pa0,b0 · Pb0,c0 (2.13)
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As a result, all market indexes have the desired base period a0.
4. Finally, all index bases need to be changed to a0. Provider indexes are
chained with the new market indexes with base period a0 and corre-
sponding reference period s0.
Pa0,st = Pa0,s0 · Ps0,st (2.14)
Thus, all indexes have base period a0. Note that the resulting represen-
tation in table 2.2 corresponds to the OECD approach for inter-periodical
comparisons. For intra-periodical price comparisons, each period’s mar-
ket serves as base period, as illustrated in table 2.1.
Table 2.2: Indexes with base period 0
0 1 2 3
a 100 Pa0,a1 Pa0,a2 Pa0,a3
b Pa0,b0 Pa0,b1 Pa0,b2 Pa0,b3
c Pa0,c0 Pa0,c1 Pa0,c2 Pa0,c3
An ex post change of base period a0 to a period τ0 can be done by a base
change, see equation (2.15). After the base change, the index value of the
new base period corresponds to 100 points (by definition).
Pτ0,st =
Pa0,st
Pa0,τ0
(2.15)
Theoretically, all indexes could be calculated directly for the desired provider
and period. Remember that in both index concepts, Fisher and Törnqvist,
the consumption of the base and reference periods are included symmetrically.
As long as the base and reference periods show similar consumption patterns,
the resulting difference between chaining or directly determining indexes with
desired periods should not be large.
However, as soon as the base and reference periods are further away, technical
progress and new tariff plans change consumption significantly. In the more
recent period, new goods or units that did not exist in the older period might be
consumed. Solutions to these problems - like ignoring new goods - are given,
but the final result is always inferior. Chaining allows for the description of
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changes in consumption better than directly computing indexes. If new goods
or units are introduced in a period, they can be implemented in the subsequent
period without any technical issues.
2.2.4 Comments on the indexes
To compare provider prices, double-imputed Fisher and Törnqvist indexes are
suggested. To create indexes over time and multiple providers, chaining is ap-
plied. In this subsection, the choice of the double-imputation method, the two
index formulas and the chaining is motivated. These comments are not needed
to understand the index concept. They are simply meant to motivate these
choices with respect to other possibilities within the hedonic framework.
With the double-imputation method, standard price index formulas with pre-
dicted prices are used. Theoretically, it would suffice to use hypothetical pre-
dicted prices for one provider and compare them to the truly observed prices of
the other provider. This would be the (single-)imputation method. With the
single-imputation method, providers are not treated in the same manner. Per-
haps the model used has a hidden bias, missing variables or something else that
systematically influences the index. While comparing tariff plans belonging to
two providers, one provider could be systematically favoured, which is generally
not regarded as desirable. Comparing the service prices of both providers in
an equal manner is preferable.
The symmetric index formulas of Fisher and Törnqvist are used. The Fisher
index describes a provider’s price development for aggregated consumption.
The modified Törnqvist index describes an average consumer’s price develop-
ment. Both are so-called superlative price indexes, see for details the consumer
price index manual of the International Labour Office (2004). They treat both
providers (which are compared) in an equal or symmetric manner. Remember
that consumption is dependent on tariff plans. If symmetric indexes are not
used, the provider who serves as the base (in the formulas provider 0) would
most certainly be favoured. Consumers adapt to tariff plans, and if the con-
sumption vectors of only one provider are used to predict prices, the predicted
prices of the other provider will be relatively high.
Due to the great diversity in tariff plans across time and providers, as well as the
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rapid technical progress that alters consumption behavior very quickly, chaining
is used. More precisely, the indexes are constructed across providers in a given
time period. Over multiple periods, the indexes are chained, which corresponds
to the multiplication of growth factors. Even though symmetric indexes are
used, which would implement consumption and prices in both periods equally,
consumption profiles differ greatly over large time intervals. Chained indexes
over multiple time periods describe price development for time period-specific
consumption - plus or minus one period. Consequently, the index values are not
influenced by periods that are far away. Chaining is used in nearly every official
price index, mainly to obtain a realistic basket of goods, as well as avoiding
problems with new goods that did not exist during the base period.
Finally, besides the imputation method, the time dummy and the characteris-
tics method are popular for hedonic price indexes, see Hill (2011). The time
dummy method adds to the model specification a dummy for every period or
provider to estimate the relative price. Thus, no index formulas are used, and
the price change is indicated by the dummy (which is similar to a fixed effect).
Alternatively, the so-called characteristics method could be applied. As with
the other methods, a model specification is estimated. Then, based on this
estimation, prices are predicted for a few (for example, three) predefined or
constructed consumption profiles for every provider and then compared. In
the end, two reasons are important to the choice of the double-imputation
method. Firstly, index values do not change ex post by adding new time peri-
ods, as they do with the time dummy method. For official statistics, it would
be very disadvantageous if index values changed with every period added. Sec-
ondly, actual observed consumption is used to predict and aggregate prices,
unlike in the characteristics method, which uses a few artificial profiles.
2.3 Empirical applications
The empirical section is divided into four parts. In subsection 2.3.1, the data
are described. Then, models are estimated in 2.3.2, followed by an illustration
of indexes in 2.3.3. The section is closed by an analysis of the impact of
the consumers’ age on the invoiced amount and, consequently, the indexes in
2.3.4.
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2.3.1 Data
The data used are based on a sample of phone bills from students and em-
ployees of the University of Fribourg. Compared to a large and representative
sample for Switzerland, it is not an optimal solution. Nonetheless, as the
goal of this project is to test whether hedonic indexes are applicable to mobile
communication, the sample suffices for all basic requirements.
One might even argue that students are better informed than older people
and more likely to choose optimal tariff plans. Despite the fact that stu-
dents benefit from special discounts on their contracts, they usually have a
relatively constrained budget, which drives them to minimise mobile communi-
cation cost. Moreover, younger consumers usually have fewer problems com-
paring tariff plans because of their superior technical knowledge. Thus, this
sample can be considered as very conservative, containing only well-informed
consumers who have relatively optimal tariff plans given their corresponding
consumption.
The following description of the data is split into three parts. Firstly, the
distribution of sampled bills over time and providers is presented. Secondly,
the data sampled from monthly bills are described. Finally, the data from the
consumer survey are presented.
Number of observations per provider and quarterly period
The Swiss market for mobile communication is mainly shared by three providers,
with Swisscom as the biggest, followed by Sunrise and Orange. There are
other providers, but they have very small market shares. Nearly all 415 bills
sampled are from Swisscom or Orange. The reasons for this are discussed
below.
Swisscom is by far the largest provider. Sunrise bills were supplied very rarely.
In Fribourg, where most bills were sampled, Swisscom and Orange have large,
centrally located shops, whereas the Sunrise shop is smaller and less central.
Additionally, some Sunrise bills did not contain all of the required information
about consumed units, and unlike with Swisscom, it was not possible to obtain
the missing data via an online customer account. However, contracts from
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Sunrise are perhaps not as attractive for students, and that could be the reason
for the low number of bills obtained from this provider.
The sample consists of 415 bills from 60 different consumers. The bills are
not sampled randomly. The incentive set to encourage people to supply bills
was a chance to win a voucher for a new smartphone.3 The resulting sample is
therefore neither entirely representative of the entire Swiss market nor of the
University of Fribourg. Additionally, the observations are not independent be-
cause one person could supply multiple bills. Every supplied bill was, if possible,
included in the sample. The aim of this empirical section is to illustrate how a
hedonic price index for mobile communication can be constructed and to test
the method. Therefore, all interpretations of empirical results are therefore
only valid for the given sample. For a representative price comparison, the ob-
servations should be drawn randomly. How to obtain a representative random
sample is discussed in subsection 2.4.3.
Table 2.3 shows the distribution of bills over providers and quarters. Orange
customers could access bills online for the past year, whereas Swisscom clients
only get access to the bills from the previous six months.
Table 2.3: Number of observations per quarter and provider
Q1.12 Q2.12 Q3.12 Q4.12 Q1.13
Swisscom 0 1 66 99 50
Orange 35 44 43 49 23
Sunrise 0 0 0 3 2
Total 35 45 109 151 75
A few Swisscom bills are for two months. In these cases, the bills (invoiced
amount and consumed units) were distributed equally over the two corre-
sponding months. This is not a very elegant solution, and it causes additional
econometric issues. However, it is done in order to include only monthly con-
sumption vectors in the data.
3Because most consumers already own a smartphone, and receive a new one for signing a
new contract, this is considered to be a minor issue. Most people were intrinsically motivated
to participate.
CHAPTER 2. MOBILE COMMUNICATION 34
Bills
As already mentioned, the sample consists of 415 bills which were supplied by
60 consumers. All bills contain invoiced amount and aggregated consumed
units per month. Table 2.4 summarises the data from these bills; only the
discount on the phone purchased is not shown on the bills. It is in this table
because it includes all of the variables needed to create the hedonic indexes.
How exactly the discount is calculated is described in detail at the end of this
data description.
The groups that will be used in the grouped model estimation are in the first
column. The second and third columns contain single variable names (for single
variable estimation), as well as brief descriptions. For all variables, except the
phone discount, the arithmetic mean is larger than the median. This indicates
outliers in the intense consumption segments. A majority of consumers show a
relatively moderate consumption. While in the groups minutes, text messages
and MB (megabyte), and therefore in communication in Switzerland, quite
high maximum values can be observed, all maximums of roaming groups are
much smaller. This is mainly because in a lot of contracts, flat rates apply to
national communication, but not internationally. The only exception is calls
from Switzerland to abroad (CH minutes roaming), which has a very high
maximum. The extremely high values come from one consumer with a flat
rate for international communication. As the small median and mean indicate,
these extreme values represent outliers.
Three data adjustments to the genuine bills are made:
• The invoiced amount variable used for the model estimation does not
correspond exactly to the amount invoiced on the bill. All services from
third-party providers, like train ticket SMS, mobile TV, etc., are de-
ducted. Therefore, only the amount invoiced for effective mobile com-
munication through the specific provider is contained.
• In the bills, Swisscom splits landline calls (minutes) into two types. One
type consists of calls to another customer with a Swisscom fix net,
and the other consists of calls to the fix net of a third-party provider.
Orange and most other providers in Switzerland do not have their own
fix net phone products. Therefore, these two distinct Swisscom types
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Table 2.4: Bills data
Grouped Single Description Mean Median SD Min Max
Invoiced amount Invoiced amount Exclusively for mobile com-
munication services, in CHF
55.61 45.64 33.05 1.10 264.20
Minutes fix net Calls on fix net 36.94 16.48 52.69 0.00 343.50
mobile on Calls on the mobile net of
the provider
84.90 41.90 121.51 0.00 555.90
mobile off Calls on mobile nets of
other providers
20.44 5.09 31.92 0.00 225.30
Text messages SMS SMS sent 50.30 41.00 88.68 0.00 658.00
MMS MMS sent 1.55 0.00 4.38 0.00 35.50
MB MB Megabyte used 442.50 234.50 663.66 0.00 5954.00
Roaming minutes CH min. roaming Calls out of Switzerland 5.55 0.00 53.10 0.00 583.50
Roaming minutes Outgoing and incoming
calls abroad
1.15 0.00 4.11 0.00 34.05
Roaming text CH SMS roaming SMS out of Switzerland 2.65 0.00 8.14 0.00 103.00
Roaming SMS Roaming, SMS abroad 2.31 0.00 8.25 0.00 94.00
Roaming MMS Roaming, MMS abroad 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.00 2.00
Roaming MB Roaming MB Roaming, MB abroad 1.00 0.00 6.88 0.00 95.98
Phone discount Phone discount Monthly discount on mobile
phone price, in CHF
13.45 14.58 9.64 0.00 38.55
Note: All data described in this table are from the 415 sampled phone bills. Only the discount on the phone cannot be determined by
information contained on phone bills. Because it is also required in the hedonic model, it is reported in this table.
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are merged into one category for calls on fix net.
• Providers usually round up prices for calls to the next minute; for exam-
ple a call of 3 minutes and 26 seconds is billed as 4-minute call. On the
bill, it is still reported as 3:26-minute call. However, Orange also rounds
up the reported minutes and not only the invoiced amount for minutes,
so no information about the ’true’ aggregated number of minutes called
is available. Based on Swisscom bills, which have more precise infor-
mation, the relation between aggregated, precisely consumed minutes
(Min precise) per month and aggregated, hypothetically rounded up
minutes (Min rounded) is estimated. A simple linear regression with-
out a constant (2.16) is employed.
Min precisei = θ ·Min roundedi + ui (2.16)
The resulting estimate, θˆ = 0.788, is used as as discount factor for all
Orange minutes in order to approximate the ’true’ or precise amount of
minutes called. An estimation with a constant would be unbiased, but it
would lead to negative amounts of minutes and subsequently sometimes
to negative predicted invoiced amounts.
How differently scaled consumption units among providers influence symmetric
price indexes is not clear, and this is an open question for further research.
Nonetheless, for this analysis, I corrected the minutes because having well-
scaled units seems very important in the evaluation of the estimations and
indexes. The downside of correcting is that it results in a kind of two-stage
estimation, which requires special attention. An alternative would be to not
correct the minutes and to evaluate them as they are billed. But this would
probably lead to a bias in the index.
A last important decision in the data preparation is how variables or units
will be divided. In this project, a differentiation is suggested through the use
of single and grouped variables. However, the roaming variables in particular
could be split more precisely. Incoming and outgoing calls could be separated.
Also, a more precise partition of different country groups (Europe, Asia, etc.)
could be made. How the partitions should look depends upon the sample
size because roaming units are rarely consumed. If only a few or even just
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one observation containing a specific unit is present, extreme and unrealistic
magnitudes of estimated coefficients can sometimes be observed.
Consumer survey and phone discount
Each of the 415 bills is supplied by one of 60 consumers. All participants also
supplied information about their contract, phone, data usage and the consumer
via a survey, the results of which are summarised in table 2.5. The main reason
not to sample only phone bills was that there was no information available on
the bills about the phone discount they had received for signing.
The variables needed to estimate the monthly discount are the duration of the
contract (Abo duration), the discounted price paid for the phone (Phone price)
and the date of purchase (Phone month). The phone discount is normally
dependent upon the duration and the monthly fixed cost of the contract. The
higher the monthly fixed cost and the longer the duration of the contract, the
bigger the discount on the mobile phone price.
The monthly discount (2.17) on the phone price is calculated by subtracting
the price of the phone paid to the provider (Phone pr ice) from the average
market price at purchase date (Phone market pr ice) for every observation i .
Finally, due to the monthly periods, this difference is divided by the minimum
duration of the contract in months (Abo duration). The market price data
were gathered from www.toppreise.ch. This represents the average price of
a specific phone based on a set of online offers.
Phone discounti =
Phone market pr icei − Phone pr icei
Abo durationi
(2.17)
There are several important things to remark about the discount on phones.
• Some phones are developed continuously, and new specifications (with
the same name) enter the market with an elevated price. They can
hardly be distinguished from older specifications by description alone. In
this context, it would be advantageous to only consider consumers who
just signed a new contract.
• Additionally, phones that were purchased more than a year ago might
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Table 2.5: Consumption behaviour and phone data
Group Variable name Description Values
Contract Provider Provider which with the contract was signed Orange, Sunrise, Swisscom
Contract Name of contract
Abo duration Minimum duration of contract in months 0, 12, 24
Abo extension Dummy for contract extension not elected
Phone Phone month Month when signed contract
Phone model Type of phone received HTC One, iPhone 3 GS, . . .
Phone price Price paid for phone (with discount )
Phone precision Estimation precision of the phone price not precise, . . . , very precise
Phone current price Market price of phone in a given month
Phone market price Market price of phone when purchased
Phone OS Operating system of the phone Android, iOS, . . .
Data usage SMS Usage of apps for SMS
Min Usage of apps for calls 0: never
Web Usage of apps for surfing 1: unfrequently
Video Usage of apps for videos and streams 2: monthly
Calendar Usage of apps for calendar 3: weekly
Mail Usage of apps for mails 4: daily
Maps Usage of apps for maps 5: daily, 5 times +
Storage Usage of apps for data storage
Demographic Semester Semester studying or not studying
Major Major subject
Age Age in years
Sex Gender
Fix net Dummy for landline phone at home
Note: This table contains all of the information gathered via consumer surveys. Not all data will be used in this thesis. Mostly information
about contract duration, phone type, phone price and purchase date are used to estimate the discounts on phone prices. The current
and market prices for phones are not from consumer surveys, but from www.toppreise.ch. Both are needed to estimate the discount on
phone prices.
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not even be on the market anymore, so no market price is given on
www.toppreise.ch. In this case, average market prices were approxi-
mated by the prices of phones with similar specifications.
• Alternatively, instead of the market price at the purchase date, the mar-
ket price in every given month could be used. This is mainly because the
customer pays back a part of his (already relatively old) phone, which
has a lower current price every month. In the following estimations, only
market prices at purchase date are used.
• In table 2.4, the minimal discount is zero. In a first estimation, negative
discounts were obtained for one consumer. He indicated (through the
variable phone precision) that his estimate of the phone price paid was
not reliable. Therefore, this estimate was adjusted.
For determining the phone price discount, variables from the groups ’contract’
and ’phone’ are used. In both groups, there are other variables that were not
used in the end. The data usage group contains frequencies of usage of data-
based services. The last group contains standard demographic variables, from
which only the age is used in an estimation later on.
2.3.2 Model estimation and performance
In this subsection, the model specifications will be estimated through several
variants. Both, the model specification and the estimation variant influence
the interpretation of the estimated unit prices, the prediction accuracy and the
resulting hedonic price indexes. Therefore, a well-specified model is a central
element of a hedonic price index. This subsection consists of an extensive anal-
ysis of the different model specifications and estimation variants. The indexes
to compare the prices of Swisscom and Orange are presented afterwards, in
subsection 2.3.3. The results of this subsection show that no model specifi-
cation outperforms the others significantly. The estimations can be improved
by grouping variables, as well as removing influential observations.
The aim is to achieve a better understanding of model performance under
different estimation methods. For every estimation method, all four model
specifications are estimated once for Swisscom and Orange data. This split
according to providers allows for the observation of specification and estimation
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performance in different systems of tariff plans. The data contain the third
and fourth quarters of 2012 and the first of 2013. Not enough Swisscom
observations are given for earlier time periods, so the corresponding Orange
observations are skipped.
This long subsection is divided into five parts. In the first four parts, model
specifications are estimated through different methods. Starting with complete
models in the first part, variables are then grouped in the second part. This
mainly results in more consistent coefficient estimates, for example, fewer
negative unit prices and more realistic unit price levels. Still, many outliers
disturb the estimations in the grouped variant, so influential observations are
also removed in the third part. The fourth part excludes influential observations
for models with single variables, such as those in part one. Finally, in the
fifth part, models and estimation methods are compared, and the interaction
between them is summarised.
By doing Jarque-Bera tests to control for residual distribution, Breusch-Pagan
tests for heteroscedasticity and RESET tests for model specification, estima-
tions are evaluated from multiple perspectives. No specification and estimation
method is able to pass all of the tests. This is done mainly to discover where
there are problems within the different specifications and estimation methods.
The small sample still poses problems; perhaps a larger sample would resolve
many issues on its own. Despite testing for multiple statistical problems, in
the end, most important for a hedonic price index is the predictive power of
the model. This is measured by the adjusted R-squared. Further analyses re-
garding prediction accuracy should be carried out in future research, as argued
more precisely in the outlook in subsection 2.4.2.
Basic specifications with single variables
The model is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). All four model spec-
ifications, namely linear (lin), semi-log (log), Box-Cox (BC) and decreasing
marginal price (dmp), are each estimated on Swisscom (S) and Orange (O)
data from July 2012 to March 2013. First model specifications, followed
by underlying data, are indicated at the top of each column. The Swisscom
subsample contains 215 observations and that of Orange 115. Each of the ex-
planatory variables are included individually in the model specifications.
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The estimation of the Box-Cox-coefficient on the full sample yields λ̂ = 0.3,
and is therefore used to transform the dependent variable accordingly. As
discount factor for the decreasing marginal price specification, θ = 0.3 is
chosen. The rather low level is favoured over higher ones in order to make a
significant difference compared to the linear specification. Only the discount
for phones was not discounted, because the quantity is always just one phone,
despite the fact that the variable is scaled in Swiss francs. The intention of
the dmp specification is to discount the quantities of consumed units. The
quantity of the phone discount is always 1 if a consumer received a discount
or 0 if he did not.
Note that in estimations ’dmp S’ and ’dmp O’, the explanatory variables are
transformed as suggested by the model, and in the end, the corresponding
coefficients are finally not for the same variables as in the first six estimations.
Even though a consumer could supply multiple bills, no special form of standard
error estimation for the coefficients is used. The estimations of the standard
errors of coefficients could have been corrected for clusters, as done in chapter
4. This is not done for three reasons. First and most importantly, the values of
the predicted invoiced amounts are not affected by standard error correction.
Only the values of the predicted amounts (which are not affected by a standard
error correction) are used for the indexes, not the standard errors. Secondly,
in further applications, especially for official statistics, observations should be
independent. Finally, a broad set of tests that analyse more relevant issues for
the resulting indexes have already been applied.
The interpretation of the eight estimations in table 2.6 starts with the coef-
ficients. The coefficients of the linear model specification (lin) can be inter-
preted as the marginal price per unit consumed in Swiss francs (CHF). In the
semi-log specification (log), the prices are semi-elasticities. If the consumption
of unit j increases by 1, the invoiced amount increases in average by 100 · β̂j%.
Variable-specific comments and interpretations of the estimated coefficients
follow. A coefficient is considered significantly different from 0 if its p-value
(from the t-statistic) is below 5%. I will comment more on the results in table
2.6 in the following paragraph. Again, the results are neither representative
of Switzerland nor of any specific demographic subgroup. Additionally, the
sample size is rather small. Nonetheless, all observations are real bills based
on actual consumption and tariff plans from Swiss providers. Consequently,
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
2.
M
O
B
IL
E
C
O
M
M
U
N
IC
A
T
IO
N
42
Table 2.6: Specifications with single consumption variables
lin S lin O log S log O BC S BC O dmp S dmp O
Constant 36.510∗∗∗ 44.231∗∗∗ 3.452∗∗∗ 3.706∗∗∗ 7.716∗∗∗ 8.644∗∗∗ 18.209∗∗ 31.772∗∗
(2.937) (5.171) (0.062) (0.092) (0.250) (0.428) (6.185) (10.878)
Minutes fix net 0.039 −0.030 0.001 −0.001 0.004 −0.003 0.591 1.989
(0.030) (0.046) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (1.397) (2.455)
Minutes mobile on −0.032∗∗ 0.021 −0.000 0.001 −0.002∗∗ 0.004 −0.981 −0.405
(0.010) (0.035) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (1.097) (1.928)
Minutes mobile off 0.164∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 0.002 0.007∗∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 5.203∗∗∗ 8.532∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.065) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (1.429) (2.141)
SMS −0.002 −0.030 0.000 −0.000 0.001 −0.002 −0.332 −1.716
(0.019) (0.029) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (1.641) (2.080)
MMS 0.470 0.756 0.004 0.004 0.027 0.033 5.934∗∗ 16.647∗∗∗
(0.308) (1.106) (0.006) (0.020) (0.026) (0.092) (1.924) (4.655)
MB 0.019∗∗∗ 0.003 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 4.584∗∗∗ 1.023
(0.002) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.613) (1.393)
CH minutes roaming 0.078∗∗ 0.162 0.001 0.003 0.005∗ 0.016 4.871∗ 2.091
(0.025) (0.248) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.021) (2.340) (3.466)
CH SMS roaming −0.411 0.791∗∗∗ −0.003 0.012∗∗∗ −0.026 0.065∗∗∗ −5.931∗∗ 4.401
(0.246) (0.165) (0.005) (0.003) (0.021) (0.014) (1.986) (2.831)
Roaming minutes 1.624∗∗∗ 5.050∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 13.496∗∗∗ 11.907∗∗
(0.366) (0.669) (0.008) (0.012) (0.031) (0.055) (2.951) (4.418)
Roaming SMS 0.247 0.570 0.005 0.006 0.024∗ 0.035 5.849∗∗ 4.420
(0.135) (0.395) (0.003) (0.007) (0.011) (0.033) (1.819) (4.755)
Roaming MMS 13.769 −17.911 0.246 −0.407 1.197∗ −1.843 2.832 18.133
(7.000) (22.228) (0.147) (0.394) (0.596) (1.841) (9.902) (24.363)
Roaming MB 1.003∗∗∗ 1.137∗∗∗ 0.001 0.014∗ 0.027 0.081∗∗ 16.408∗∗∗ 17.805∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.320) (0.004) (0.006) (0.018) (0.027) (4.491) (4.379)
Phone discount 0.210 −0.420∗ 0.011∗∗ −0.003 0.038∗ −0.024 −0.345 −0.619∗
(0.188) (0.206) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.017) (0.200) (0.237)
N 215 115 215 115 215 115 215 115
adj. R-squared 0.719 0.676 0.479 0.510 0.627 0.599 0.695 0.592
Reset 10.213∗∗∗ 9.979∗∗∗ 11.400∗∗∗ 1.742 13.554∗∗∗ 1.997 5.573∗∗ 13.754∗∗∗
Jarque-Bera 356.379∗∗∗ 7.805∗ 6666.716∗∗∗ 120.464∗∗∗ 3118.213∗∗∗ 14.577∗∗∗ 446.388∗∗∗ 97.213∗∗∗
Breusch-Pagan 58.184∗∗∗ 49.096∗∗ 6.260 8.3381 26.290∗ 13.442 46.161∗∗∗ 44.493∗∗∗
Note: The dependent variable in all estimations is the monthly invoiced amount. Different model specifications are estimated, as indicated in the
header: lin (Linear), log (Semi-log), BC (Box-Cox) and dmp (Decreasing marginal price). All coefficients are estimated by OLS for Swisscom (S) and
Orange (O). Significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Estimated standard errors are reported in parentheses below every
estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared, RESET test with null hypothesis ’well specified’, Jarque-Bera tests with null hypothesis
’normal residual distribution’ and stud. Breusch-Pagan test with null hypothesis ’no heteroscedasticity’ are in the second part of the table.
2.3. EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS 43
the results characterise and represent a considerable part of the reality of the
Swiss market for mobile communication services. The major difference from
a ’representative sample’ is that contracts for young people or students are
represented more than others.
Some estimated coefficients seem plausible and are significant in the linear
specification. For example, an additional megabyte for a Swisscom customer
costs in average 0.019 CHF. Other estimates are not plausible at first glance.
For example, minutes called on the fix net by Orange customers cost in average
−0.030 CHF. However, most negative estimates are not significantly different
from 0, as indicated by the t-statistics. This could be interpreted as a flat-
rate element in the tariff plan, where price and consumption are independent.
Remember that the sample contains a lot of bills supplied by students. In
contracts for students, communication in Switzerland is usually covered by
a flat-rate element, so the (explicit) marginal unit price is equal to 0. Non-
significant coefficients for communication in Switzerland can thus be explained
by flat-rate elements of the tariff plans.
In the linear specifications (lin), there are significantly negative coefficients,
such as, for example, for Swisscom ’Minutes mobile on’. This estimate is gen-
erally not plausible. Providers’ tariff plans can be observed, and no provider
pays money back for consumption through negative explicit marginal unit
prices. There are two possible explanations for why the implicit marginal unit
price of ’Minutes mobile on’ could be negative. Firstly, when consumers can
call on the net owned by the provider for free or even for a negative implicit
marginal unit price, this provides an incentive for the consumer to motivate
other potential consumers to sign a contract with this provider. Secondly,
providers also earn money with calls which are made on their own net. The
distinction between explicit and negative implicit marginal unit prices outlines a
possible explanation for this particular estimation result. Alternatively, the sta-
tistical explanation is that the ’true’ implicit marginal unit price is (in average)
equal to 0, but the OLS-estimation causes a slight deviation.
If only prediction within a double-imputed price index is considered, estimated
negative coefficients are a minor problem. But if, for example, the model is
used with an index using the characteristics method, then prices for single pre-
defined consumption vectors are predicted. In this case, negative coefficients
CHAPTER 2. MOBILE COMMUNICATION 44
may lead to undesired results. Some estimated coefficients, such as ’Roaming
MMS’, have absolutely unrealistic magnitudes. Swisscom clients pay, accord-
ing to the estimation, 13.769 CHF for one additional MMS abroad, whereas
Orange customers receive 17.911 CHF for one. These very specific extreme
estimates emerge because ’Roaming MMS’ are very rarely consumed units, so
the estimation reacts sensitively.
An interesting variable is the monthly discount on phones, because it should
maintain the independence between consumption and the contract. However,
it does not behave consistently. A large part of the discount on the phone ’van-
ishes’ in the constant, as shown precisely by estimating specifications without
a constant, see appendix A.1.1. Additionally, if the constant is suppressed,
the coefficients can be interpreted as average implicit unit prices, which is not
possible as long a constant is in the specification.
With single consumption variables, the semi-logarithmic specification shows
no coefficients that are significantly negative. All of the other three specifica-
tions contain significant negative coefficients. For interpreting the coefficients,
among the different specifications, the semi-logarithmic model is clearly the
best. Also, in the overall estimation performance with regard to all tests, the
semi-logarithmic specification performs better than the others. Recall that the
adjusted R-squared cannot be compared between the different specifications
because of the dependent variables have been transformed differently. Reset,
Jarque-Bera and studentised Breusch-Pagan tests are carried out to evaluate
the estimations.
Six out of the eight estimations have significant RESET test statistics. This
is an indication that the model specifications could be improved by adding
higher-order terms of variables. Only the log and BC specification for Orange
data passed, but in general the models could be specified better. The problem
with adding higher order terms is that the interpretation of the coefficients as
marginal unit prices is no longer possible. Therefore, instead of changing the
specification, estimation methods are modified later on. The Jarque-Bera tests
control for the normal distribution of the residuals, which is a major assumption
of OLS. Residuals distributions are not normal over all estimations. Finally, the
studentised Breusch-Pagan test statistic indicates that in the semi-logarithmic
specification, no heteroscedasticity is present. In all other specifications, t-
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statistics might be partially invalid, and significances of the coefficients should
not be interpreted over-confidently. Nevertheless, the levels of coefficients can
still be interpreted.
Overall, the models have relatively high explanatory power, which is important
for predictions and the subsequent index construction. The semi-logarithmic
specification seems to fit best with single variable estimation. In the other
specifications, the main problem is the negative and non-significant estimates
of coefficients, which are not desirable. Negative coefficients can cause pre-
dicted prices (invoiced amounts) to be negative. This is generally not plausible,
and it can be problematic for the index construction, as it can make the growth
factors of price levels negative.
Specifications with grouped variables
The aim of grouping variables is mainly to avoid negative and non-significant
coefficients. Coefficients should not - by the nature of the observed tariff
plans - be estimated significantly negative. Even though in the last part,
which discussed single variable estimations, reasons for slightly negative implicit
marginal unit prices for communication in Switzerland are provided, strong
negative magnitudes are generally not plausible, and they are probably caused
by statistical issues. Additionally, negative coefficients cause problems for the
construction of the indexes. The variables are grouped for the next set of
estimations, as described in table 2.4. This is especially helpful for units that
are rarely consumed, such as all roaming units.
The dmp discount factor remains at θ = 0.3. The estimated coefficient for the
Box-Cox specification for grouped variables is λ̂ = 0.4. Besides that, and the
grouping of variables, everything is similar to the estimation of specifications
with single consumption variables. The main change in interpretation when
grouping consumption variables is that coefficients are no longer interpretable
as price or semi-elasticity for a single unit, but rather for a group of similar
units. The trade-off at first glance is the loss of some precision by reducing the
number of explanatory variables in order to obtain more reasonable estimates
for grouped variables. The results are summarised in table 2.7.
As can be seen, grouping variables has an effect on the significance and non-
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Table 2.7: Specifications with grouped consumption variables
lin S lin O log S log O BC S BC O dmp S dmp O
Constant 35.735∗∗∗ 52.788∗∗∗ 3.458∗∗∗ 3.849∗∗∗ 6.202∗∗∗ 7.349∗∗∗ 10.539 29.220∗
(3.042) (7.018) (0.061) (0.110) (0.176) (0.361) (6.265) (12.414)
Minutes 0.001 0.032 0.000 0.001∗ 0.000 0.002∗ 1.785 6.584∗∗
(0.009) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (1.098) (2.010)
Text messages 0.012 −0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.822 0.464
(0.015) (0.040) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (1.472) (2.273)
MB 0.020∗∗∗ 0.010 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 4.925∗∗∗ 0.107
(0.002) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.611) (1.531)
Roaming minutes 0.136∗∗∗ 1.183∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 10.800∗∗∗ 10.471∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.210) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.011) (1.938) (2.599)
Roaming text 0.374∗∗ −0.024 0.007∗ −0.005 0.023∗∗ −0.015 4.722∗∗ 2.011
(0.142) (0.521) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.027) (1.789) (4.823)
Roaming MB 1.361∗∗∗ 1.867∗∗∗ 0.006 0.024∗∗∗ 0.033∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 18.345∗∗∗ 27.067∗∗∗
(0.222) (0.424) (0.004) (0.007) (0.013) (0.022) (4.247) (4.505)
Phone discount 0.190 −0.513 0.011∗∗ −0.006 0.027∗ −0.023 −0.277 −0.575∗
(0.201) (0.271) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.014) (0.206) (0.247)
N 215 115 215 115 215 115 215 115
adj. R-squared 0.662 0.357 0.425 0.245 0.533 0.291 0.650 0.462
Reset 1.597 24.574∗∗∗ 8.171∗∗∗ 7.630∗∗∗ 4.775∗∗ 10.724∗∗∗ 3.350∗ 3.368∗
Jarque-Bera 771.525∗∗∗ 90.284∗∗ 4240.838∗∗∗ 24.131∗∗∗ 275.305∗∗∗ 3.381 456.553∗∗∗ 117.020∗∗∗
Breusch-Pagan 12.142 46.053∗∗∗ 5.708 10.580 8.474 23.319∗∗ 27.821∗∗∗ 28.529∗∗∗
Note: The dependent variable in all estimations is the monthly invoiced amount. Different model specifications are estimated, as indicated in the
header: lin (Linear), log (Semi-log), BC (Box-Cox) and dmp (Decreasing marginal price). All coefficients are estimated by OLS for Swisscom (S) and
Orange (O). Significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Estimated standard errors are reported in parentheses below every
estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared, RESET test with null hypothesis ’well specified’, Jarque-Bera tests with null hypothesis
’normal residual distribution’ and stud. Breusch-Pagan test with null hypothesis ’no heteroscedasticity’ are in the second part of the table.
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negativity of coefficients, especially in the linear model. Some specific ob-
servations are listed below. In the linear model, all Swisscom coefficients are
positive, and most are significant at the 5% level. Minutes, text messages and
the discount are not significant. Minutes and text messages are mostly cov-
ered by flat rates, so it is reasonable that their coefficients are not significant.
The linear specification shows some problems with the Orange tariff system.
Only roaming units and the constant are significantly different from zero. This
may be caused by flat rates, but it does not seem realistic when inspecting
the underlying contracts. In the semi-logarithmic, BC and dmp specifications,
coefficients’ behaviour is similar to that found in the linear model. The co-
efficients for monthly discounts still do not show consistent influence over all
estimations.
The key benefit of grouping consumption variables is that estimated coeffi-
cients overall become more significant and obtain reasonable magnitudes or
levels. The explanatory power of the models decreases, especially for Orange
tariff plans. Nevertheless, because only a few estimated coefficients are neg-
ative, negative predicted invoiced amounts can be avoided. Consequently, the
index creation process is facilitated greatly by grouping variables, as shown
more clearly in 2.3.3. Whether grouping only seems helpful due to the small
sample size is an open question. Perhaps, with a larger sample size, grouping
would no longer improve estimates that much.
Compared to single variable estimation, test performance did not change sig-
nificantly. Besides the linear specification of Swisscom, all models still have
specification problems, as indicated by the RESET test. Also, the residual
distributions are problematic, as indicated by the Jarque-Bera tests. The BC-
specification has one residual distribution that is normal, which is intended
with the use of a BC-specification. As seen in the Breusch-Pagan tests, het-
eroscedasticity is less frequently present.
The main benefit of grouping variables is that the quality of the estimated
coefficients is improved. They obtain reasonable magnitudes, positive signs
and are more often significantly different from zero. All specifications perform
approximately equally; only the dmp-specification does slightly worse.
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Removing influential observations with grouped variable specifications
By grouping variables, the estimates are improved, but the specifications still
show problems with model specification, residual distribution and heteroscedas-
ticity. One way to deal with heteroscedasticity issues would obviously be to
use a heteroscedasticity consistent estimation of standard errors. However, if
that alone is done, problems with specification and residual distribution still
remain. These problems are often caused by outliers. One possible way to
prevent these problems is to remove influential observations in the underlying
data.
As with grouping, removing influential observations changes the interpretation
of the estimated prices and thus the indexes. If, for example, the 10% of the
most influential observations (or outliers) are dropped, prices will be estimated
for the broad majority of consumers. Nonetheless, extreme cases, which clearly
also belong to the real world - such as very intense roaming - are excluded.
Providers with high unit prices in these segments would benefit from a lower
index value. On the other hand, data quality might be bad, such that, for
example, a typo that changes 1 ’Roaming MMS’ to 1000 would be correctly
excluded. As long as data quality is good, removing influential observations
influences the analysis by cutting out elements of consumption.
Belsley et al. (1980) suggest DFFITS as a measure of influence. By removing
every single observation individually once from the complete sample, the influ-
ence on predicted prices compared to the observed prices for all observations
is estimated. The resulting metrically scaled influence statistic for every single
observation is compared to a cut-off value that indicates whether the obser-
vation is influential, thereby allowing for the creation of a binary distinction
with values ’influential’ or ’not influential’. The cut-off value is dependent
upon a multiplier for tuning the strictness of removal, which is set manu-
ally. For this analysis, the cut-off multiplier is set to 1.5, as suggested by
Staudte and Sheather (1990). All observations that have an influence (based
on the complete sample) are excluded, resulting in a reduced sample. This
procedure is not repeated for the reduced sample. With this configuration,
between 5% and 15% of the observations are considered influential, as shown
in table 2.8.
Compared to the estimation of grouped variables in table 2.7, several state-
2.3.
E
M
P
IR
IC
A
L
A
P
P
L
IC
A
T
IO
N
S
49
Table 2.8: Removing influential observations, grouped variables
lin S lin O log S log O BC S BC O dmp S dmp O
Constant 29.645∗∗∗ 50.830∗∗∗ 3.456∗∗∗ 3.884∗∗∗ 6.045∗∗∗ 7.308∗∗∗ 11.325∗∗ 27.130∗∗∗
(2.045) (4.879) (0.046) (0.078) (0.145) (0.256) (4.152) (7.532)
Minutes 0.011 0.066∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.004∗∗∗ 1.949∗∗ 6.301∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.697) (1.266)
Text messages 0.014 −0.018 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 1.154 2.198
(0.010) (0.028) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.927) (1.511)
MB 0.020∗∗∗ 0.002 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 3.811∗∗∗ −1.086
(0.002) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.410) (0.964)
Roaming minutes 0.092∗ 1.230∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 8.923∗∗∗ 6.450∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.251) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.013) (1.420) (1.814)
Roaming text 0.433∗∗∗ −0.831 0.008∗ −0.011 0.027∗∗ −0.050 2.400∗ 28.787
(0.122) (1.057) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.052) (1.115) (16.027)
Roaming MB 4.016∗∗ 6.936∗∗∗ 0.008 0.074∗∗∗ 0.035 0.356∗∗∗ 20.004∗∗∗ 25.687∗∗∗
(1.449) (1.667) (0.007) (0.015) (0.035) (0.082) (3.487) (3.651)
Phone discount 0.444∗∗ −0.505∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗ −0.069 −0.328∗
(0.139) (0.190) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.137) (0.159)
N 198 102 203 99 201 96 193 98
adj. R-squared 0.591 0.374 0.511 0.451 0.523 0.424 0.667 0.626
Reset 3.146∗ 0.046 5.676∗∗ 1.641 3.228∗ 0.357 3.022 0.663
Jarque-Bera 50.804∗∗ 5.476 7.962∗ 1.289 29.289∗∗∗ 3.007 25.468∗∗∗ 1.456
Breusch-Pagan 7.016 12.058 5.804 4.175 4.358 4.080 6.710 5.766
Note: The dependent variable in all estimations is the monthly invoiced amount. Different model specifications are estimated, as indicated in the
header: lin (Linear), log (Semi-log), BC (Box-Cox) and dmp (Decreasing marginal price). All coefficients are estimated by OLS for Swisscom (S) and
Orange (O). Significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Estimated standard errors are reported in parentheses below every
estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared, RESET test with null hypothesis ’well specified’, Jarque-Bera tests with null hypothesis
’normal residual distribution’ and stud. Breusch-Pagan test with null hypothesis ’no heteroscedasticity’ are in the second part of the table.
CHAPTER 2. MOBILE COMMUNICATION 50
ments about the coefficients estimated with removing influential observations
in table 2.8 can be made. First, coefficients are estimated with similar mag-
nitudes. In particular, the discounts in the linear specification become signif-
icant. One is negative, the other positive. Discounts become significant in
general.
Removing influential values, therefore, does not change significances, levels
or signs to a large extent. However, as is expected with the removal of in-
fluential observations, overall estimation performance improves. Despite the
small influence on estimated coefficients, the tests show clear improvements
for the entire estimations. The RESET test does indicate that only three
models have specification issues, compared to seven before. As seen in the
Jarque-Bera test, four estimations might have non-normally distributed resid-
uals, compared to seven before. The main improvement gained by removing
influential values is that heteroscedasticity is no longer a problem. The ad-
justed R-squared change depends on provider and specification. The estimated
coefficients, especially the t-statistics, become reliable. However, these im-
provements are ’purchased’ at quite a high cost: dropping 5% to 15% of the
observations, all of which belong to the effective consumption, if the data are
correct.
In the end, it is a question of individual preference as to whether influential
observations should be dropped in order to avoid heteroscedasticity. If no
heteroscedasticity were present and data quality were good, then no signifi-
cant benefits from removing influential observations would be obtained. As
an alternate solution, a heteroscedasticity-consistent estimation of standard
errors does not change anything in terms of the prediction of prices. This will
make the t-statistics of coefficients reliable, if the residual distributions are
normal.
Removing influential observations with single variable specifications
In the last variation of estimation, single variables are used, as in the first
set of estimations in table 2.6, and influential values are removed as before.
Again, DFFITS with a cut-off multiplier 1.5 is used, and around 5% to 10% of
observations, depending on specification and data, are excluded. The results
are summarised in table 2.9.
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Table 2.9: Removing influential observations, single variables
lin S lin O log S log O BC S BC O dmp S dmp O
Constant 31.377∗∗∗ 38.640∗∗∗ 3.436∗∗∗ 3.627∗∗∗ 6.081∗∗∗ 6.643∗∗∗ 16.994∗∗∗ 27.460∗∗∗
(1.997) (4.049) (0.045) (0.071) (0.138) (0.231) (4.308) (6.468)
Minutes fix net 0.049∗ −0.032 0.002∗∗∗ −0.000 0.003 −0.001 1.913∗ 0.091
(0.025) (0.049) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.919) (1.543)
Minutes mobile on −0.020∗∗ 0.051 −0.000∗ 0.002∗∗ −0.001∗ 0.004∗ −1.139 1.716
(0.007) (0.028) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.704) (1.254)
Minutes mobile off 0.195∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.002 0.007∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 4.565∗∗∗ 7.866∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.066) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.895) (1.308)
SMS 0.004 −0.011 0.000 −0.000 0.001 −0.000 −0.933 0.622
(0.012) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (1.077) (1.339)
MMS 0.155 4.510 0.001 0.103 0.007 0.107 3.520∗∗ 10.642∗∗
(0.205) (2.543) (0.005) (0.061) (0.015) (0.138) (1.208) (3.391)
MB 0.018∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 4.633∗∗∗ −0.791
(0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.414) (0.875)
CH minutes roaming 0.070 0.351 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.039 6.698∗∗∗ 2.743
(0.041) (0.408) (0.001) (0.007) (0.003) (0.023) (1.646) (2.416)
CH SMS roaming −0.428 0.932∗∗ −0.003 0.017∗∗∗ −0.014 0.059∗∗∗ −5.298∗∗∗ 5.970∗∗
(0.236) (0.320) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.017) (1.275) (1.790)
Roaming minutes 1.295 2.059 0.033∗∗ 0.032 0.069 0.056 7.030∗∗ 3.995
(1.067) (1.472) (0.012) (0.022) (0.075) (0.067) (2.313) (2.999)
Roaming SMS 0.455∗∗∗ −0.567 0.008∗ −0.013 0.027∗∗ 0.003 4.219∗∗∗ 2.042
(0.117) (0.904) (0.003) (0.016) (0.010) (0.019) (1.140) (4.004)
Roaming MMS 0.995 −37.678 0.344∗ −0.685 0.132 −2.858 7.312 22.812
(12.210) (33.319) (0.159) (0.395) (0.836) (1.751) (6.107) (14.558)
Roaming MB 1.066 3.542 −0.011 0.019 −0.012 0.163 12.927∗∗∗ 18.519∗∗∗
(0.601) (2.175) (0.012) (0.013) (0.042) (0.119) (3.713) (3.386)
Phone discount 0.428∗∗ −0.127 0.009∗∗ −0.002 0.029∗∗ −0.009 −0.006 −0.117
(0.130) (0.164) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.009) (0.132) (0.159)
N 191 100 197 98 188 99 197 100
adj. R-squared 0.729 0.634 0.592 0.600 0.616 0.625 0.767 0.737
Reset 2.349 1.235 5.854∗∗ 4.313∗ 4.761∗∗ 3.988∗ 11.810∗∗∗ 2.765
Jarque-Bera 24.497∗∗∗ 9.443∗∗ 11.343∗∗ 1.250 6.349∗ 6.065∗ 22.229∗∗∗ 1.484
Breusch-Pagan 10.937 13.213 16.727 12.686 13.104 12.346 25.058 13.068
Note: The dependent variable in all estimations is the monthly invoiced amount. Different model specifications are estimated, as indicated in the
header: lin (Linear), log (Semi-log), BC (Box-Cox) and dmp (Decreasing marginal price). All coefficients are estimated by OLS for Swisscom (S) and
Orange (O). Significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Estimated standard errors are reported in parentheses below every
estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared, RESET test with null hypothesis ’well specified’, Jarque-Bera tests with null hypothesis
’normal residual distribution’ and stud. Breusch-Pagan test with null hypothesis ’no heteroscedasticity’ are in the second part of the table.
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As in the single variable estimation, the estimated coefficients remain very
problematic. For example ’Roaming MMS’ is estimated as −37.678 for Or-
ange. These unrealistic estimates can be very problematic for predictions
because negative growth factors might result. The adjusted R-squared are
comparable to those in estimations in which influential observations were not
removed with single variables.
As already seen in the estimation for grouped variables, removing influential
values removes the presence of heteroscedasticity. Additionally, the Jarque-
Bera tests are still significant six times. The model specification remains an
unsolved problem, as five RESET tests are significant.
As long as the estimated coefficients do not yield consistently reasonable levels
and signs, there is no use of removing influential observations to avoid het-
eroscedasticity and to make t-statistics reliable. Perhaps with a large sample
that covers a greater number of rare consumption units, such as all roaming
categories, the combination of single variables and the removal influential ob-
servations might be reasonable. Whether removing influential observations and
single consumption variables can be a valid combination is an open question
for further research.
Index construction: linear specification with grouped variables
Section 2.3.2 is closed by summarising the most important results for spec-
ifications and estimation methods. First, estimation methods are compared,
and then the model specifications are evaluated. Finally, a linear specification
with grouped variables, without removing influential observations, is chosen to
create the indexes.
Besides the standard OLS estimation with single variables, two modifications
are applied: grouping variables and removing influential observations. Group-
ing variables results in nearly fully reasonable estimations of coefficients and
avoids large negative roaming coefficients. The cost of grouping is that unit
prices cannot be interpreted anymore for units as they are billed. But overall,
especially for the construction of indexes, the benefits of grouping clearly dom-
inate. As mentioned before, with a significantly larger sample size, grouping
might no longer be necessary.
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Removing influential variables is the second distinction in estimation meth-
ods. By removing influential observations, most heteroscedasticity issues can
be avoided, and t-statistics of estimates are reliable (if residuals are normally
distributed). Whether influential observations are removed or not is also a
question of data quality. If data quality is not very good, removing influential
observations could help to sort out bad observations (for example, typing er-
rors). But as long as data quality is not expected to be bad, dropping influential
variables cuts out a part of reality and may favour providers with specific tariff
systems over others. Presence of heteroscedasticity versus including complete
consumption is the trade-off, and as long as only indexes are the object of
interest, all observations should be considered.
For the index construction process, treating all providers with correspond-
ing tariff systems equally is preferred. Therefore, for the index calculations
afterwards, specifications with grouped variables are used, and influential ob-
servations are not removed. A specification must be chosen as the second
step.
Four model specifications were analysed. Whereas the linear specification ben-
efits from very simple interpretation of the coefficients, in the semi-log and
Box-Cox specifications, the dependent variables are transformed. Theoret-
ically, the benefit of these transformations is to have normally distributed
residuals, but this is not observed. The dmp specification discounts con-
sumption, seems reliable when influential observations are removed and may
be a reasonable way to model mobile communication prices. However, be-
cause hedonic price indexes are new in mobile communication, a simpler, more
straightforward specification should be chosen.
In the grouped variable estimations, no model specification is clearly the best
with regard to estimated coefficients and test statistics. For the index esti-
mation in section 2.3.3, the linear model will be used. It is the simplest spec-
ification and the best to interpret with marginal unit prices, which are quite
interesting in the mobile communication context. With the use of grouped
variables in a linear specification, it is not the technically best model used,
but it is the easiest to understand. When interpreting indexes, this should not
be neglected because data, model specification, estimation method and index
formula all influence the interpretation.
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For hedonic price indexes, the predictive power of a model is important. In
this analysis, the predictive power was measured by the adjusted R-squared.
Another way to control for prediction quality would be cross-validation, as an
out-of-sample measure. To compare prediction quality across specifications
with differently transformed dependent variables, the transformed dependent
variables would have to be re-transformed.
2.3.3 Constructing hedonic price indexes
In this section, double-imputed Fisher and (modified) Törnqvist indexes are
constructed to compare Swisscom and Orange prices over the quarters Q3.12,
Q4.12 and Q1.13. Linear models with grouped variables are used. First, unit
prices are estimated per provider and quarter. Then, the problems of negative
predicted prices are discussed and resolved by removing negative predictions.
In the third part, indexes are constructed and evaluated.
Model estimation over providers and time
As mentioned before, a linear specification with grouped variables is used as the
basis for the estimation of unit prices. Unit prices are estimated for three quar-
ters, Q3.12, Q4.12 and Q1.13, and three providers: Swisscom (S), Orange
(O) and the entire sample (M). The results are presented in table 2.10.
With the exception of Orange in Q1.13, the regressions have more than 30
degrees of freedom. However, there are not enough observations to create
stable results. Nonetheless, here, the aim is to illustrate how to construct
indexes. For this purpose, the sample size suffices. The explanatory power
of most estimations is acceptable, even though the number of observations is
quite small. More specific comments on coefficients are listed below.
’Minutes’ are estimated on reasonable magnitudes with mostly positive signs,
but these are not significant. ’Roaming minutes’ prices are partially estimated
to be relatively high. The same goes for ’Roaming text’ for Orange in Q1.13.
The only two variables whose coefficients are estimated significantly negative
are ’Roaming text’ and ’Phone discount’. As in subsection 2.3.2, ’Roaming
text’ is the most difficult unit group, probably due to the relatively low num-
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Table 2.10: Model estimation for index construction
Q3.12 M Q3.12 S Q3.12 O Q4.12 M Q4.12 S Q4.12 O Q1.13 M Q1.13 S Q1.13 O
Constant 43.609∗∗∗ 37.340∗∗∗ 48.899∗∗∗ 41.393∗∗∗ 32.969∗∗∗ 67.691∗∗∗ 26.550∗∗∗ 28.590∗∗∗ 21.351
(4.966) (6.692) (7.776) (4.054) (3.742) (9.880) (5.877) (4.994) (10.296)
Minutes 0.014 0.008 0.052∗ 0.012 0.010 0.038 0.005 −0.001 0.086
(0.016) (0.021) (0.024) (0.012) (0.012) (0.028) (0.015) (0.012) (0.040)
Text messages 0.024 0.067 0.002 0.016 0.019 −0.088 0.019 0.005 0.039
(0.037) (0.052) (0.048) (0.021) (0.018) (0.059) (0.022) (0.016) (0.066)
MB 0.015∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.005 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.007 0.006 0.011∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.003) (0.002) (0.011) (0.004) (0.003) (0.013)
Roaming minutes 1.564∗∗∗ 2.004∗∗∗ 0.752 0.135∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 2.743∗∗∗ 0.009 0.102∗∗ 0.221
(0.322) (0.416) (0.513) (0.029) (0.025) (0.546) (0.042) (0.037) (0.243)
Roaming text −0.092 0.040 −0.412 0.396 0.695∗ −1.235 0.783∗ 0.570∗ 4.152
(0.196) (0.213) (0.549) (0.327) (0.280) (1.297) (0.304) (0.218) (6.998)
Roaming MB 2.013∗∗∗ 1.148 6.554∗∗∗ 1.084∗∗∗ 1.093∗∗∗ 1.476∗ 6.235∗∗∗ 2.623∗∗ 5.672
(0.540) (0.577) (1.270) (0.220) (0.228) (0.598) (0.961) (0.952) (9.372)
Phone discount −0.168 −0.248 −0.375 −0.103 0.186 −1.122∗∗ 1.132∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗ 0.946
(0.247) (0.370) (0.315) (0.205) (0.265) (0.340) (0.302) (0.327) (0.509)
N 109 66 43 151 99 49 75 50 23
adj. R-squared 0.604 0.708 0.486 0.563 0.749 0.473 0.637 0.720 0.881
Note: The dependent variable in all estimations is the monthly invoiced amount. All estimations are for a quarter (Q) and a provider: entire market
(M), Swisscom (S) and Orange (O). Significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Estimated standard errors are reported in
parentheses below every estimate. The number of observations (N) and the adjusted R-squared are reported in the second part of the table.
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ber of ’Roaming text’ units consumed. How to explain and prevent negative
estimates for the phone discount is described in detail in appendix A.1.1. How-
ever, estimated negative marginal unit prices might cause negative predicted
invoiced amounts.
Removing negative predicted prices
By using the double-imputation method, only predicted, and no observed,
prices (invoiced amounts) are used to construct indexes. In the Fisher in-
dex (2.7) with implicit expenditure weights, predicted prices are aggregated.
Negative estimates of invoiced amounts are neither desired nor realistic, but
they still allow the computation of the index. Negative predictions ’vanish’
in the aggregate. It is impossible to calculate a Fisher index when a sum in
the Laspeyres or Paasche indexes, and therefore the entire index, becomes
negative. This is not the case here.
In the modified Törnqvist (2.10) index, just one negative price prediction makes
calculating an index impossible. Remember that, instead of Laspeyres and
Paasche indexes, this index uses their geometric pendants, as in formulas
(2.11) and (2.12). In both, for each observation, a growth factor is first
determined and then averaged by the geometric mean. A negative growth
factor for an invoiced amount is not realistic. Additionally, and even more im-
portantly, by using the geometric mean, 1/n is in the potency, which is smaller
than 1. The mean would not be a real number anymore, which would make
index calculation impossible.
For the following index calculations, the (only) one negative predicted price is
excluded for Törnqvist, as well as for Fisher. Theoretically, it could have been
left in the data for Fisher. But it is more convenient to compare differently
calculated indexes when they are based on identical data. Removal is not a very
elegant approach, but it is necessary to calculate the Törnqvist index. In this
context, it is very important to have well-specified models with non-negative
estimated coefficients.
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Chained Fisher and Törnqvist price indexes
Based on the reduced data, Fisher and Törnqvist indexes are formed for every
quarter. The market index (M) with all observations of each quarter is equal to
100 points. Then, indexes for Swisscom (S) and Orange (O) are constructed
for each quarter, as shown in table 2.11. Fisher indexes are on the left half of
the table, and Törnqvist indexes are on the right. All indexes are constructed
as described in the theoretical section.
For the interpretation of the results, it is necessary to keep the model speci-
fication and the estimation method in mind. The effect of grouping variables
should have minor effects on the interpretations. Also, using a linear model
specification does not complicate the interpretation of the index, which is a
reason to choose both. A ’dmp’ model specification, for example, would com-
plicate the interpretation significantly. Remember that double-imputation is
applied, so all prices used are predicted and not observed. With single impu-
tation, the prices that can be observed would be used, and the hypothetical
ones be predicted. However, comparing equally constructed values is pre-
ferred.
The Fisher index describes a provider’s price level relative to the market index
(all observations within a quarter). Prices or the total costs of the aggregated
consumption are compared. Observations with high consumption obtain au-
tomatically higher weights. In contrast, the Törnqvist index measures the
relative price for the average consumer. All consumers receive an identical
weight through the use of the geometric means of growths factors. In this
way, single observations cannot have such a high influence on the indexes as
those with high consumption in the Fisher index.
Keep in mind that the sample is not entirely representative for Switzerland;
the index values in table 2.11 are only valid for the underlying sample.4 The
4Additionally, the indexes are based on random variables, such as consumed units and billed
amounts, so an indicator of the statistical reliability or significance of the indexes should be
provided. This could be done with confidence intervals. But applying confidence intervals
to (double-imputed superlative) hedonic price indexes is not state of the art, even though
it is statistically desirable. Confidence intervals could be estimated by a non-parametric
approach, as in Beer (2007), who estimated confidence intervals for elementary indexes.
The general approach would be to use bootstrapping (or a similar method) to estimate the
hedonic function for every bootstrapped sample. Then, based on the complete data set, an
index value is predicted for each estimated hedonic function. This results in a distribution of
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Table 2.11: Indexes with base period t
Fisher Törnqvist
M S O M S O
Q3.12 100.00 95.35 105.14 100.00 93.93 102.98
Q4.12 100.00 92.69 137.17 100.00 91.38 115.25
Q1.13 100.00 98.25 121.62 100.00 100.20 111.50
Note: Swisscom (S) and Orange (O) prices are compared to the entire
sample or market (M). All price comparisons are made within one of the
quarterly periods, Q3.12, Q4.12 and Q1.13. The Fisher index is reported
on the left and the Törnqvist index on the right.
interpretation of the index values can now begin. First and most importantly,
overall Swisscom prices are lower than those of Orange. This result contradicts
the official statistics of the Federal Office of Communications, in which Orange
is clearly less expensive for small and medium consumption profiles, and in
which, for intense consumption, an approximately equal price for both providers
is reported. In Q3.12, Swisscom prices with 95.35 index points are about ten
percent lower than Orange prices. In Q4.12 and Q1.13, there are quite large
differences between Orange and Swisscom. Keep in mind that in Q1.13, only
a few Orange observations are available. Note that in the Törnqvist index in
Q1.13, both Swisscom and Orange obtain a higher price level than the market
index (M). This is caused by the OLS estimation and an additional indicator
that the number of observations is too small.
However, it is far more interesting to compare the differences between Fisher
and Törnqvist indexes. The Törnqvist index estimates price levels more smoothly.
The estimated index values are closer to each other in the Törnqvist index.
This shows that single observations with intense consumption influence Fisher
more strongly than they do Törnqvist. Especially in Q4.12, the difference
between Orange and Swisscom in the Fisher index is twice as large as with
Törnqvist. The trends in both indexes are the same, but the levels are different.
price indexes. Thus, for example, for a 95% confidence interval, the 2.5% and the 97.5%
quantiles are non-parametrically determined. Because the focus of this first application of
hedonic price indexes for mobile communication services is on elementary issues, such as
the model specification and the index formulas, confidence intervals are not reported here.
How to optimally estimate confidence intervals for these indexes is an open area for further
research. Note that determining confidence intervals parametrically or theoretically is a
complex issue because the indexes are sums, products and means of random variables with
unknown (joint) distributions.
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This result requires further analyses with a larger sample.
In the representation above, each quarter’s full sampleM is chosen as the base
period. As described in section 2.2.3, chaining is applied to have only one single
base period. Chaining is chosen over constructing indexes directly between
different providers and periods. In this way, only period-specific consumption
is included in the calculation process of indexes. In table 2.12, the full sample
of Q3.12 is the unique base period.
Table 2.12: Indexes with base period 0
Fisher Törnqvist
M S O M S O
Q3.12 100.00 95.35 105.14 100.00 93.93 102.98
Q4.12 83.23 77.14 114.16 92.70 84.71 106.84
Q1.13 82.53 81.10 100.38 91.93 92.04 102.50
Note: Swisscom (S) and Orange (O) prices are compared to the entire
sample or market (M). All price comparisons are relative to the entire
market (M) in Q3.12, thus, the price development over time is observ-
able. The Fisher index is reported on the left and the Törnqvist index
on the right.
Note that the differences in levels (index points) are not the same in the
chained version in table 2.12 as in the unchained one. This is because all of
the indexes in table 2.11 are chained or multiplied by an index value that is
not equal to one. This changes the ’scales’ of later periods.
Considering all model specifications, estimation variants, index formulas, index
methods and representation forms, a very large number of different price in-
dexes could have been constructed. The applied configuration seemed to be
the best for this application of hedonic price indexes for mobile communication
services. Note that in ’reality’, years would likely be better time periods, but
the underlying data favoured working with quarters.
Which index formula, Fisher, modified Törnqvist or some other, is applied in
the end is, like every single choice in this analysis, a trade-off. The greatest
weakness revealed in this empirical section is that price index values vary widely.
Whether this is caused by sensitive model specifications or the small number
of observations is an open question for further research. Because the sample
is not representative, among other reasons, the indexes cannot be compared
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to the OECD method. Nonetheless, an attempt to compare both methods
and their results is made in appendix A.1.2.
2.3.4 The influence of the consumers’ age
The hedonic function and its specifications allow a broad set of detailed anal-
yses related to communication prices. The model, which is set up to predict
prices, can explain the basic composition of invoiced amounts dependent on
consumed units. Because the invoiced amount is not dependent only on con-
sumption, other variables can also help to explain it. Consider, for example, all
special specifications of contracts and customer consultation. These influence
the invoiced amount as well.
Contracts contain different specifications for different demographic subgroups.
The most price-relevant specifications are made for young consumers and stu-
dents. By simply adding the age of the consumer into the specification, the
prices are also evaluated according to the age of the consumer. The esti-
mated coefficients for age are significantly different from zero, thus the age
of the consumer is - as expected - relevant to the invoiced amount and, con-
sequently, the indexes. The open question is how to quantify this difference in
Swiss francs.
Again, specifications with grouped variables are used, mainly because the in-
terest lies in coefficients. Influential observations are removed to reduce het-
eroscedasticity and thereby obtain normally distributed residuals. The added
variable ’Age’ denotes the age in years of the contract holder. The models are
again estimated for both providers and observations from Q3.12, Q4.12 and
Q1.13. The results are summarised in table 2.13. This regression is similar to
the so-called time-dummy method for the creation of hedonic price indexes.
With the time-dummy method, instead of using index formulas and predicted
prices, the specifications are complemented with a dummy for a time period
or provider. The estimated coefficients for these dummies are then used to
create the index.
’Age’ is significantly positive in all estimations. The residual distributions for
Swisscom estimations are not normal. Only the Box-Cox specification shows
normally distributed residuals for Swisscom. The adjusted R-squared do not
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Table 2.13: Impact of age on the invoiced amount
lin S lin O log S log O BC S BC O dmp S dmp O
Constant −13.574∗∗ 22.058 2.681∗∗∗ 3.401∗∗∗ 3.512∗∗∗ 5.791∗∗∗ −40.338∗∗∗ −2.390
(5.126) (14.479) (0.112) (0.233) (0.326) (0.745) (5.793) (15.603)
Minutes 0.011 0.040∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.004∗∗∗ 1.774∗∗ 6.017∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.593) (1.352)
Text messages 0.016 0.032 0.000∗ 0.001 0.001∗ 0.003 1.226 3.018
(0.008) (0.034) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.806) (1.786)
MB 0.021∗∗∗ 0.005 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 5.376∗∗∗ 0.057
(0.002) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.358) (1.056)
Roaming minutes 0.091∗∗ 1.206∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 7.887∗∗∗ 7.070∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.253) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.013) (1.212) (1.851)
Roaming text 0.445∗∗∗ −0.599 0.008∗∗ −0.009 0.026∗∗ −0.035 3.772∗∗∗ 1.713
(0.103) (1.048) (0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.020) (0.953) (6.170)
Roaming MB 3.621∗∗ 4.516 0.000 0.058∗∗ 0.009 0.225∗∗∗ 16.922∗∗∗ 23.101∗∗∗
(1.217) (2.387) (0.006) (0.018) (0.030) (0.057) (3.056) (3.696)
Phone discount 0.269∗ −0.582∗∗ 0.009∗∗ −0.010∗∗ 0.026∗∗ −0.029∗∗ −0.033 −0.448∗∗
(0.122) (0.191) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.010) (0.117) (0.170)
Age 1.873∗∗∗ 1.062∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.052∗ 1.827∗∗∗ 0.890∗
(0.214) (0.475) (0.004) (0.008) (0.013) (0.025) (0.184) (0.401)
N 193 101 200 99 195 98 195 97
adj. R-squared 0.720 0.313 0.642 0.411 0.664 0.455 0.788 0.579
Jarque-Bera 31.081∗∗∗ 4.328 22.500∗∗∗ 0.995 2.577 2.878 17.057∗∗∗ 1.968
Breusch-Pagan 11.895 13.883 8.171 14.137 13.361 9.742 15.449 4.967
Note: The dependent variable in all estimations is the monthly invoiced amount. Different model specifications are estimated, as indicated in the header:
lin (Linear), log (Semi-log), BC (Box-Cox) and dmp (Decreasing marginal price). All coefficients are estimated by OLS for Swisscom (S) and Orange
(O). Significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Estimated standard errors are reported in parentheses below every estimate.
The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared, Jarque-Bera tests with null hypothesis ’normal residual distribution’ and stud. Breusch-Pagan
test with null hypothesis ’no heteroscedasticity’ are in the second part of the table.
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change significantly by adding ’Age’.
These results show that consumers tend to pay 1 to 2 CHF more per additional
year of age. There are various reasons for this. First and most importantly,
providers in Switzerland offer special discounts to young people and students.
The age cap is usually 26 or 27 years. Part of the gap between young and old
can therefore be deducted from different contracts. Additionally, young people
usually have a lower income, and invoiced amounts for mobile communication
can be a serious portion of their expenditures. Substitution of cheaper units
may explain the result, like substituting SMS with Whatsapp messages. The
estimated coefficient seems to be quite large. However, consider that most
observations are from students or employees of the university. The age of the
consumers is between 19 and 50 years, with most between 19 and 26. In a
representative sample, the estimated coefficient is likely to be smaller.
The fact that young consumers have lower invoiced amounts could partially
explain the relatively high prices of Orange in the indexes of the previous sub-
section. The average age of customers in the sample, weighted by the number
of bills supplied, is 24.33 for Swisscom and 28.20 for Orange. Consequently,
fewer Orange consumers benefit from special student discounts. This could
cause some of the differences between the two providers’ prices. Whether
the indexes should be adjusted for the age is an issue for further research.
One possible solution is to draw up a sample with similar distributions for the
consumers’ age for all providers. Alternatively, the influence of age on the
invoiced amounts could be estimated, as shown. Then, a correction factor for
asymmetric age distributions among providers could be applied on the indexes.
As a third possibility, indexes could be estimated for demographic subgroups,
such as ’student’, ’adult’ and ’business’, instead of different consumption in-
tensities, as is done with the profile method.
Applying hedonic price indexes on mobile communication services yields pos-
sibilities for additional analyses of tariff plans. Governments, for example,
might be interested in issues that disadvantage consumers, such as rollover
contracts.5 Comparing and predicting prices for very precisely specified indi-
viduals or groups could be an interesting option for price comparison websites.
5Rollover contracts are contracts that are automatically extended after the minimal du-
ration - unless they are explicitly terminated. My attempts to estimate the impact of rollover
contracts on invoiced amounts yielded inconsistent results.
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And, as a last example, contract-specific variables could be added to the es-
timations (such as the type or name) for providers to analyse their own tariff
system.
2.4 Summary
This summary is divided into three parts. Firstly, the key findings are sum-
marised in subsection 2.4.1. After discussing the results, an outlook is given
in 2.4.2. Finally, in subsection 2.4.3, important practical aspects are men-
tioned.
2.4.1 Results
In this analysis, hedonic price indexes are applied to mobile communication ser-
vices to adjust explicit service prices (invoiced amounts) to actually consumed
units. The results from the empirical section show that overall, Orange is
more expensive than Swisscom, which contradicts the official statistics. Even
though the sample is not representative, it is shown that the profile method
with minimal-cost contracts is not capable of accurate estimation and com-
parison of mobile communication prices.
Disadvantages of the profile method
In the OECD method, several important price-relevant variables, such as roam-
ing, discounts on phones, demographic discounts and any other special nuances
in contracts, are not implemented. Using hedonic price indexes allows us to
capture all of these variables completely. Moreover, customer consultation is
included by putting inefficient contracts at a disadvantage. The official method
is simple to apply, but is a far less accurate estimator for mobile communication
prices.
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The hedonic function
The basic idea behind the model and the hedonic function is that, through a
contract, consumed units are transformed into the invoiced amount. With this
approach, all contracts can be treated equally. The only aspect of consumption
that could not have been included was geographic network coverage, as well
as partially the speed of data connections.
Besides these elements, all invoiced amounts are evaluated according to the
effectively observed consumption. No assumption of perfectly rational and
informed consumers is made. If a consumer is on a bad contract, it is included
as this in the price index. Therefore, it does not suffice if a provider has a
great contracts, but the consumers are not using them.
Model specification and estimation method
The hedonic function is specified in four variants: linear, semi-logarithmic,
Box-Cox and decreasing marginal price. These specifications are estimated
without modification, with grouped variables and without influential observa-
tions.
The linear specification allows for the direct interpretation of coefficients as
unit prices, which helps validate the results. Based on known contracts, cor-
responding prices per unit and fixed cost, expectations about estimated unit
prices can be formed for validation. The semi-log and Box-Cox specifications
are mainly used to adjust for typical issues in price distributions.
Without any modification, especially rarely consumed variables obtain unre-
alistic and non-significant estimated coefficients. By grouping variables, the
estimated coefficients can be improved greatly because they obtain reasonable
magnitudes. Especially rarely observed roaming units disturb single variable
estimations. Grouping variables solves this problem. Removing influential
observations removes heteroscedasticity and makes standard errors reliable.
Consequently, the coefficients and the corresponding significances can be in-
terpreted. The explanatory power of all specifications and estimation methods
is sufficient, but it can and should be improved. The Swisscom tariff plans are
generally better explained than the tariff plans of Orange. The major reason
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for this is the number of observations, which is twice as large for Swisscom
than for Orange.
No specification outperforms any other. Thus, for the index construction,
the linear specification with grouped variables is used. The well estimated
coefficients particularly support index construction. Influential values are not
removed for index construction because all consumption should be included
in the price index. Additionally, the focus is on optimal predictions, not on
estimated coefficients.
Index formulas and values
Double-imputed Fisher and Törnqvist price indexes are used. The motivation
for using double imputation is to compare equal to equal, that is, predicted
prices with predicted prices and not observed ones.
Two index formulas are introduced. The first is a Fisher index, which describes
the relative price of the aggregated consumption. This formula contains im-
plicit weighting, which means that observations with intense consumption ob-
tain relatively more weight. The second formula, a modified Törnqvist index,
describes price development for an average consumer, meaning that every con-
sumer or bill obtains the same weight.
Because the underlying database is not representative and contains a major-
ity of bills from students, the results are only valid for this sample. Swisscom
shows lower price levels than Orange over all estimated indexes. This is contra-
dicts the official statistics, in which Orange is - especially for small consumption
profiles - clearly cheaper than Swisscom. The extent to which this result is
dependent on the methods or differences in the sample base is unknown. The
results need to be verified by a representative sample.
In conclusion, hedonic price index methods can be adapted to mobile com-
munication. This project was very general, and specific problems still need to
be solved; more details are offered in the outlook in subsection 2.4.2. Also,
practical issues need improvements as described in subsection 2.4.3.
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2.4.2 Outlook
As this is a first application of hedonic price indexes on mobile communication
services, some problems remain unsolved. Current limitations are discussed
and further research is suggested in this outlook.
Implementation of service quality
The general model approach is to apply hedonic price indexes not for quality,
but for quantity adjustment. On a theoretical level, the quality of connec-
tions remains an unsolved problem. The geographical coverage of networks is
especially difficult to include.
If good information about the connectivity and speed with different contracts
is given, this could be added to the linear model. An interaction term between
’MB’ and ’Speed’, for example, could suffice. How this or these interaction
terms would be specified is open. Controlling for geographical network cov-
erage seems much more complicated. What is understood by coverage, how
it is measured and why it is important to consumers should be precisely de-
fined. Additional, related questions include: Does an abandoned valley need
connectivity? If so, how should it be weighted compared to a city centre? How
should the quality of the connection influence such a measure? How should
network quality be related to single observations, regarding their region-specific
consumption?
Non-linear and non-parametric model specifications
Only linear specifications have been used so far. Consider the full range of
existing contracts in the tariff systems. There are prepaid contracts without
any fixed cost or flat rates with high fixed and no marginal cost. The relation of
the invoiced amount to consumption within a provider’s tariff system is unlikely
to be linear. Non-linear functional forms could be viable. This modification
would also require alternate estimation methods, so it is an area open for study.
Also, non-parametric methods to predict prices could improve predictive power.
The fact that non-parametric methods usually require less specifications could
be especially useful.
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Prediction performance analysis
The model specifications and estimation methods were evaluated according to
the predicted coefficients, its significances and validities, residual distribution
and heteroscedasticity. The explanatory power of specifications and estimation
methods was monitored by the adjusted R-squared. However, the predictive
power is key for hedonic price indexes using the double-imputation method.
The indexes are based entirely on predicted prices, so these should be as
accurate as possible.
The adjusted R-squared is an in-sample measure. Out-of-sample measures,
such as cross-validation, could provide additional insight about prediction per-
formance. Additionally, confidence intervals could and should be estimated.
These are not applied in this study because the focus is on more basic issues,
such as the hedonic function, its specification and the index formula.
Negative predicted prices
So far, the few prices that have been predicted to be negative have been re-
moved. In the Fisher index, they are not a big problem. They vanish in the
aggregate. In the modified Törnqvist index, negative growth factors might
occur, and this does not allow the computation of an index. Negative predic-
tions can be avoided by well-specified models and resulting positive predictions.
Grouping variables solves a large part of this problem, because rare roaming
observations are less relevant.
I did not find a more elegant method to handle this issue other than deletion.
Perhaps further research will reveal a better solution.
Comparison to profile-based indexes
The double-imputed indexes can be compared to the minimal-cost approach
of the Federal Office of Communications (2013). Through the characteristics
method, an attempt to do so is made in appendix A.1.2. The main problem is
that estimated unit prices of the hedonic indexes are based on the entire spec-
trum of units, whereas the official consumption profiles only contain minutes
and text messages.
CHAPTER 2. MOBILE COMMUNICATION 68
Even when the profiles are complemented by megabytes, roaming and dis-
counts on phones are still excluded. Before comparing hedonic indexes based
on complete consumption vectors to limited consumption profiles, as suggested
by the OECD (2010), some problems need to be discussed. How should sub-
samples be formed for profile-specific price estimates? Are the given profiles
realistic, or should they be completed by roaming units and phone discounts?
Do the presented model specifications and estimation methods perform sys-
tematically poorly with the characteristics method, or is this caused by the
reduced profiles or the small sample size?
Demographic and consumption-specific indexes
If a large and representative data sample is available, it could be interesting
to compare not only prices across providers and over time, but also across
different groups. Demographic splits could be made according to age groups
or other categories, such as ’student’, ’working’ or ’retired’. Consumption
splits, similar to the profiles in official statistics, can be done in a wide variety.
Also, more specific consumption aspects, such as roaming or phone discounts,
can be analysed with this approach. Recall that the age of the consumers has
an impact on the indexes. Consequently, the distribution of the consumers’
age across observations from all providers should be similar.
Data traffic and unit substitution
In the past decade, the introduction of data traffic in mobile communication
has greatly altered consumption behaviour. Minutes and SMS can be sub-
stituted with data traffic (MB) with applications like Whatsapp or Skype. If
data in a contract are cheap, or wireless LAN is available, costly units can be
substituted with free data or at least data with a flat rate.
Motivated by this change, the consumer survey contains questions about usage
frequencies for different types of applications. Because this sample contains
a short time dimension, substitution behaviour could not be observed over
several years. No surprising or unexpected results are obtained. Nevertheless,
in a sample with a wider time interval, any effects of substitution on invoiced
amounts could be verified.
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2.4.3 Manual
This project is a first encounter with hedonic price indexes for mobile com-
munication. As in every empirical project, there are some practical problems.
In this last part of the conclusion, the most important ’practical’ experiences
that somehow did not belong to any previous section are shared.
Firstly, questions surrounding the sample and sampling process will be dis-
cussed extensively. Then, we take a closer look at the phone price discount
and the consumer survey. Finally, billed services of other companies, the im-
plementation of new units, the scaling of units and incomplete information are
discussed.
Sampling frequency, size and source
In this project, quarters were chosen as periods, mainly because it is very
difficult to obtain phone bills from more than a year ago. It is even more
difficult to obtain all the information needed for the calculation of the phone
discount as price paid and market prices of older phone types. In official
statistics years are used as periods, which is reasonable. Providers usually
change their tariff plans in yearly intervals. If the goal is ’continuous’ price
monitoring, data should be sampled at least once a year.
The sample size is another very important aspect. If sampled directly from
consumers, a larger sample is more costly. Sampling cost can be reduced by
grouping variables. Not only does the number of degrees of freedom increase,
but also the rarely consumed units, such as ’Roaming MMS’, lose influence
over the estimated coefficients and cause fewer problems. All frequently con-
sumed units’ estimated prices remained overall stable with 40 or more degrees
of freedom. Beyond 40 degrees of freedoms, even estimates for frequently
consumed units become highly problematic.
I cannot offer an optimal sample size for hedonic price indexes in mobile com-
munication, but there are some indicators for a lower boundary. Fifty observa-
tions per provider and period might be theoretically sufficient, but for official
statistics, it is clearly not enough in my experience. Based on my work with
this project, I do not think that anything beyond 100 degrees of freedom will
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result in reliable estimations. Even the ’large’ sub-samples, with 200 or more
estimations, may not be enough. As mentioned in the beginning, there is a
trade-off between sample size and sampling cost. One way to eliminate sam-
pling cost would be to sample bills directly from the providers, which could be
possible for the government.
One should keep in mind that the underlying model puts contracts that are
relatively expensive at a disadvantage. Therefore, poor customer consultation
is punished by the index. Every provider is conscious of this, so they might
deliver a biased sample. If a sample from providers is used, it is important to
indicate precisely how bills are to be randomly selected. This could be done by
giving the providers a set of phone numbers and months. In addition to the
bills, information about phone discounts is needed, namely which phone was
sold when and for how much. It seems very likely that providers have stored
this information.
The consumers’ age influences the implicit service prices and, consequently,
the indexes. If the sample is large and the distribution of consumers similar
among all providers, this problem is solved. If asymmetries among providers are
present, one has to consider either the creation of indexes for different types
of consumers or the application of a correction factor to the indexes.
Phone price discount and consumer survey
Regardless of where bills are sampled from, information about the phone dis-
count is not included. Quite a bit of the sampling process has to do with
obtaining the variables about the price of the phone sold by the provider and
the date it was sold. I decided to embed the sampling of these two variables
into a consumer survey with further questions about phone type, consumption
behaviour and demographic variables.
However, the answers about price and purchase date are often estimates.
Therefore, a precision indicator variable is added to the survey. As a result,
most people indicated that they were certain about the price they paid. Dif-
ficulties occur when the purchase date is several years before. Firstly, people
do not remember the date and price precisely. Secondly, it is difficult to elab-
orate the average market price of a phone from a purchase made a long time
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ago.
As an alternative to the market price at the purchase date, the current average
market price could be used. The reasoning is that consumers pay a part of this
discount back to the provider. Especially in contracts with a two-year minimal
duration, the difference of the average market price between purchase date
and the end of the contract can be huge.
Incomplete information, special and new services
Bills may not contain complete information. Firstly, scaling can be a problem,
as we have seen. Variables can be adjusted, as shown for Orange minutes, but
this is not desirable. Secondly, bills often do not contain any quantities, but
these can be obtained through the consumers’ online account. The quantities
are provided by Swisscom up on request in the online account, but only for the
past six months. Bills from some Sunrise contracts did not contain the data
traffic used.
As mentioned in the data description, special services are excluded from the
model and the corresponding estimations. Special services excluded are all
services consumed from other companies, such as purchases over SMS or
costly hot-lines. There are also contract specifications that directly affect the
invoiced amount. Swisscom, for example, provides an additional discount for
consumers who already have a contract for TV, internet and landline phones
with them. These kinds of discounts were included in the analysis because
they affect the price for the mobile communication services. One might argue
that these discounts should be excluded because of ’fairness’ across providers
(not all of whom might provide landline services).
However, I think it is correct to implement these discounts, because they ex-
plicitly affect mobile communication prices, and not the prices of TV, internet
or landline communication. Additionally, if these discounts were to be ex-
cluded, other discounts should also be excluded, such as those for students
or young people. I think including all discounts from a provider that directly
concern mobile communication prices is most consistent.
Finally, technical progress in mobile communication is relatively rapid. Units
like SMS and MMS might disappear because all text communication may come
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to data traffic. Or new units might be introduced, such as very fast data traffic
packages for a certain time period or amount. Units that are newly introduced
during a period cannot be compared to older periods because these units did
not exist then. Through chaining, this problem is partially resolved, and only
the index between the period before and the period during the introduction of
the new good is problematic. The most convenient way to handle this problem
is to exclude this service from the introduction period and deduct its cost from
the invoiced amount.
Chapter 3
Kilometer Price Index for
Public Transport
In this chapter, a price index concept for public transport is presented. A
modified Laspeyres index describes the price development of an averagely con-
sumed kilometer. It is applied to Swiss Federal Railways data from 2007 to
2011.
After an introduction to Swiss public transport in section 3.1, the index is de-
ducted in section 3.2 and illustrated through data in section 3.3. A conclusion
follows in section 3.4. This chapter is the earliest part of the thesis, and it is
based on Seger (2012).
3.1 Tariff plans in Swiss public transport
As noted by Brachinger (2011), price measurement in Swiss public transport
does yield problems, due to tariff plans. When purchasing a single ticket for
a train journey, the service or quantity consumed can be easily related to the
price. Contrariwise, a very successful and often purchased ticket is the GA
travelcard (Generalabonnement, abonnement général). The GA travelcard
is a flat-rate tariff plan for all public transport for one person over a year.
Consequently, the price of the GA is independent of consumption. There are
other tariff plans that fall in between paying for every single ticket individually
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and purchasing a GA. The most popular one is the half-fare travelcard, which
gives a 50% discount on every ticket purchased.
The Swiss Federal Railways (SBB, CFF) is the main provider on interregional
routes. Regional routes are covered by local suppliers and tariff unions. These
local suppliers and tariff unions usually follow the federal tariffs, but also offer
additional options to pay for travelling. Several tariff plans or even tariff sys-
tems exist in Swiss public transport. In sum, for every route, different tariff
plans can be used to pay the journey.
Specific scientific literature on public transport price indexes is difficult to find.
In addition, providers do not communicate how they calculate or determine
price changes. Even technical manuals from statistical offices do not contain
public transport-specific information, and one has to rely on verbal explana-
tions. As in both other chapters, either hedonic indexes or consumption profiles
could be used to compare prices. The Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2011a)
applies a method similar to consumption profiles in the formation of represen-
tative routes for the Swiss consumer price index (CPI).6 Representative routes
are not an optimal choice because a trip on a given route can be purchased
under different tariff plans. Subsequently, the price for one route cannot be
determined unambiguously. Hedonic price indexes, on the other hand, would
certainly yield relatively precise price estimates for these tariff systems. How-
ever, the quality of the currently available data is not sufficient.
For public transport, a third possibility is chosen: measuring the price of a
representative or average kilometer. The price for a kilometer is at first glance
more like a characteristic number than an index. But in the end, it is based on
possibly the most famous concept in price statistics; the Laspeyres price index.
The method chosen has two advantages over others. Firstly, it uses data that
are available and do not need to be sampled. Secondly, the method finally
applied to describe the price development for an average or representative
kilometer is plausible for a broad public and therefore easy to communicate.
Most indexes or price communications in the press are not explained very
well. In this project, index plausibility was a main target, also because it was
6In the manual cited above, no public transport-specific information is given. The infor-
mation about how the Swiss Federal Statistical Office estimates public transport prices is
based on verbal explanations. They are from a member of the office who is involved in the
construction of public transport elementary price indexes for the Swiss CPI.
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a joint project with Swiss Federal Railways. Consumers and politics should
understand the measure, especially when it yields unexpected results, such as
price decreases.
In section 3.2, the index concept is developed. Requirements of such an in-
dex are formulated and then the desired attributes are discussed. Two issues
are important in this context. Firstly, multiple tariff plans offer different ways
to pay for trips. Secondly, the effective consumption cannot be deducted
from ticket sales because of the underlying tariff plans and their characteris-
tics.
The concept is applied on data from the Swiss Federal Railways in section
3.3. An index that describes the implicit price development of an average
kilometer travelled between 2007 and 2011 is developed. By adjusting price
development to travelled kilometers, tariff increases are estimated to be sys-
tematically lower than they have been up to now. Additionally, in years without
any official tariff change, changes in implicit prices can be observed. This hap-
pens because the implicit prices are not only dependent on the tariff, but also
on consumption.
A summary follows in section 3.4.
3.2 Price index concept for an averagely travelled kilo-
meter
In this section, the price index concept is presented. Firstly, in 3.2.1, the
creation process is illustrated by summarising the requirements and desired at-
tributes of the index. The results of this discussion are related to the Laspeyres
price index concept, discussed in subsection 3.2.2. A formal description of the
index is offered in 3.2.3.
3.2.1 Desired attributes of the index
The initial position in this joint project with the Swiss Federal Railways was to
create a price index for passenger traffic. The Swiss Federal Railways specified
neither a desired index concept nor a representation form. Therefore, first,
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the requirements that the index should suffice to are defined. Based on these
requirements, the desired attributes of the index are deducted.
The requirements of the index are:
• Price development in public transport is frequently discussed in the media
and politics. Consequently, the index should be comprehensible to the
public. It should describe the price development of passenger traffic.
• The diversity of tariff plans in public transport is huge. Without further
specifications, different types of tickets, and thus their prices, cannot
be compared. Nevertheless, all ticket types, and especially their prices,
must be included consistently.
• Public transport in Switzerland is faced with continuously increasing de-
mand. The problem with standard price index formulas with constant
spending shares is that they fail to identify actual consumption when
tariff plans are present. In the case of a GA travelcard, for example,
one GA sold does not indicate anything about how many journeys are
made with it. A weighting scheme that represents actual consumption
is required.
• Finally, quality changes over time should be included. The main changes
are that transfers become faster and more comfortable trains are in use.
Based on the requirements stated above, the desired attributes of the index
are defined as follows:
• Because of public interest, the resulting index should be easily compara-
ble to the Swiss CPI. Consumers, politicians and the media should be able
to compare public transport prices to general price development. The
Swiss CPI is on the highest aggregation level a Laspeyres price index,
see Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2011a). This concept is adapted
for the public transport index.
• Ticket prices need to be implemented consistently. Because for some
tickets, such as the GA, consumed distance and price paid are not re-
lated, kilometers are used as goods. Therefore, the implicit price per
kilometer travelled (with a given ticket) is considered as price from now
on, and not the explicit price paid for a ticket. Consequently, all prices
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are normalised to kilometers and related to consumption.
• The index should describe the price development of an average trip and
therefore represent all ticket types in proportion to their consumption.
Therefore, as weights for each ticket type, it is not expenditure shares,
as in standard Laspeyres indexes, but rather the proportion of kilometers
travelled with the specific ticket type to total kilometers travelled. Note
that a simple division of aggregated revenue by aggregated kilometers
does not yield a useful result. Every price index has to compare the
prices for a constant basket or consumption profile. Comparing prices
of distinct baskets is the same as comparing the prices of apples and
oranges.
• Quality changes must be included. Quality in public transport is influ-
enced by various dimensions, such as safety, space available, hygiene in
the toilets or food served. However, by far the most important aspect
of quality is probably travel time.
Whereas quality can not generally be included in a Laspeyres-type index, travel
time can be to some extent. The Swiss Federal Railways uses so-called ’tariff
kilometers’ in pricing. Basically, the price of a transfer from station A to B is, in
the case of a single ticket, a linear transformation of the distance measured by
’geographical kilometers’. On most routes, tariff and geographical kilometers
are identical. However, specific routes require major investments, like tunnels
through the Alps or connections between cities. One possibility for providers to
adjust the price on such specific routes is to increase the corresponding tariff
kilometers artificially. The most famous Swiss example is Zurich-Berne, for
which the tariff kilometers are significantly higher than the geographical ones.
Therefore, if travel time is reduced and, as a result, quality increases on a
route, tariff kilometers also increase. Aggregated tariff kilometers will be used
to quantify consumption. By using tariff instead of geographical kilometers,
partial quality adjustment is implemented.
3.2.2 Adjusting a Laspeyres price index to tariff plans
Based on the discussion in 3.2.1, an index similar to a Laspeyres price index can
be created. For this purpose, the most important results from the discussion
CHAPTER 3. PUBLIC TRANSPORT 78
are summarised.
1. The scale of consumption is kilometers. Each kilometer is ’consumed’
with a certain tariff plan or ticket type.
2. All prices are normalised to kilometers.
3. All kilometers consumed over a year constitute the consumption basket.
The weights for the index are based on the corresponding distribution.
4. An immense number of different tickets and travelcards exist. Every
single journey between two specific stations is an independent good.
Therefore, tickets are classified by type and assigned to accounts, as
described in 3.3.1.
As discussed in the previous subsection, the Laspeyres price index (3.1) is used
as a basic framework. It is the most popular concept in price statistics, as seen
in International Labour Office (2004), Fahrmeir et al. (2007) or Diewert, E.
(2009). The Laspeyres index describes the price development of a basket of
goods between two periods t = 0, 1. The change of price p of every good i
from period 0 to 1 is weighted with the expenditure share s of this good. The
expenditure share is the proportion of spendings for good i to total spendings
for the basket, usually in t = 0.
P0,1 =
n∑
i=1
s0i ·
p1i
p0i
(3.1)
Kilometers are used as basic units and implicit prices per kilometer as prices.
A ticket type i is a group of similar tickets. For each ticket type, monthly
aggregated revenue and kilometers travelled are known. The implicit price per
kilometer of a certain ticket type can therefore be determined for every month.
As mentioned, using expenditure shares is a problem when multiple tariff plans
are present. Therefore ’kilometer shares’, instead of expenditure shares, are
used. In the following subsection, the kilometer price index (KMI) is specified
based on the Laspeyres concept.
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3.2.3 The kilometer price index
Below, the KMI for public transport is formally specified. The Laspeyres index
(3.1) is adjusted to the desired attributes stated in 3.2.2. The index to describe
price development within a year is developed on a monthly basis. December
of the previous year serves as the base period. All of the months of the year
are compared to this base period.
First, the implicit price of a kilometer travelled with ticket type i at month t is
defined as pti . To determine this price, aggregated revenue r is divided by the
aggregated number of kilometers km consumed with ticket type i at month t,
as in equation (3.2).
pti =
r ti
kmti
(3.2)
As weight s for a ticket type i , the aggregated number of kilometers consumed
in t relative to the total amount of kilometers consumed with allm ticket types
is used, as shown in equation (3.3).
s ti =
kmti∑m
j=1 km
t
j
(3.3)
The index is constructed on a monthly basis to describe price development
over the course of a year. The question is which time period should serve as
a basis for the weights. In the standard Laspeyres approach, the weights are
determined in the base period, which would correspond to December of the
previous year. Consumed kilometers underlie seasonal fluctuations, and the
kilometer distribution might be different than the yearly distribution. There-
fore, the yearly kilometer distribution is used to weight all twelve indexes within
year y , as seen in equation (3.4).
syi =
kmyi∑m
j=1 km
y
j
(3.4)
The KMI (3.5) describes the price development of an average kilometer over a
year for each month (1). The base period (0) is the December of the previous
year. The average kilometer is the proportional composition of all kilometers
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consumed in year y with all m = n ticket types.
KMI0,1 =
n∑
i=1
kmyi∑m
j=1 km
y
j
·
r1
i
km1
i
r0
i
km0
i
(3.5)
Price development over one year is interesting, but price development over
multiple years is much more relevant to the public discussion. To describe
price development over multiple years, indexes can be chained (3.6). This
involves a simple multiplication of two indexes, which is the same as multiplying
growth factors. The point of time τ at which two indexes are chained can be
every month. However, if all monthly indexes are constructed with the base
of December of the previous year, τ will typically fall in December.
KMI0,1 = KMI0,τ ·KMIτ,1 (3.6)
If the base of the chained index must be changed, a base change can be carried
out (3.7). This is done by dividing by the index with the same actual base
period and the desired new base period KMI0,τ . Note that this is the same
(rearranged) equation as for chaining (3.6).
KMIτ,1 =
KMI0,1
KMI0,τ
(3.7)
The KMI describes the price development of an averagely travelled kilometer.
Because it is chained over multiple years, the index is adjusted to changes in
consumption behaviour. That is especially important because of the increasing
demand. One minor disadvantage of chaining is that the price developments
in different years are not weighted equally.
Note that the index is used to describe the price development of the Swiss Fed-
eral Railways over time, and not to compare different providers. A Laspeyres-
type index is chosen because it can be interpreted straightforwardly. If different
providers are compared, the same issues that arose with the hedonic price in-
dexes for mobile communication will arise. Consumption may be dependent
on tariff plans, and if it is, then only using the aggregated consumption of one
provider as weights could yield biases. Also, using the aggregated number of
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kilometers travelled with both providers does not solve the problem, because
one provider usually supplies more kilometers than the other. Consequently,
this provider has more influence on the weights. Therefore, if several public
transport providers are compared, one should think about using superlative
indexes like Fisher or Törnqvist in order to treat all providers identically. An
approach similar to the one illustrated at the end of subsection 2.2.3 could be
applied. Indexes could be calculated to compare providers and then be chained
over time periods, as in tables 2.1 and 2.2.
3.3 SBB passenger traffic price development
The development of a public transport price index was a joint project with the
Swiss Federal Railways (SBB, CFF). This hinders a complete data description
in 3.3.1 because data are partially confidential. Nevertheless, authorised re-
sults can be published, and the index, applied on SBB passenger traffic, will
be presented in 3.3.2. Then, a comparison to other estimations for public
transport price development is offered in subsection 3.3.3. The section closes
with a close look at the two most important ticket types in the index, the ’GA
travelcard’ and the ’Normal tariff’, in subsection 3.3.4.
3.3.1 Data
The KMI is based on revenues and kilometers per ticket type. Revenues per
ticket type in particular are classified as confidential by the SBB, and so the raw
data cannot be presented here. Revenues and kilometers are given from De-
cember 2006 to December 2011. Revenue is provided by the SBB accounting.
The kilometer data are based on estimations and extrapolations made by the
SBB, called ’Hochrechnung Personenverkehr’, or abbreviated as ’HOP’. Due
to changes in method, data before 2006 are not comparable without extensive
modifications.
Seven ticket types are used to classify tickets. The most important types are
’GA travelcard’ and ’Normal tariff’. It is important to note that in December
2010, more than half of the kilometers are travelled with a ’GA travelcard’,
and nearly 30% with the ’Normal tariff’, which together make up most stan-
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dard tickets in the Swiss railways. That more than half of the kilometers are
purchased via GA, shows the importance to use implicit kilometer prices and
effective consumption weights compared to expenditure shares. The major
problem of the underlying ticket type classification is that first- and second-
class tickets - which are clearly different products - are mixed in the accounts.
As long as the ratio between kilometers consumed by both classes remains
constant, there is no problem. But this is not a given and therefore in future
projects, first and second class should get different accounts.
Finally, this index is based on data from the providers whose prices are com-
pared. A price index is supposed to be ’objective’ in every conceivable aspect,
and treating every provider equally, but in this case it cannot be guaranteed.
Consider this a first test of the method. Further applications should intensely
analyse aggregation and sampling processes of the basic data. This is espe-
cially important if different providers and time periods are compared, to treat
everyone identically and - if not possible - to make adjustments.
3.3.2 Price development from 2007 to 2011
In figure 3.1, the price development of the SBB passenger traffic is plotted.
Both lines are KMI values with base period December 2010 equal to 100
points. The dashed line is the monthly index, and the solid line the yearly
average index. The geometric mean is used to average the monthly values
because price index values are growth factors. Applying the geometric mean
instead of the arithmetic mean is more appropriate because the properties of
the growth factors are maintained in the yearly values. The yearly averages
are plotted in June and interpolated. Both lines are based on exactly the same
basic index values.
It can be seen that the index is very volatile over different months. Usually
there are two local minima and one local maximum per year. These have
different reasons; for example, the SBB usually changes prices in December,
and generally there is no commuting traffic during holidays. Moreover, the
aggregation and especially differentiation in HOP also play a role.
Note that despite the fact that prices are only changed in December, notable
monthly movements can be observed. This is due to the nature of the KMI.
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Figure 3.1: SBB price development, 2007 - 2011
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Note: The dashed line represents the monthly values of the KMI for the SBB passenger
traffic with base period December 2010 equal to 100 points. The solid line is the yearly
(geometric) means of the monthly KMI values. They are plotted in June and interpolated.
First and most importantly, consumption underlies seasonal fluctuations, which
influence implicit prices per kilometer each month. Additionally, people may
still travel with travelcards purchased before the price change, which also in-
fluences the price index. A third problem is in the data. The GA travelcard,
for example, is sold on a specific date and is valid for one year. The revenue is
put into the GA travelcard account. But in this account, the revenue is divided
accordingly across all months. The SBB divides the revenue equally over all
twelve months. This is obviously a simplification because a passenger does
not travel an equal amount of kilometers every month. How revenue should
be optimally distributed for the index is an open question.
The monthly index shows interesting elements of public transport pricing, but
it also reveals unresolved problems, as discussed above. For this reason, index
values are averaged over the year. In addition, yearly values can be compared to
the CPI of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2012b) and the communicated
price changes of the providers.
3.3.3 Comparison to tariff-based indexes
In Switzerland public transport can be split into two groups: direct traffic and
regional traffic. Direct traffic includes roughly all interregional routes and is
mainly covered by the SBB. Regional traffic is usually covered by different local
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providers. There are different tariff plans in every system. Usually, regional
suppliers follow the tariffs of direct traffic, but they can and do deviate slightly.
Though the SBB is the major supplier in direct traffic, it is not the only
one. Price setting for direct traffic is supervised by the association for public
transport, VöV (Verband öffentlicher Verkehr, Union des transports public).
Therefore, all price changes are made and communicated by the VöV.
In Switzerland, two tariff plan-based measures for direct traffic prices exist
thus far. Firstly, the VöV announces adjustments in tariffs, usually in Decem-
ber. Secondly, the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2012b) has an elementary
price index for direct traffic in the CPI. Whereas the VöV communication is
done ex ante and therefore cannot be as precise, the CPI elementary index
is measured afterwards, similar to the KMI developed in this analysis. Note
that both other measures describe the development of explicit prices based on
tickets resulting from tariff plans. Contrariwise, the KMI describes the implicit
price development, based on actually consumed or travelled kilometers. The
different measures are summarised in table 3.1. Note that the VöV, as well
as the CPI, are for all direct traffic, whereas the KMI is only for the SBB.
Because the SBB is the major provider in direct traffic and tariff plans are
equal for all providers, this is a minor problem.
Table 3.1: SBB price development compared to prior year and CPI
2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
KMI 2.45% -1.21% 0.57% 4.40% 6.27%
VöV 3.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.90% 9.08%
CPI direct traffic 3.49% 0.00% 0.00% 5.74% 9.43%
CPI total 2.43% -0.48% 0.69% 0.23% 2.87%
Note: The table contains the yearly price development of the SBB passenger traffic
compared to the previous year. The total development from 2007 to 2011 is added in the
last column. The price development is measured by the kilometer price index (KMI), the
VöV and the elementary price index for direct traffic of the Swiss CPI. To relate the SBB
passenger traffic price development to general inflation, the ’CPI total’ is added in the
last row. Sources: Verbal SBB communications (VöV), Swiss Federal Statistical Office
(2012b) (CPI) and own estimation (KMI).
Quite large differences can be observed. Whereas in the VöV communication
and the CPI for direct traffic, no price change is measured in years without
explicit tariff changes, the KMI shows movements in the implicit price. This
is due to the nature of the KMI, as explained in previous sections and is to be
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expected. The following two major issues can be observed:
1. The KMI estimates explicit price increases (2008, 2011) as lower than
both other measures.
2. In years without explicit tariff changes (2009, 2010), implicit prices
change according to the KMI, particularly with a decrease in 2009.
In addition, the KMI estimates the total price development between 2007 and
2011 at approximately 3% lower than in both other measures. If changes are
compared to general price development in Switzerland (CPI total), only the
last tariff change, from 2010 to 2011, differs significantly. Because this is a
first encounter with this type of index in public transport, the results should be
interpreted with caution. The presence of data aggregation issues cannot be
fully denied. Additionally, remember that it is not exactly the same variables
being compared (complete direct traffic versus SBB traffic). However, the
notion that implicit prices can change despite the fact that tariffs have not
been modified is important for price measurement in public transport, and it
is not at all present in the public’s perception.
3.3.4 The ’GA travelcard’ and ’Normal tariff’ ticket types
As mentioned in the data description, around 50% of all travelled kilometers
are purchased via GA travelcard. Almost 30% are paid with a ’Normal tariff’
ticket, which include all standard tickets and the half-fare travelcards. The
remaining 20% of travelled kilometers are divided among five accounts that
are not explicitly analysed here. In December 2010, the average price of a
kilometer travelled with a GA travelcard was 0.094 CHF. The average price
of a kilometer travelled with a ’Normal tariff’ ticket was 0.211 CHF. The
development of these unit prices, the corresponding consumption and their
impact on the KMI are illustrated below.
The GA travelcard is the most important ticket type in the index. Additionally,
it is a flat-rate tariff plan, and consumers can travel without restriction for a
fixed amount. Figure 3.2 illustrates the implicit price per kilometer travelled
with a GA travelcard. This is complemented by the amount of kilometers
travelled with a GA travelcard and the total amount of kilometers travelled
with any ticket type. All values are yearly arithmetic means. Due to the
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different scales (Swiss francs and kilometers) and magnitudes, all variables are
normalised to 100 points in the year 2010.
Figure 3.2: The GA travelcard in the KMI
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Note: The implicit price per kilometer of the GA travelcard (solid line) and the yearly amount
of kilometers travelled with a GA travelcard (dashed line) are plotted. The total consumption
or total amount of kilometers travelled with any ticket type is indicated by a third line
(dotted). All values are normalised to 100 points in the year 2010.
First and most importantly, the implicit kilometer price of the GA increases
by around 4% from 2007 to 2011. Therefore, the implicit price of the GA
travelcard increased less than other ticket types. The average implicit price
increase as measured by the KMI, is 6.27%, as seen in table 3.1. Despite the
fact that the explicit prices of the GA travelcard increased significantly, the
implicit price changed less. The aggregated number of kilometers travelled
with a GA travelcard increased by approximately one-third from 2007 to 2011.
This explains why the implicit kilometer price increased less than the explicit
ticket price. Compared to the total consumption, the amount of travelled
kilometers with the GA increased much more notably.
The implicit kilometer price of the GA is an important component of the re-
sults in this empirical section, and it explains, at least in part, why the implicit
prices measured by the KMI differ from those resulting from the currently
applied measures. All other ticket types have a weaker, but still significant
impact on the KMI. The implicit kilometer prices of ticket types with small
weights in particular increased more, such as the ones of ’Special offers’ and
’Multi-trip tickets’. From the KMI perspective, the GA travelcard is the most
successful tariff plan in Swiss public transport mainly because its average im-
plicit kilometer price is much lower (and increases less rapidly) than those of
other ticket types.
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The ’Normal tariff’ is the other important ticket type in the KMI. Figure 3.3
illustrates the implicit unit price, the amount of kilometers travelled with the
normal tariff and the total amount of kilometers travelled with any ticket
type. Because of the different scales and magnitudes, again all variables are
normalised to 100 points in 2010. Recall that the implicit kilometer price of
the normal tariff is about double that of the GA, and the amount of consumed
kilometers is approximately 30% of total consumption.
Figure 3.3: The normal tariff tickets in the KMI
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Note: The implicit price per kilometer of the ’Normal tariff’ (solid line) and the yearly
amount of kilometers travelled with a ’Normal tariff’ ticket (dashed line) are plotted. The
total consumption or total amount of kilometers travelled with any ticket type is indicated
by a third line (dotted). All values are normalised to 100 points in the year 2010.
Significant differences between the ’Normal tariff’ and ’GA travelcard’ can be
observed. The decrease in the KMI in 2009 can be explained by the normal
tariff tickets, but not by the GA. From 2007 to 2011, the implicit kilometer
price of the normal tariff increased by about 3%. It is not as much as with
that of the GA, mostly because the explicit ticket prices increased less overall.
Nevertheless, the absolute implicit kilometer price is still much higher. Con-
sequently, the consumption of ’Normal tariff’ kilometers increases less than
the average, and even decreases in 2010 and 2011. Compared to the total
consumption, the ’Normal tariff’ kilometers are consumed less frequently, and
their weight in the index is continuously decreasing over time.
As a result, the implicit prices for the GA travelcards and the normal tariff
increased by 3% to 4% between 2007 and 2011. Of the kilometers travelled
in total, 80% are paid with one of these two ticket types. As mentioned
before, implicit kilometer prices for other, less frequently used ticket types
increased significantly more. Possibly the most surprising result in this sub-
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section is that the kilometers travelled with a GA travelcard increased a great
deal, and those travelled with normal tariff tickets actually decreased in 2010
and 2011. This observation could be explained by implicit kilometer prices
and explicit ticket prices. Consumers using a GA travelcard compensate for
explicit price increases by raising their consumption or switching to another
tariff plan (without the high fixed cost). Generally speaking, they minimise
their ’personal’ implicit kilometer prices. If a consumer travels frequently, the
GA does minimise the implicit kilometer price. Contrariwise, consumers who
use the normal tariff cannot substitute a less expensive tariff plan. Therefore,
they have to pay for explicit price increases fully or travel less. Alternatively,
they may consume more kilometers, switch into the GA tariff plan and benefit
from low implicit kilometer prices. Consequently, the amount of kilometers
travelled with the ’Normal tariff’ decreases and the amount of those travelled
with the ’GA travelcard’ increases.
3.4 Summary
The KMI describes the price development of an average kilometer. The con-
cept chosen to illustrate the price development of an average kilometer is clear,
comprehensible and therefore easy to communicate.
By using implicit kilometer prices, the index reflects the prices of actual con-
sumption and not explicit prices of tariff plans. All ticket types are included
identically in the index. Through the use of tariff instead of geographical kilo-
meters, the index is partially adjusted for quality. The major disadvantage of
the index concept is, first, that the construction is dependent on aggregated
data and second, these data are supplied by the providers themselves. There-
fore complete independence between price measurement and providers cannot
be claimed.
The price development of the SBB passenger traffic measured by the KMI is
as expected. It is shown that price increases have been measured and com-
municated relatively high (in comparison to the KMI). The KMI reflects the
implicit price development in public transport, while the other indexes describe
explicit prices for tickets what causes this difference. The implicit price also
changes without modification of the tariff plans because it is dependent on the
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consumption of kilometers. In one year without tariff plan modification, the
implicit price actually falls. The most important ticket type in the index is the
GA travelcard. It is a special flat-rate tariff plan that is partially responsible for
the lower implicit prices. The consumption of kilometers using a GA travelcard
increases consistently in absolute values, but also relative to other ticket types.
Consequently, the implicit kilometer price of the GA travelcard increases less
than any of the other ticket types. Consumers using normal tariff tickets, in
contrast, pay explicit price modifications fully, cannot substitute cheaper tariff
plans and therefore consume relatively fewer kilometers. The implicit price
development of the SBB passenger traffic from 2007 to 2010 is similar to
general price development in Switzerland, which is measured by the CPI. In
2011, it is clearly stronger.
Further applications of this method should mainly invest in a better data struc-
ture. First- and second-class tickets should not be mixed in the accounts.
Moreover, if the concept is applied to compare multiple providers, time and
account differentiations have to be identical for all participating providers. The
key advantage of this index is that the data are available. The problem is the
dependence of the providers, which is rather unlucky from the consumer’s per-
spective. In the consumer’s perspective, a hedonic index is preferable, if the
data quality is sufficient. However, so far, this is the most accurate approach
to measure price development in public transport. The notion that implicit
prices can also change without any tariff modification - therefore change dy-
namically, depending on consumption - is a major gain of this analysis, and,
motivated the entire thesis.
Chapter 4
Administered Prices of Basic
Services in Swiss
Municipalities
Service prices for electricity, waste management, water supply and sewer water
in Swiss municipalities are analysed in chapter 4.
Section 4.1 is an introduction to basic service prices in Switzerland. The index
concept to measure and compare service price levels across the 324 largest
Swiss municipalities is explained in section 4.2. The estimated price levels, es-
pecially the differences, are discussed with regard to several municipality char-
acteristics in section 4.3. For this purpose, the prices are related to economies
of scale, income tax rates, rents, institutional controls and capitalisation. A
summary and outlook follow in section 4.4.
4.1 Introduction to administered prices of basic ser-
vices
Service prices for electricity, water supply, sewer water and waste management
are paid by every Swiss household at least once a year. Unlike with mobile
communication and public transport, service providers are almost always local
monopolists and offer only one single tariff plan within a municipality. Con-
90
4.1. ADMINISTERED PRICES OF BASIC SERVICES 91
sequently, consumers can not substitute services, providers or tariff plans. A
two-person household in one of the 324 largest Swiss municipalities pays on
average about 600 Swiss francs for electricity and 200 Swiss francs for each
of the other three services per year.
Besides the considerable yearly cost for every household, the prices for these
basic services have three characteristics that motivate an analysis. First and
most importantly, the services are supplied by local monopolistic providers. In
addition, the service prices are administered by local governments. Conse-
quently, these prices are not the result of supply and demand in a competitive
market and should therefore be monitored closely. Secondly, administered
prices for basic services are related to user charges. User charges contribute a
considerable part of municipalities’ revenue. By analysing basic service prices,
the direct impact of user charges (which are contained in the prices) on house-
holds can be illustrated. Finally, a monopolistic provider offers only one tariff
plan in a municipality. This allows the implementation of consumption pro-
files with considerably fewer problems than if multiple tariff plans per service,
provider and municipality were in place. In this case, the profiles represent the
consumption of typical Swiss household types. The prices are representative
because they can be determined unambiguously for every household. Conse-
quently, they can be compared consistently via consumption profiles.
Monopolistic supply, administered service prices and user charges
Basic services on a communal or municipal level are supplied in most cases by
monopolists. In some cases, the local government produces the service. In
others, a semi-private firm is a supplier in which municipalities or cantons have
property rights. A third possibility is that governments designate a private firm
to be a monopolistic supplier.
In Switzerland, governments on a communal, cantonal or federal level set
prices and impose user charges. These prices are considered administered.
Many different prices at all levels are administered, as can be seen in the
report from the Swiss Price Control (2005). This also holds for all four basic
service prices analysed in this chapter. The administered price of a basic service
is dependent upon the consumed service units and the underlying tariff plan.
The tariff plan transforms consumed units into the explicit service price. The
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administered, explicit service price corresponds to the total service cost for a
household.
According to the federal constitution of the Swiss confederation, user charges
(and consequently administered prices) underlie two principles: the cost re-
covery principle and the benefits principle. The cost recovery principle urges
governments not to let revenues exceed costs for services financed by user
charges. This balance is often very difficult to maintain. Courts normally do
not pursue imbalances, except in the case of very large exaggerations, as men-
tioned by Jaeger et al. (2002). The benefits principle states that consumers
must not pay for more than they effectively consume. With regard to both
principles, the observed variation of administered prices, illustrated in section
4.2, is not expected.
The household perspective on non-tax government revenue
Governments generate a major part of their revenue through taxes. A smaller
proportion of this, Feld et al. (2003) estimate around 20% at the total and
communal levels, are generated by user charges. Jaeger et al. (2002) esti-
mate the overall non-tax revenue at 25.6%, and at the communal level, they
estimate that this reaches 35.7%. The inventory of the Swiss Price Control
(2005) supports these claims; municipalities in particular tend to show a high
proportion of non-tax revenue. Although government revenue is not the major
object of interest in this analysis, these numbers show that user charges can
be an important part of this revenue, especially in municipalities.
User charges are analysed in the international literature (which is not explicitly
mentioned here), but mostly as aggregated revenue. Likewise, in the Swiss
literature, which is discussed throughout the chapter, user charges are pre-
dominantly introduced as aggregated government revenue. The problem with
aggregated revenue is that the data are provided by the government. It is
often unclear as to how households are really affected. The reason is that
households do not only pay user charges. User charges are, as discussed be-
fore, merely one part of the overall cost for a service. A simple division of
generated revenue per service by population size does not necessarily yield a
consistent estimator for the burden on households.
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Administered prices for basic (government) services are rarely analysed in the
public economics literature. Most standard textbooks contain zero to maxi-
mally two pages about user charges. They never discuss administered prices;
see, for example, Persson and Tabellini (2000), Mueller (2003) or Blankart
(2012). An exception to this rule is a study about administered service prices
paid by Swiss households by Pommerehne (1983). He pursues the question in
an analysis about 100 cities, whether private or public waste management has
lower prices and production costs.
The main benefit of comparing service prices instead of aggregated revenue is
that the direct impact on households can be analysed. Although an alternative
view on the impacts of government revenue is provided, a direct inference on
government revenue is not possible. User charges that generate government
revenue are merely one part of administered prices, dependent on the specific
service, provider and municipality. Additionally, statements about production
efficiency through price comparisons may be biased because service qualities
differ across municipalities. However, if it is assumed that services have similar
levels of quality, then the price is a much stronger indicator of (in-)efficiency
than a comparison of aggregated cost and revenue of services.
Measuring basic service prices using consumption profiles
In 2008, the Swiss national council was faced with a motion7 that requested
a detailed analysis of the user charge burden on households. The four services
analysed in this study constitute a considerable part of these costs. However,
due to the enormous number of very distinct user charges, the motion could
not be satisfied. The Federal Finance Administration (2012) published a con-
cept paper as a response to discover whether the cost recovery principle was
respected. They compare aggregated cost and revenue for services, but they
do not make a statement about the user charge burden of households, nor do
they discuss the benefits principle. Therefore, they do not answer the motion.
The Swiss price control began gathering data some years ago about admin-
istered service prices in municipalities, namely for waste management, sewer
water and water supply. They determine prices for three household types with
7A motion is a proposal to a parliament made by a member of the parliament. It can be
made in a communal, cantonal or federal parliament.
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corresponding consumption profiles. Additionally, the Swiss electricity com-
mission maintains a similar database of electricity prices.
Unlike scientists, politicians are interested in administered service prices as
described above. Through its different institutions, the government is mon-
itoring the prices households face. Nevertheless, observing the overall user
charge burden for Swiss households is an extremely complex task. At the
very least, it requires an immense effort, as will be discussed in more detail in
section 4.2.
For this analysis, an index based on consumption profiles is used. In the general
introduction, several problems of consumption profiles were discussed. Here,
consumption profiles are used for several reasons. First, the most severe prob-
lem with consumption profiles is not present. In this case, a provider only offers
one tariff plan per municipality, and there is only one provider per municipality.
Thus, no assumptions about perfectly informed and rational consumers have
to be made in order to select a tariff plan. The other problems are to some
extent still present, but they can be resolved in a satisfying manner. However,
the use of profiles also has a practical motivation. Consider that it is not just
a few service providers that are compared. Prices are administered individ-
ually in each of the 324 municipalities. A representative random sample for
each municipality, as in the mobile communication project in chapter 2, would
create an exorbitant cost. Using a similar approach as the price index for pub-
lic transport in chapter 3 poses a problem because aggregated revenue from
user charges does not necessarily reflect the prices households pay. Whether
comparable aggregates for revenue and especially consumed units over all mu-
nicipalities even exist is an open question. In sum, using consumption profiles
for households is not the most elegant solution, but in this case, it is the best
feasible solution.
In section 4.2, based on household consumption profiles, a price index for basic
services in municipalities is constructed. Criteria are defined in order to select
all important basic services. Based on these criteria, electricity, water supply,
sewer water and waste management are included in indexes for administered
basic service prices in municipalities. The distribution of these administered
prices across the 324 largest Swiss municipalities is analysed descriptively. The
data used are relatively new, and they have not yet been analysed jointly. As a
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first result, quite large intra- and inter-cantonal differences in price levels can
be observed. Considering that all services are quite similar across municipalities
and that the benefits and cost recovery principles should be respected, these
differences come as a surprise.
In section 4.3, an attempt is made to explain the service price differences
through several characteristics of the municipalities. Firstly, it is shown that
there is no indication of economies of scale. The administered prices are inde-
pendent of a municipalities population and agglomeration size. Secondly, the
relation between tax rates, rents and administered price levels is illustrated.
Municipalities with high income tax rates show relatively high service price lev-
els. Subsequently, the influence of fiscal control on price levels is investigated.
In municipalities with potentially strong finance commissions, administered
prices tend to be relatively low. Finally, the impact of administered prices on
municipalities is discussed by analysing the capitalisation of service prices into
rents. Administered prices do not seem to capitalise. A summary and outlook
follow in section 4.4.
4.2 Price index concept for Swiss municipalities
The result of this section is an index for administered prices (API) of basic
services across the 324 largest Swiss municipalities. The index serves to mea-
sure and analyse these administered prices for basic services in this section. It
will be used as an endogenous variable in section 4.3 for further analyses. The
index is presented in detail in table A.12 in the appendix. Summary statistics
are reported in table 4.2.
The index measures how much a representative Swiss household pays in a
given municipality for electricity, waste management, water supply and sewer
water services per year. First, in subsection 4.2.1, the selection criteria for
the services to be included in the index to compare municipalities are defined.
In 4.2.2, the standard households and corresponding consumption profiles are
presented. These are used to estimate average service prices. Finally, in 4.2.3,
the administered price index for Swiss municipalities is formally described, em-
pirically presented and interpreted.
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4.2.1 Selection and description of services
On all three levels of state - federal, cantonal and communal - governments
supply different services to their citizens. In the federal Swiss state, many
legal differences throughout cantons and municipalities lead to different service
structures, tariff plans and prices. The resulting administered prices can be
characterised as follows:
• They may differ greatly. Whereas prices for health care, for example,
can be extraordinarily high, an attestation from an administrative office
costs a few Swiss francs.
• Prices are administered on a federal, cantonal or communal level.
• Prices may be directly regulated, be the result of a (state-) monopoly or
fiscally influenced by special taxes, see Price Control (2005).
• The frequency of purchases differs widely across households. Some ser-
vices are consumed daily and paid for at least once a year, like water
supply. Others may never even be incurred, such as charges for civil
weddings.
Including all (administered) prices of a municipality consistently in an index
is a complex problem because of the varying service characteristics. From a
household perspective, it is very difficult to include the prices of a birth cer-
tificate and water supply in the same index, as long as effectively observed
purchasing frequencies with joint frequency distributions are used. First, the
joint frequency distributions are often unknown. Second, the profiles would
be extremely complex and specific. A profile should represent a typical con-
sumption pattern. If a lot of services are included, the profiles become overly
specific and are not able to represent a typical household. Therefore, criteria
are defined in order to be able to include the most ’important’ services in a
consistent manner.
Stating selection criteria obviously excludes part of the reality, but this is, as
discussed, required. The statistical benefit of the criteria listed below is that
the construction cost of the index is minimised, but the most important services
are still included. The following criteria describe the characteristics of what is
understood as an important service, assuring that it will be included:
4.2. PRICE INDEX CONCEPT FOR SWISS MUNICIPALITIES 97
• A relevant amount of direct spending of every household is covered.
• All services are consumed (or purchased) at least once a year by every
household.
• The quality of each service is approximately equal across all municipali-
ties.
• Substitution of different services or services of other municipalities is not
possible. For example, the water supply service of a municipality can not
be replaced either by another service nor by the water supply service of
another municipality.
Applying these criteria to the inventory of administered prices of the Swiss
Price Control (2005) leads to the selection of the following four services:
water supply, sewer water, waste management and electricity supply. This
selection covers the most ’expensive’ and frequently purchased services with
administered prices on a communal level. Note that on a federal level, radio
and television charges would also fit to these criteria. On a cantonal level, for
a lot of households, education and health care costs are relevant and frequent
spendings. However, the index only includes basic service prices that are ad-
ministered on a communal level. Thus, radio and television, education and
health care prices are not considered. The four services that will be analysed
are described briefly below.
Water supply is usually organised by every municipality on its own. Sewer water
services are often supplied jointly by multiple municipalities (for topographical
reasons). Every household receives a bill at least once a year. Tenants pay
additional expenses on top of the rent, and these are invoiced separately by the
renter (who receives a bill from the supplier). When a house is constructed, a
connection fee for access to the water network has to be paid. The amount is
specified individually in municipalities. These connection fees, which compen-
sate the municipalities for investments in the infrastructure (in this case, for
creating a connection between the house and the municipalities’ water supply
network), are not considered here. First, they are not included because they
are implemented differently across different municipalities, and so far it is not
possible to treat them consistently. Secondly, all investments in a building
are usually passed to the tenants via rents. The rents are used as a control
variable in the empirical analysis in section 4.3.
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Waste management is typically organised into joint waste management au-
thorities by several municipalities or whole cantons, including collection and
elimination. In most municipalities, households pay a fee for every waste bag
(by purchasing it). Some communities, especially in the French-speaking part,
do not yet impose fees on waste bags. They were urged by the Swiss Federal
Tribunal to implement this as soon as possible due to the cost recovery princi-
ple. Additionally, a basic yearly fee can be charged. For special waste, pricing
schemes vary widely. This analysis focuses exclusively on standard household
waste.
In most areas, the electricity supply is covered by one provider across several
cantons, but not necessarily. The largest proportion of the Swiss electricity
market is supplied by a few firms. Nonetheless, prices from the same supplier
may differ in different cantons and municipalities due to different contracts
or user charges on a communal level. Some municipalities have up to four
electricity suppliers, but households usually cannot not choose their supplier.
The supplier is defined by the address of the household.
This selection of services allows the comparison of the most important service
prices in municipalities in a consistent manner because they adhere to the four
criteria introduced above. Note that these services are not necessarily provided
by the governments themselves, so inferences regarding government revenue
are not entirely valid. If the criteria were relaxed, other services may also be
included in the basket. The most important criterion for keeping the index
creation efficient is the inclusion of only services with a relatively high yearly
expenditure share. A service that is purchased on average once every 20 years
and costs a few Swiss francs does not change the index significantly, but it
may complicate its construction drastically. Theoretically, the major issue with
including other services is the extension of consumption profiles. This results
in overly specific profiles, as discussed earlier.
4.2.2 Households, consumption profiles and service prices
Standard households are introduced due to tariff plans, which do not allow
a simple multiplication of quantity and unit prices. Different household con-
sumption profiles allow the measurement of prices for different consumption
intensities. As a result, the Swiss price control gathered prices for three
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standard households. Prices are given for the 324 largest Swiss municipal-
ities, with at least 5′000 inhabitants in 2012. The prices for waste man-
agement, water supply and sewer water are from the Swiss Price Control
(2012). They began building the database around 2010 and completed it
2012, so no complete panel was available in 2012, when this project was car-
ried out. The data are complemented by electricity prices provided by the
Federal Electricity Comission (2012).
For all four services, the prices for three standard households with a specific
yearly consumption profile, as seen in table 4.1, are given. The consumption
profiles and the household types are based on the collaborative efforts of the
Federal Statistical Office and the price control. Electricity consumption is
estimated by the electricity commission and then matched for this study to
the household profiles. The most frequent household types, apart from the
two-person household, are included.
Table 4.1: Standard households and consumption profiles
Living
Characteristics Persons Rooms Type m2 Floors
Household 1 1 2 Apartm. 55 5
Household 2 3 4 Apartm. 100 3
Household 3 4 6 House 150 2
Waste Waste Waste Water Electricity
Consumption 35l-bag 60l-bag kg m3 kWh
Household 1 41 3 229 60 1’600
Household 2 122 9 681 170 2’500
Household 3 162 12 904 230 10’000
Sources: Price Control (2012), Federal Electricity Comission (2012)
As previously mentioned, prices are observed for every household type and ev-
ery municipality. The prices were measured by determining how much a given
household type, as described in the upper half of the table, in a certain munic-
ipality had to pay for its yearly usage of a service, as indicated in the second
half of the table. In the basic data for every service, corresponding household
and municipality, one price is included, rendering a total of 3′888 prices. Sewer
water estimations are complemented by building size for rain water. The gen-
uine consumption profiles contain more details; this is a summary of the most
important characteristics.
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In order to obtain one single price pi ,j for every service i in a municipal-
ity j , a weighted average price over all three standard households is esti-
mated as stated in equation (4.1). The weight wh for household type h
is based on the frequency distribution of households in municipalities, see
Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2011b).
pi ,j =
3∑
h=1
wh · ph,i,j (4.1)
The weights used are: household type 1: 0.50; household type 2: 0.30; and
household type 3: 0.20. The relative frequency of the two-person household
is equally distributed between the weights of household types 1 and 2. The
weight of household type 3 is the sum of the relative frequencies of households
containing four or more persons. In the 324 municipalities, an average of
about 2.3 persons were living in one household. The weights do not change
significantly if the household distributions of all other Swiss municipalities are
added.
The weights used in the average service price in equation (4.1), are the same
for every municipality, despite the fact that frequency distributions of house-
hold sizes differ among municipalities. The constructed mean price measures
what a representative Swiss household in municipality j pays for service i . If
the household distribution of each municipality were to be used as weights,
prices could not be compared. The underlying basket would change for each
municipality, and prices for differently aggregated consumption profiles would
be compared.
A description and interpretation of the price distributions, summarised in table
4.2, follows in the next subsection, combined with the discussion of the indexes.
The frequency distributions of all service prices are plotted in the appendix in
figure A.2.2. A detailed list of prices from all municipalities is in table A.12,
also in the appendix. Note that prices are indexed to 100 points and not scaled
in Swiss francs.
Introducing standard households and consumption profiles allows us to com-
pare service prices across municipalities. Using consumption profiles is a huge
simplification of the reality. A large random sample of household consump-
tion and invoiced amounts would be much better, but also drastically more
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expensive to create. Random sampling would improve the indexes because the
’true’ consumption distribution could be estimated. Based on such a ’true’
consumption distribution, prices would be estimated for the effectively con-
sumed service units and not hypothetical consumption profiles (even though
these are based on estimations of consumption). Additionally, those parts of
consumption that are not included in predefined consumption profiles, mainly
connection fees for access to different networks of water or electricity supply,
could be included. Special types of waste management charges could be added
as well, which is nearly impossible with profiles.
4.2.3 Administered price index for basic services
The administered price index (API) in equation (4.2) describes the price for the
yearly consumption of an average Swiss household for all selected services in
municipality j . The service prices ph,i,j are weighted according to its households
relative frequency wh as before, and then aggregated over all four services i .
This is the basic administered price index that will be used later on. It can be
slightly modified, depending on the analyses and underlying models.
APIj =
4∑
i=1
3∑
h=1
wh · ph,i,j (4.2)
The API as defined in (4.2) is an average price. In order to obtain an index
value, every API-value is divided by the arithmetic mean of all municipalities
and multiplied by 100. Therefore, the mean across all municipalities is 100
points. Table 4.2 illustrates the summary statistics of the API, the API without
electricity (API−e) and the average prices for the four single goods as defined
in the previous subsection. The complete index lists are shown in table A.12
in the appendix.
The mean price of electricity (for a 2.3-person household, which is the average
household size in this sample) is about 610 Swiss francs (CHF), whereas the
means of the other three prices are slightly above 200 CHF. Electricity, there-
fore, generates half of the cost in the selected basket. Additionally, electricity
is supplied by larger firms over larger regions than the other services. Thus,
the API without electricity (API−e) is introduced as an additional index with
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics for the API 2012
Variable Scale Mean SD Min Max
Administered Price Index API Index 100.0 13.7 61.6 151.7
API without electricity API−e Index 100.0 23.7 38.4 179.6
Electricity EL CHF 609.9 75.5 398.0 827.2
Waste management WM CHF 214.8 91.2 0.0 382.9
Sewer water SW CHF 235.9 89.4 57.3 502.4
Water supply WS CHF 219.3 81.9 0.0 624.4
Sources: Own estimations, based on Price Control (2012) and
Federal Electricity Comission (2012).
approximately equally expensive services.
The most ’expensive’ municipality in the API is Le Locle, with an index value
of 151.72. It is more than twice as expensive as Lugano, with 61.56 points on
rank one. This difference, which is even larger in the API without electricity, is
quite surprising, keeping in mind that the services are similar, and cost recovery
and benefits principles should be respected. The standard deviation of the API
is 13.67 points, implying that a large number of municipalities range between
80 and 120 points and show quite similar prices.
Four municipalities have a price equal to zero in water supply and 39 in waste
management. The waste management price is predominantly zero in munic-
ipalities in the French-speaking part because no charges are placed on waste
bags. The reasons for water prices being equal to zero are usually special
property rights and billing procedures. Before closing section 4.2, two issues
should be described. First, the conditional distribution of administered prices
in cantons is illustrated. Then, the correlation between the different service
prices across municipalities is analysed.
Although the municipalities can set prices autonomously, regional providers and
cantonal regulations have an influence. Figure 4.1 shows the API-distribution
over cantons. The box plots for small cantons with a few or even just one
municipality containing 5′000 or more inhabitants have no minimal or maximal
values. In cantons with only one large municipality, only the median is shown.
Dots indicate outliers.
Quite large intra- and inter-cantonal deviations can be observed. While the
medians remain between 80 and 120 points for all cantons, the maximum span
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Figure 4.1: API distribution within and across cantons. The API and API−e distribution for every canton is plotted by box-plots. The bold bar indicates
the median of every canton, the boxes the interquartile range, dashed lines indicate first and fourth quartile and points outliers. Very small cantons,
such as Glarus (GL), have only one municipality with 5’000 or more inhabitants, hence only the median is plotted. In small cantons with only few large
municipalities, the box captures all observations. In Geneva (GE), all prices are administered on nearly identical levels and plotted in a box.
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in a canton may be larger than 40 points. If the observations between the 25%
and 75% quartiles of each canton are considered, some cantons show clearly
higher overall prices than others. As already indicated in table 4.2, the span
width increases in the API without electricity. The cantonal distributions of
single service prices are in figure A.2 in the appendix.
Finally, in general, for all four services, are municipalities expensive or cheap?
In other words, do prices for different services correlate across municipalities?
Table 4.3 shows correlations between the administered service prices for the
entire data set and a restricted sample (without any municipality showing any
price equal to zero).
Table 4.3: Correlations between service prices
EL WM SW WS
Electricity EL − −0.08 0.09 −0.02
Waste management WM −0.13∗ − 0.11∗ −0.19∗∗∗
Sewer water SW 0.08 0.03 − 0.22∗∗∗
Water supply WS 0.00 0.01 0.30∗∗∗ −
The correlations are estimated by Bravais-Pearson correlation coefficients. The X-squared
statistics significance levels are: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. The restricted sample
without municipalities with waste management or water supply prices equal to zero is on the
left-hand, lower half, with sample size of n=281. The entire sample is on the right-hand,
upper half with, n=324 observations.
The only correlation that is significantly positive (at 5%) in both samples is
the one between water supply and sewer water. This observation seems quite
plausible, even though water supply is usually run by a municipality on its own,
while sewer water tends to be run by multiple municipalities. Waste manage-
ment prices correlate significantly negatively with electricity in the restricted
sample (without all municipalities showing any price equal to zero) and with
water supply in the complete sample. A significant positive correlation of waste
management and sewer water prices can be observed in the complete sample,
but not the restricted one. With the exception of water supply and sewer
water, prices correlate neither strongly nor systematically.
The small descriptive analysis at the end of this section shows that admin-
istered service prices vary within and among cantons. With the exception of
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water supply and sewer water service prices, they do not correlate significantly.
Keep in mind that in general, high administered prices are not necessarily bad.
The cost recovery and benefits principle should be respected. For example, a
lot of municipalities have a waste management price equal to zero, and they
will be forced to change it in near future. This implementation will change the
API significantly and lower its standard deviation. Additionally, service quality
might vary, which could partly explain differences - but it does not necessarily
have to.
4.3 Empirical analyses of administered prices
The API index of section 4.2 indicates that there are price level differences
between municipalities. In this section, the price differences are analysed with
regard to different municipality characteristics. Four independent analyses are
carried out. The aim of this section is thus to illustrate different possible
aspects to explain administered price levels; therefore, the analyses are split in
four parts. The fact that a large number of explanatory variables is included is
the second reason not only to create one model that explains all aspects jointly,
but to split the analyses. Finally, note that the underlying sample consists only
of the 324 largest Swiss municipalities. The results of this section are therefore
valid for Swiss municipalities with more than 5′000 inhabitants.
In the first subsection, 4.3.1, the data used to describe municipality charac-
teristics is presented. Then, whether the prices of basic services benefit from
economies of scale is investigated in 4.3.2. In 4.3.3, the relation between
administered price levels, income tax burden and rents is highlighted. After
discussing the influence of scale effects, tax burden and rents on administered
price levels, in 4.3.4 how the prices are affected by institutional control is anal-
ysed. The section is concluded in subsection 4.3.5 with the analysis of the
effect of administered prices on municipalities via capitalisation.
4.3.1 Data
Some characteristics of the data was described in subsection 4.2.3, mainly
the administered price index (API), the API without electricity (API−e) and
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the prices for single services. In this subsection, all characteristic variables of
municipalities are explained. They are summarised in table 4.4. For the 324
municipalities, different categories of variables are used. The table is divided
according to these categories. All data used, except the construction variables
and the household distribution in the ’Tax’ variable, are for the same year as
the service prices, i.e. 2012.
Municipality, topography, language and region
The first set of variables describes mainly geographical, economic, cultural
and demographic characteristics of municipalities. The combination of these
particular variables allows us to describe a municipality precisely.
’Municipality’ contains seven binary dummies, which yield information mainly
about location and economic structure. Every municipality is assigned to one
type and therefore cannot belong to multiple types. The characteristics are
’Centre’, ’Suburban’, ’High-income’, ’Peri-urban’, ’Tourist’, ’Industrial’ and
’Agronomic’.
’Topography’ has four characteristics, namely ’Midland’, ’Alps’ and ’Jura’,
which corresponds to the basic geographical repartition of Switzerland. The
fourth characteristics is ’non-assignable’, used for a few observations. Whereas
most area is covered by the Alps, most municipalities with 5′000 inhabitants
or more are located in the Midland. The region with the smallest number of
municipalities, and with the smallest area, is the Jura.
’Language’ is dived into ’German’, ’French’ and ’Italian’. Even though with
Rhaeto-Romanic, a fourth language is spoken in Switzerland, no municipal-
ity in the sample has it as an official language. German is spoken in 249
municipalities, French in 66 and Italian in 9.
Finally, for ’Region’, Switzerland can be divided into seven principle parts,
namely ’Région lémanique’, ’Espace Midland’, ’North-west’, ’Zurich’, ’East’,
’Central’ and ’Ticino’. The regions are used to control for local effects more
precisely than with language or topography dummies.8
8However, using cantons directly would be even better. But because only 324 munici-
palities are distributed over 26 cantons, econometric issues arise. The main problem is that
some cantons only have one municipality in the sample. This causes problems in the esti-
mation of coefficients (the design matrix sometimes cannot be inverted). Cantonal effects
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Table 4.4: Explanatory variables for municipalities in 2012
Variable Description Mean SD Min Max Source
Municipality Seven dummies describing the geo-
graphic and economic structure
Swiss Federal Statistical Office
(2012a)
Topography Four dummies describing the topo-
graphical location
Swiss Federal Statistical Office
(2012a)
Language Three dummies describing the official
language
Swiss Federal Statistical Office
(2012a)
Region Seven dummies describing the geo-
graphical region
Swiss Federal Statistical Office
(2012a)
Agglomeration Index describing the agglomeration
size
4.41 2 1 7 Swiss Federal Statistical Office
(2012a)
Population Population size 14’570 26’997 5’051 368’700 Price Control (2012)
Tax Index of average communal and can-
tonal income tax burden
100 19.96 39.64 157.1 Swiss Federal Statistical Office
(2012d)
Rent Index of average rent for a 4.5-room
apartment
100 24.09 57.25 195.1 comparis.ch (2012)
Parliament Dummy for municipalities with parlia-
ment (vs. town meeting)
0.432 0.495 0 1 Ladner (2012), idheap, Univer-
sity of Lausanne
Finance commission index Index of strength of communal fi-
nance commission
1.7 0.92 0 3 Rühli (2012), Avenir Suisse
Finance commission dummies Four dummies on elements of finance
commissions
Rühli (2012), Avenir Suisse
Constructions finished Constructions finished in 2010 and
2011
154.4 245.87 0 3’512 Swiss Federal Statistical Office
(2012c)
Building applications Building applications accepted in
2010 and 2011
172.1 310.44 0 4’734 Swiss Federal Statistical Office
(2012c)
Constructions ongoing Average number of buildings under
construction in 2010 and 2011
137.1 307.8 0 4’834 Swiss Federal Statistical Office
(2012c)
Note: All variables used in the upcoming analyses are described. For metric and binary variables arithmetic mean (Mean), standard deviation
(SD), minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) are shown. Nominal variables with multiple characteristics are merely described, but summary
statistics are not presented.
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As mentioned before, every single variable describes different aspects of a
municipality. In particular, the combination of these variables allows a precise
characterisation of municipalities.
Population and agglomeration
A weak indicator for the municipalities’ population and agglomeration size is
already given in the ’Municipality’ variable. Two further variables are used to
describe their size and agglomeration.9
Table 4.5: Agglomeration size index
Agglomeration Sample
Index size frequency
7 > 500’000 57
6 200’000 – 499‘999 68
5 100’000 – 199‘999 38
4 50’000 – 99‘999 57
3 < 50’000 48
2 Isolated town 5
1 Rural municipality 51
’Population’ is the number of inhabitants in a municipality. ’Agglomeration’
is an index for the agglomeration size, that is, how many inhabitants an ag-
glomeration contains, as described in table 4.5. Agglomeration size is taken
into consideration especially for infrastructure and joint service supply over
different municipalities.
Tax and rent
Taxes and rents are important spendings for households. The tax burden ’Tax’
is a weighted mean of spendings as a percentage of income for communal and
were implemented by using standard errors, which are corrected for cantonal clusters. An-
other solution would be to exclude all municipalities from small cantons. This approach is
not applied because the results should hold for all 324 Swiss municipalities examined and all
cantons.
9An agglomeration is defined as a cluster of geographically connected municipalities with
at least 20′000 inhabitants. Each agglomeration’s core area is defined as one or multiple
municipalities that have at least 85 workplaces per 100 inhabitants.
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cantonal income tax, as in equation (4.3). To calculate the ’Tax’ variable, the
tax burden tb as percentage of income for three types of persons p, namely a
single, a married and a married person with two children are used. For every
municipality j and income class i with relative frequency f , the arithmetic
mean of these three percentages is calculated. Based on the national income
distribution with 21 classes, see Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2010), the
tax burden for an average Swiss income in municipality j is determined.
Taxj =
21∑
i=1
fi
1
3
3∑
p=1
tbp,i,j
 (4.3)
Finally, the resulting average tax burden is indexed with a sample mean equal
to 100 points by dividing all communal burdens by the average tax burden of
the sample. According to this calculation, an average-income household in the
most expensive municipality pays with 157.1 index points, nearly four times
more than in the cheapest one, with 39.64. The smallest tax burden in this
indicator is in Zug, whereas the largest one is in Val-de-Travers.
The variable ’Rent’ is scaled as an index with sample mean equal to 100
points. The variable describes the average rent for a 4.5-room apartment in a
municipality. It is estimated with a hedonic approach by comparis.ch (2012)
and based on apartments offered on the internet. If fewer than 50 offers
in a municipality were found, the entire district is used as an approximation.
Because all municipalities contain more than 5′000 inhabitants, the data have
to be approximated for only one municipality.
In Switzerland, renters invoice costs for water supply and sewer water as ad-
ditional costs to the rent. The municipality-specific cost for household type 2
is deducted to avoid endogeneity issues. The highest index value is 195.07 in
St. Moritz, followed closely by Geneva, with 194.01. The rents are nearly
four times higher than in the cheapest municipality, with 57.25, which is
Moutier.
Parliaments and finance commissions
The next category contains three variables on institutions in municipalities.
The variable ’Parliament’ indicates whether a municipality has a parliament
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(1) or town meeting (0). It serves as an indicator for direct democracy on
a communal level. In the sample, 43.2% of the municipalities have a parlia-
ment. Because the sample contains only the largest Swiss municipalities, this
percentage is much lower throughout all Swiss municipalities.
The ’Finance commission index’ is an indicator for the competences of insti-
tutions for financial control in municipalities, which is dependent on cantons.
It was first developed by Eichenberger and Schelker (2007) and updated by
Rühli (2012). Based on cantonal law, different elements of financial con-
trol are mandatory, recommended or not requested. The index evaluates the
potential strength and competency within every canton.
Additionally, Rühli (2012) distinguished between institutions based on cantonal
law as being mandatory or optional. This distinction is captured in the ’Fi-
nance commission dummies’. These are ’Accounts audit’, ’Business audit’,
’External audit’ and ’Finance commission’. The dummies take a value of 1 if
an institution is mandatory and 0 otherwise.
Constructions
To measure the construction activity in municipalities, ’Constructions finished’,
’Constructions ongoing’ and ’Building applications’ are observed. These are
aggregates for 2010 and 2011. ’Constructions ongoing’ is measured every
quarter and averaged over all eight quarters. In the subsequent analysis, the
construction variables are used per capita, and are therefore divided by the
population size of municipalities.
The minimum value of all construction variables is 0. In a municipality with
at least 5′000 inhabitants, this is very unlikely to be true. The problematic 11
observations are later excluded from the estimations.
4.3.2 Absence of economies of scale
In this subsection, the question of whether economies of scale are detectable
in price levels for government services is pursued. It is found that economies of
scale generally do not become visible for households through lower prices. Re-
call that all municipalities in the sample have 5′000 or more inhabitants, so this
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result is only valid for large municipalities. The optimal size of municipalities is
especially relevant for amalgamations of municipalities. For further research,
investigating administered service prices in smaller municipalities, which are
more likely to merge than larger municipalities, could contribute important
facts to this discussion.
The upcoming estimations are for model specification (4.4). The influence of
scale effects on administered prices is mainly estimated by relating adminis-
tered price levels to the population and agglomeration size of a municipality.
At the end of the subsection, additional modified functional forms will be es-
timated.
Administered prices levels ’AP’, as dependent variables, are measured by the
indexes presented in section 4.2. All price variables used are indexes with sam-
ple mean equal to 100 points. The main explanatory variables are population
’Pop’ and agglomeration size ’Agg’. Agglomeration size is measured by an
index with grouped observations, as seen in table 4.5. Population size is mea-
sured by the number of inhabitants. Population size and administered prices
are specified with a logarithm because the specification is linear. By using a
logarithm, residuals are more likely to be distributed normally, especially when
using prices as the dependent variable. Agglomeration size is by its construc-
tion already a kind of linearised variable, due to the class intervals, and no
logarithm is used.
log(APj) = β0 + β1log(Popj ) + β2Aggj + βkMj + uj (4.4)
Finally, the specification is completed by M, a set of dummy variables de-
scribing municipality j . In this basic specification, the seven dummies for the
economic and demographic structure, as well as the language dummies, are
used. The dummies for the economic and demographic structure characterise
the municipality in a basic way. Language dummies are often used in stud-
ies in Switzerland to control for cultural influence. One might argue that in
the context of administered prices for basic services, topography or cantons
are more relevant than the cultural influences. At the end of this subsection,
estimations using different model specifications are discussed.
The estimation of model specification (4.4) can be seen in table 4.6. The
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headline indicates the dependent variable. In estimations (1) to (4), the API
with and without electricity (API−e) are used as dependent variables. Once,
each is used for an estimation with the complete sample containing all 324 ob-
servations, and then once on a reduced sample with no observation containing
prices at zero. This is done to avoid merely looking at one sample, with or
without the particular decision to finance services alternatively.
Electricity (EL), waste management (WM), sewer water (SW) and water sup-
ply (WS) prices are used as dependent variables in estimations (5) to (8).
Here, data only contains municipalities with service prices that are not equal
to zero. Remember that 39 municipalities have a waste management and 4 a
water supply price equal to zero. Therefore, in estimations (6) and (8), fewer
than 324 observations are used. All estimations are done by OLS.
In table 4.6, the estimated coefficients for the exogenous variables and their
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are shown. The heteroscedastic-
ity consistent standard errors are estimated as hc3, according to Long and Ervin
(2000), using the R-package tonymisc.10 The F-Statistic verifies whether
population and agglomeration size collectively show an impact on adminis-
tered price levels, tested by the joint hypothesis H0 : β1 = β2 = 0. The
normality of the residual distribution is monitored with the Jarque-Bera test in
order to verify if the p-values of the coefficients are valid.
In the following, the results shown in table 4.6 are interpreted. First, the effects
of economies of scales on the general administered price level are discussed.
In estimations (1) to (4), only the coefficient for ’Agglomeration’ in the es-
timation on the API−e with the reduced sample size is significantly different
from zero at a 5% level. With this specification and the underlying indexes,
economies of scales cannot be detected in prices. Also, the joint hypothesis
tests do not indicate any common influence of ’Agglomeration’ and ’Popula-
tion’. No F-Statistic is significantly different from zero. In set M, the seven
municipality dummies are rarely significantly different from zero. ’Language’
indicates that in the French and Italian-speaking areas, prices are relatively low
compared to the German-speaking area.
10The hc3 standard errors correct, as mentioned, for heteroscedasticity, but also for small
sample sizes. Therefore, the standard errors are estimated conservatively. In some of the fol-
lowing estimations, cluster robust standard errors are introduced. The basic estimations are
made with hc3 and not cluster robust standard errors because it is ex ante not unambiguously
clear which variable should be used to define the clusters.
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Table 4.6: Absence of economies of scale
(1) API (2) API−e (3) API (4) API−e (5) EL (6) WM (7) SW (8) WS
Constant 4.714∗∗∗ 4.711∗∗∗ 4.551∗∗∗ 4.511∗∗∗ 4.728∗∗∗ 5.297∗∗∗ 4.232∗∗∗ 3.699∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.249) (0.137) (0.216) (0.152) (0.188) (0.370) (0.366)
log(Population) −0.005 −0.009 0.010 0.009 −0.001 −0.062∗∗ 0.042 0.067
(0.015) (0.026) (0.014) (0.023) (0.016) (0.020) (0.040) (0.038)
Agglomeration −0.009 0.014 −0.006 0.020∗ −0.037∗∗∗ 0.023∗ −0.011 0.050∗∗
(0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.020) (0.018)
Suburban −0.033 −0.099∗ −0.013 −0.077 0.045∗ −0.096∗ −0.031 −0.072
(0.029) (0.049) (0.028) (0.045) (0.021) (0.043) (0.081) (0.081)
High-income 0.029 0.012 0.066 0.053 0.044 −0.145∗ 0.188 0.159
(0.041) (0.070) (0.041) (0.070) (0.034) (0.058) (0.110) (0.109)
Peri-urban −0.057 −0.125 −0.041 −0.101 0.014 −0.229∗∗ −0.100 −0.012
(0.040) (0.076) (0.039) (0.064) (0.034) (0.082) (0.131) (0.107)
Tourist −0.034 −0.067 −0.020 −0.027 −0.018 −0.200 0.165 −0.070
(0.063) (0.124) (0.060) (0.085) (0.040) (0.109) (0.162) (0.175)
Industrial 0.004 0.036 0.023 0.060 −0.036 −0.006 0.128 0.101
(0.034) (0.059) (0.033) (0.057) (0.025) (0.058) (0.106) (0.090)
Agronomic 0.000 −0.042 0.011 −0.033 0.029 −0.133 0.176 −0.142
(0.077) (0.156) (0.069) (0.143) (0.033) (0.088) (0.244) (0.176)
French −0.071∗∗∗ −0.213∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.066 0.072∗∗∗ −0.174∗ −0.161∗∗ 0.164∗∗
(0.021) (0.036) (0.029) (0.050) (0.016) (0.072) (0.060) (0.051)
Italian −0.159∗∗ −0.440∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗ −0.338∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗ −0.250∗∗ −0.767∗∗∗ −0.029
(0.054) (0.098) (0.035) (0.065) (0.033) (0.095) (0.122) (0.085)
N 324 324 281 281 324 285 324 320
adj. R-squared 0.090 0.195 0.036 0.106 0.258 0.139 0.127 0.115
Jarque-Bera 0.805 14.407∗∗∗ 1.798 3.027 7.606∗ 32.956∗∗∗ 13.710∗∗ 33.840∗∗∗
F-Statistic 1.325 0.779 0.456 2.780 28.736∗∗∗ 3.940∗ 0.459 8.781∗∗∗
Note: The estimations are on the logarithm of different dependent variables, as indicated in the header: API (administered price index), API−e (API
without electricity), EL (electricity), WM (waste management), SW (sewer water) and WS (water supply). All coefficients are estimated by OLS, and
significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (hc3) are reported in parentheses
below every estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared and Jarque-Bera tests with null hypothesis ’normal residual distribution’
are in the second part of the table. The F-test is for the joint hypothesis that agglomeration and population size mutually do not show any significant
impact on the dependent variable.
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Compared to overall administered price levels in estimations (1) to (4), esti-
mations on single service prices in (5) to (8) yield, to some extent, different,
but still inconsistent results. Four out of eight estimated coefficients for ’Ag-
glomeration’ and ’Population’ are significantly different from zero. Two are
positive, two are negative. Agglomeration size has a negative effect on elec-
tricity prices. The population size of a municipality has no impact on the prices
of the locally supplied services of water supply or sewer water. However, over
all four services, no clear tendency in how economies of scale interact with
administered service prices can be identified. Additionally, the F-Statistics for
the joint hypothesis H0 : β1 = β2 = 0 indicates that for all services apart from
sewer water, agglomeration and population size have a joint influence. But,
as discussed earlier, the estimated coefficients do not yield a consistent result
over all services. The variables of M show an influence similar to those in es-
timations (1) to (4). Municipality dummies have overall only a few significant
estimated coefficients, whereas the language dummies indicate differences be-
tween linguistic regions.
The estimation performance is described by measuring its explanatory power
and verifying the residual distribution. Remember that heteroscedasticity con-
sistent standard errors are used. Generally, the adjusted R-squared is between
9.0% and 25.8%. In one single estimation, it is 3.6%, which indicates ex-
tremely little explanatory power. This disqualifies this model specification to
some extent. The Jarque-Bera tests indicate that five of the eight estimations
have problematic residual distributions. All estimations on single prices have
problematic distributions, whereas only one of the estimations on the API or
API−e has non-normally distributed residuals. The significances of estimated
coefficients on single service prices are therefore not valid.
How should these results be judged? Or, more precisely, are prices affected by
economies of scale? Based on these estimations, the answer is ’no’.
That economies of scale are overall not visible, or at least not in ’valid’ esti-
mations, does not mean that they are nonexistent. Maybe service production
costs are affected, but producers, administrations or governments do not give
these benefits to the households over prices. Maybe scale effects are effectively
not present, because a large agglomeration or population size also brings dis-
advantages, as more complex networks or supply chains. Or, the effects might
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become visible if all smaller municipalities with less then 5′000 inhabitants were
included. Then, estimations on water supply and sewer water service prices
in particular might yield different results. However, the findings confirm the
results of Pommerehne (1983), who did not find economies of scale in waste
management service prices either. Other explanations for missing economies
of scale might be econometric problems. The explanatory power of the basic
model is weak, as seen in the very low adjusted R-squared. The model might
be specified badly and suffer from omitted variable bias. To test this last issue,
some further specifications are estimated. The section dealing with economies
of scales will conclude with a discussion of three alternate specifications to see
whether scale effects might become visible.
To change the specification, population and agglomeration size are specified
differently, as shown in table A.13 in the appendix. Population size is not used
as logarithm, and agglomeration size is complemented by the agglomeration
size squared. The change in population does not break the non-linear distribu-
tion, which allows us to see the full impact of population size on administered
prices. The added square of agglomeration size allows the estimation to ac-
count for difficulties that can emerge in large agglomerations, such as complex
supply chains or networks. The modifications do not change the results of the
basic estimations. The change is that only two F-Statistics remain signifi-
cant, so even ’less’ economies of scale can be observed with this specification
change. Also, similar specifications using, for example, the square of ’Popula-
tion’, did not yield different results. Using standard errors that are robust for
cantonal clusters also does not change the results.11
The second modification presented includes topography instead of language
dummies. Administered prices could also be affected by the underlying topog-
raphy of a municipality. The topography is split very roughly, as shown in table
A.14. No changes to the results are obtained. The estimated coefficients for
the economies of scales variables do not become significantly different from
zero. The R-squared are even lower than in the basic estimations. Addi-
11Cluster robust standard errors are used in the following subsections to control for can-
tonal influences. Note that other clusters could also be considered, for example, for munici-
palities with similar costs of living (approximated through tax burden or rents), topographical
characteristics or political similarity in terms of the prevailing ideology of the governments.
This is the main reason why hc3 standard errors, and not specific cluster robust standard
errors, are used in the basic estimations.
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tionally, no significant influence of topography on administered prices can be
detected.
Administered prices are, per definition, influenced by governments or admin-
istrations. It is very likely, as seen and discussed in section 4.2, that prices
are distributed differently across cantons. Therefore, in the estimations, one
should include cantons. But controlling for each and every canton is very dif-
ficult. The main problem is that several cantons have only one municipality in
the sample, which causes problems in the estimation of coefficients because
inverting the design matrix is not always possible. However, Switzerland can
be divided into large regions, as done in the last set of estimations, shown in
table A.15. These regions are all geographically connected and cover differ-
ent cantons and parts of cantons. Using regions does not change the results
obtained before. Nonetheless, the adjusted R-squared rise significantly in all
estimations, confirming that regional or cantonal effects play an important role
in administered price levels.
4.3.3 Relation to tax rates and rents
Income tax rates and rents are key variables for households and constitute a
considerable share of their spendings. In this subsection, the relation between
administered price levels, tax rates and rents in municipalities is analysed. Tax
rates and administered price levels show in most estimations a significantly
positive relation - therefore, municipalities with high tax rates usually show high
API values. Rents and administered prices appear to be independent.
Tax rates and rents are important variables for households, and they also affect
the choice of residence. If income is high, tax burden becomes more relevant
than rent. If income is low, tax rates do not matter that much, but the rent
becomes increasingly important. Both variables are important not only for
households, but also for municipalities. If tax rates are low and the mechanism
of capitalisation works, rents are high because households are attracted to and
willing to pay a lot to live in the municipality. If tax rates are high, households
are deterred and are not willing to pay much to live there. As a result, the
rents are typically low in such municipalities.
Since this is mainly a descriptive approach to relating tax burden and rents
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to administered prices, again a linear model specification is chosen. ’Tax’ and
’Rent’ are included with the corresponding indexes, described in subsection
4.3.1. Because a household pays different cantonal and communal income
tax in municipalities, both are included in the ’Tax’ variable. To include only
communal income tax burden in the tax variable would correspond to only
considering services provided by municipalities. Because electricity and waste
management services are provided over multiple municipalities or even cantons,
cantonal income tax is also included. For the variables ’AP’, ’Tax’ and ’Rent’,
the logarithm is taken to maintain the linearity of the model specification in the
variables as well. The model specification in equation (4.5) is again completed
by the set M, describing municipality type and official language.
log(APj ) = β0 + β1log(Taxj) + β2log(Rentj ) + βkMj + uj (4.5)
The estimations are OLS. In the table 4.7 are estimated coefficients with
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors reported (below, in parenthesis).
In the estimations (1) to (4), both the API as well the API−e are estimated
each on the complete sample of 324 municipalities and on a restricted sample
of 281. The restricted sample excludes all municipalities with any service price
equal to zero. In estimations (5) to (8), every service is used once as dependent
variable. For each estimation, municipalities with service price equal to zero
(of the dependent variable) are excluded. The residual distribution is tested
on normality through Jarque-Bera tests.
The estimation results are summarised in table 4.7. In seven out of eight
estimations, tax burden shows a significantly positive impact on administered
prices (at 5%). Consider that both variables are used in logarithmic form.
Therefore, the estimated coefficients between 0.127 and 0.542 indicate quite
a strong relationship. In estimations (1) to (4) with API and API−e , general
administered price levels increase per percent of tax burden by approximately
0.2% to 0.3%. In the estimations on single prices, especially in water supply
and sewer water, prices increase for every percent of tax burden by about 0.5%.
Again, both are strong relationships. The fact that tax burden and adminis-
tered prices have a significant positive relation to three different service prices
and differently aggregated indexes with varying databases is a notable result.
The relation to rent can not be identified based on these estimations. One co-
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Table 4.7: The relation to tax rates and rents
(1) API (2) API−e (3) API (4) API−e (5) EL (6) WM (7) SW (8) WS
Constant 6.517∗∗∗ 5.493∗∗∗ 6.052∗∗∗ 4.266∗∗∗ 4.620∗∗∗ 5.229∗∗∗ 1.000 0.317
(0.418) (0.765) (0.430) (0.742) (0.361) (0.823) (1.162) (1.217)
log(Tax) 0.211∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗ −0.069 0.542∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗
(0.052) (0.082) (0.051) (0.076) (0.042) (0.058) (0.119) (0.129)
log(Rent) −0.069 −0.046 0.044 0.208 −0.139∗∗ −0.033 0.245 0.504∗∗
(0.052) (0.111) (0.058) (0.108) (0.048) (0.134) (0.160) (0.173)
Suburban −0.017 −0.033 −0.021 −0.041 0.003 −0.011 −0.062 −0.041
(0.019) (0.033) (0.019) (0.031) (0.017) (0.031) (0.054) (0.055)
High-income 0.097∗∗ 0.156∗ 0.077∗ 0.104 0.036 −0.033 0.170 0.149
(0.033) (0.064) (0.033) (0.062) (0.032) (0.056) (0.088) (0.092)
Peri-urban −0.052 −0.079 −0.059∗ −0.082 −0.028 −0.122 −0.162 −0.031
(0.030) (0.060) (0.030) (0.048) (0.028) (0.071) (0.106) (0.077)
Tourist 0.001 −0.064 −0.023 −0.082 0.064 −0.171 0.131 −0.265
(0.049) (0.103) (0.050) (0.074) (0.040) (0.111) (0.156) (0.173)
Industrial 0.019 0.001 0.021 0.003 0.042∗ 0.004 0.099 −0.085
(0.027) (0.049) (0.027) (0.050) (0.020) (0.054) (0.093) (0.077)
Agronomic −0.002 −0.098 −0.003 −0.104 0.092∗∗ −0.117 0.120 −0.334∗
(0.072) (0.149) (0.066) (0.140) (0.032) (0.090) (0.240) (0.152)
French −0.078∗∗∗ −0.232∗∗∗ −0.023 −0.120∗ 0.084∗∗∗ −0.169∗ −0.230∗∗∗ 0.066
(0.022) (0.042) (0.028) (0.051) (0.017) (0.072) (0.067) (0.066)
Italian −0.115∗ −0.383∗∗∗ −0.068 −0.279∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ −0.253∗∗ −0.664∗∗∗ 0.062
(0.052) (0.093) (0.035) (0.062) (0.037) (0.098) (0.122) (0.082)
N 324 324 281 281 324 285 324 320
adj. R-squared 0.223 0.254 0.125 0.148 0.253 0.118 0.180 0.115
Jarque-Bera 1.973 27.792∗∗∗ 0.184 0.025 10.659∗∗ 24.050∗∗∗ 30.316∗∗∗ 33.787∗∗∗
Note: The estimations are on the logarithm of different dependent variables, as indicated in the header: API (administered price index), API−e (API
without electricity), EL (electricity), WM (waste management), SW (sewer water) and WS (water supply). All coefficients are estimated by OLS, and
significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (hc3) are reported in parentheses
below every estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared and Jarque-Bera tests with null hypothesis ’normal residual distribution’ are
in the second part of the table.
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efficient is significantly positive, one negative and the others not significantly
different from zero. In the given model specification and with underlying data,
no relation can be detected.
Adding ’Tax’ and ’Rent’ also alters overall estimation performance. The ad-
justed R-squared is between 11.5% and 25.4%. Especially in the first four
estimations with general administered price levels, taxes and rents improve
the explanatory power by quite a bit when compared to the specification with
economies of scale variables. Nevertheless, overall prediction quality is still
low, and other specifications and variables are needed to obtain good explana-
tory power. The Jarque-Bera tests indicate, as in the last subsection, issues
in the residual distribution. In the estimations with complete indexes, only one
residual distribution is not normal. In the single service price estimations (5)
to (8), distributions do not appear to be normal at all. Again, estimations
on single service prices have residual distribution problems, so estimated co-
efficients should be interpreted carefully. On the other hand, the results in
the first four estimations with the API and API−e are quite clear and seem
so far to be unproblematic, apart from the low adjusted R-squared. As an
intermediate result, taxes and administered prices are positively related. A
municipality with high income tax burden typically shows high administered
prices. Before discussing this result more in depth, some estimation variants
are presented.
As a first modification in the model specification, population and agglomera-
tion are added to the model. The estimated results are in table A.16. Even
though the conclusion of the last subsection does not confirm the presence
of economies of scale, along with tax and rent, a joint effect might occur.
However, the results do not change at all. Tax remains just as significant
as without economies of scale variables. And neither population nor agglom-
eration becomes systematically significant. The only recognisable change is
that explanatory power, measured by the adjusted R-squared, and therefore
corrected for relatively more variables, rises slightly.
Tax burden is influenced by cantons because it contains communal and can-
tonal income tax. Therefore, controlling for cantons is necessary. The problem
is again that some cantons only have one observation and many cantons only
a few. Given these circumstances, adding cantonal dummies poses problems
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for estimating the coefficients because the design matrix cannot be inverted.
Alternatively, the municipalities of the small cantons could be excluded from
the estimation. This approach is not applied, because the results should be
valid for all Swiss municipalities with more than 5′000 inhabitants. Therefore,
instead of cantonal dummies, regional dummies are added to replace language
dummies, as shown in table A.17 in the appendix. This change results in
non-significant estimated coefficients for ’Tax’, with the API−e as endoge-
nous variable. They are still positive, but no longer significantly different from
zero.
Cantonal influence can be considered by using standard errors for cluster sam-
ples. Estimations using the Huber-White method are made with the R-package
rms and reported table A.18. Correcting standard errors for cantonal clusters
confirms that other (omitted) cantonal variables could influence administered
prices. The standard errors become larger, and only two out of eight co-
efficients remain significantly different from zero. Most other p-values are
between 5% and 7%.
Both previous estimation variants weakened the initial finding that income
tax burden and administered prices show a significantly positive relation in
general. Using standard errors for cantonal clusters in particular indicates
that cantonal influences are important for this relationship. This is due to the
nature of basic services, especially for electricity and waste management, which
are not produced individually for each municipality, such that prices may be
identical in cantons or regions. In addition, the tax variable contains cantonal
income tax. Nevertheless, concluding that taxes and administered prices across
municipalities (at least across cantons) have a (weak) positive relation does
not seem to be entirely wrong. In all estimations with different dependent
variables or standard errors, all estimated coefficients were positive. If they
are not significant, the p-values are close to 5%. Up to now, the discussion
has been mainly descriptive. What implications do these results have?
A slightly more extended interpretation of these results is offered below. This
is not an hypothesis test, but it should illustrate an aspect of the estimation
results. The positive relation between tax burden and administered prices could
indicate that there are some municipalities that are more financially sound than
others. Even though municipalities may not receive all of the revenue from
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the services (because user charges are only a part of the administered price),
they still have a certain price-setting power. They often receive at least part
of the revenue through user charges. If a municipality has enough means,
revenues or other assets, there is no need to have high tax rates or administered
prices (through contained high user charges) for basic services. However,
in the opposite case, municipalities that are not financially sound have high
tax rates and also ask their households for the ’full’ price for its services,
maybe containing elements like relatively high reserves for depreciations, for
example.
This idea can be developed. What would be the conclusion if the estimated
coefficients were negative instead of positive? This would signify that munici-
palities have high tax rates and low service prices or vice versa. In this hypo-
thetical scenario, it is very likely that municipalities would substitute between
revenue, therefore either compensating for low tax revenue with user charges
and administered prices, or for low administered prices with high tax rates.
This could violate the benefits principle. Finally, there are no hints of such
behaviour. As mentioned, the results point in the opposite direction, that mu-
nicipalities are either financially sound or not. Again, how much municipalities
can influence prices and revenue from these services is an open question. The
positive relation between tax rates and administered price levels is described
here. Further research might provide better theoretical insights.
4.3.4 Institutional influence on price levels
After verifying the relation of administered prices to economies of scale, rents
and tax burden, in the upcoming subsection, the question of how administered
prices could be controlled or, more precisely, be influenced by institutions is
pursued. Two different types of institutions on the municipal level are consid-
ered in this approach, namely direct democracy and financial control. Based
on the underlying model specifications, estimations and data, municipalities
in cantons with strong finance control tend to have lower prices for the four
basic services. Direct democracy, measured by the presence of town meet-
ings (versus communal parliaments), does not affect prices in municipalities
significantly. The results have to be interpreted very carefully because finance
commission variables are constructed on the cantonal level. As before, other
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(omitted) cantonal influences might affect the analysis.
In Swiss municipalities, democratic decision making might be direct, through
town meetings, or representative, through a parliament. The findings of
Feld et al. (2003) and Matsusaka (2008) indicate that a direct democracy,
compared to a representative democracy, may shift revenue generation from
taxes to user charges. They also find that direct democracy causes smaller
governments in terms of revenue and spendings. Therefore, revenue generated
from user charges (and subsequently administered prices) is differently influ-
enced by a direct democracy than other revenue. The main explanation for
this observation, according to the authors, is that government revenue that
can be justified by a service is accepted by the people and therefore accepted
in (direct) votes. Politicians in representative systems are less focused on how
revenue is generated, which is quite plausible. Their studies are on a cantonal
level, so they are only conditionally comparable to this study analysing munic-
ipalities. Pommerehne (1983), on the other hand, stated that municipalities
with direct democracy (town meetings) showed lower prices for waste manage-
ment services. He pointed out that control mechanics in direct democracies
are much stronger, which might cause this difference.
The democratic system is included in the model specification in equation (4.6)
by the dummy variable ’Parliament’, indicating whether a municipality has
a parliament (1) or town meetings (0). The second variable of interest is
the strength of finance commissions, measured by the index ’FinCom’. The
finance commission index, originally suggested by Eichenberger and Schelker
(2007) and updated by Rühli (2012), describes how strong the mandatory
elements financial control of a municipality are. This measure is based on
cantonal law. The variable does not capture how efficiently these mandatory
elements are actually implemented, but indicates at least its minimal standards,
which are defined by cantonal law as a lower threshold. Note that the index
takes identical values for every municipality in a canton.
The key institutions in communal financial control are ’Accounts audit’, ’Busi-
ness audit’, ’External audit’ and ’Finance commission’. Based on cantonal law,
these are either optional, recommended or mandatory. The effects of these
institutions is investigated in the second part of this subsection. As mentioned
before, the results have to be interpreted very carefully because other effects
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at the cantonal level are very likely to be omitted. As seen in section 4.2, price
setting varies within and throughout cantons. Suppliers are often present over
multiple municipalities, and so similar or identically set prices might end up
showing in the estimated coefficients for cantonal variables.
In the basic model specification, in equation (4.6), ’Tax’ is added because of its
earlier significance. The specification is again completed by set M, containing
dummies for municipality type and language.
log(APj ) = β0 + β1Par lj + β2F inComj + β3log(Taxj) + βkMj + uj (4.6)
The results are reported in table 4.8. All estimations are again OLS with het-
eroscedasticity consistent standard errors. Estimations (1) to (4) are with the
API and API−e . Estimations (1) and (2) are on the complete sample, contain-
ing all 324 observations. Estimations (3) and (4) are on the restricted sample,
with 281 municipalities, excluding all municipalities with any administered ser-
vice price equal to zero. Estimations on single prices are in estimations (5)
to (8). Again, all observations with corresponding prices equal to zero are
excluded. The Jarque-Bera tests are carried out to observe residual distribu-
tions.
The estimation results are shown in table 4.8. Again, as in the previous sec-
tion, one variable shows influence, whereas the other does not seem to have
any relevance for prices. A p-value below 5% is required for a variable to be
considered as significantly different from zero. Direct democracy on a com-
munal level, measured by the presence of town meetings and parliaments, does
not have significant impact on price levels. The coefficients are estimated to
be positive. Therefore municipalities with parliaments do have slightly higher
price levels, but not significantly different from municipalities with town meet-
ings. The only significant estimated coefficient is for water supply, the most
locally organised service. This is also confirmed in further estimations, which
are discussed below. Note that the Jarque-Bera tests indicate residual distri-
bution problems, and p-values might not be valid. The coefficients for the
strength, or more precisely, potential strength, of finance commissions is con-
sistently estimated to be negative. In half of the estimations, coefficients are
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Table 4.8: Institutional control of administered prices
(1) API (2) API−e (3) API (4) API−e (5) EL (6) WM (7) SW (8) WS
Constant 6.214∗∗∗ 5.342∗∗∗ 6.499∗∗∗ 5.735∗∗∗ 3.857∗∗∗ 5.239∗∗∗ 2.714∗∗∗ 3.833∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.346) (0.189) (0.281) (0.155) (0.172) (0.412) (0.482)
Parliament 0.012 0.021 0.019 0.032 0.001 −0.009 0.013 0.135∗
(0.019) (0.037) (0.018) (0.031) (0.016) (0.031) (0.058) (0.058)
FinCom −0.024∗∗ −0.024 −0.024∗∗ −0.024 −0.026∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗ −0.012 −0.015
(0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.023) (0.023)
log(Tax) 0.216∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ −0.092∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.140
(0.045) (0.073) (0.040) (0.059) (0.032) (0.037) (0.086) (0.102)
Suburban −0.014 −0.026 −0.006 −0.011 −0.002 −0.006 −0.033 0.036
(0.019) (0.033) (0.020) (0.032) (0.016) (0.032) (0.054) (0.058)
High-income 0.083∗∗ 0.152∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.178∗∗ −0.002 −0.041 0.249∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.053) (0.030) (0.057) (0.027) (0.046) (0.078) (0.085)
Peri-urban −0.042 −0.063 −0.036 −0.040 −0.028 −0.115 −0.136 0.076
(0.031) (0.059) (0.031) (0.051) (0.028) (0.076) (0.114) (0.085)
Tourist −0.007 −0.068 −0.019 −0.061 0.047 −0.184 0.154 −0.195
(0.050) (0.110) (0.046) (0.070) (0.032) (0.107) (0.147) (0.169)
Industrial 0.028 0.013 0.029 0.011 0.048∗ 0.006 0.100 −0.042
(0.030) (0.053) (0.031) (0.053) (0.021) (0.058) (0.101) (0.077)
Agronomic −0.007 −0.099 −0.006 −0.105 0.084∗ −0.136 0.111 −0.298
(0.072) (0.149) (0.065) (0.138) (0.037) (0.087) (0.237) (0.170)
French −0.094∗∗∗ −0.250∗∗∗ −0.033 −0.136∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ −0.164∗ −0.196∗∗ 0.066
(0.022) (0.042) (0.030) (0.050) (0.017) (0.072) (0.066) (0.066)
Italian −0.087 −0.364∗∗∗ −0.056 −0.292∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ −0.201∗ −0.678∗∗∗ −0.062
(0.054) (0.100) (0.036) (0.064) (0.040) (0.100) (0.124) (0.097)
N 324 324 281 281 324 285 324 320
adj. R-squared 0.240 0.260 0.157 0.145 0.256 0.134 0.170 0.093
Jarque-Bera 0.449 9.455∗∗ 0.938 1.816 4.036 30.0164∗∗∗ 21.406∗∗∗ 38.311∗∗∗
Note: The estimations are on the logarithm of different dependent variables, as indicated in the header: API (administered price index), API−e (API
without electricity), EL (electricity), WM (waste management), SW (sewer water) and WS (water supply). All coefficients are estimated by OLS, and
significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (hc3) are reported in parentheses
below every estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared and Jarque-Bera tests with null hypothesis ’normal residual distribution’ are
in the second part of the table.
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significant at the 5% level. Remember that the FinCom-index takes values be-
tween 0 and 3; see table 4.4. A high index value indicates a potentially strong
financial control. Per increased index point, in the estimations (1) to (4) the
administered price level is 2.4% lower. For water supply and sewer water ser-
vices, prices are lower by 1.2% and 1.5%, respectively, if the index is increased
by 1. For waste management and electricity services, the impacts are 3.4%
and 2.6% stronger, respectively, when the index is increased by 1.
Without any further extensive discussion or estimations, municipalities with
potentially strong finance commissions tend to have lower service price lev-
els. However, the finance commission index (FinCom) is based on cantonal
law. Other cantonal effects may have been omitted. The intermediate result
should not be overrated, and it must be interpreted carefully. Adding insti-
tutional variables does not change the overall estimation performance much.
The adjusted-R squared remains approximately at the same level as in the
estimations with tax burden and rent. Instead of five, only four estimations
have problematic residual distributions, as indicated by the Jarque-Bera test.
Again, three estimations with the API and API−e show normally distributed
residuals.
To obtain better insight into the relation between administered price levels and
individual institutions, the specification is slightly altered. Single institutions
replace the ’FinCom’ index to see whether one institution in particular could
influence the results. In a second step, regions are added to control for local
effects. In a third step, it will be shown that without control for regions or
languages (and only topography), the ’FinCom’ index is much more relevant
for administered prices. Finally, the model is estimated with cluster robust
standard errors.
As previously discussed, the following four institutions are very important el-
ements in the financial control: ’Accounts audit’, ’Business audit’, ’External
audit’ and ’Finance commission’. The ’FinCom’ index is replaced by four
dummies, which take the value 1 if an institution is mandatory in the cor-
responding canton, and 0 otherwise. The results, as seen in table A.19 in
the appendix, show that two groups can be formed. External and business
audit coefficients are, with one exception, always negative and sometimes sig-
nificant. Accounts audit and finance commissions have negative and positive
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estimated coefficients, respectively, and they are rarely significantly different
from zero. Replacing the ’FinCom’ index with single institution dummies does
not yield robust results. Remember also that these dummies are based on
cantonal law, and therefore interpretations should be made cautiously.
The ’FinCom’ index is based on cantonal law. Controlling for cantons by
adding canton dummies would make the index redundant. Therefore, regions
replace language dummies, as shown in table A.20 in the appendix. The influ-
ence of parliaments remains weak; only in water supply is a significant negative
coefficient estimated. For the ’FinCom’ index, all estimated coefficients be-
come very small, some even positive and none is still significantly different from
zero. The extent to which this is caused by the grouping of cantons through
regions, or if truly no effects exist, is an open question. However, regional
grouping takes away a lot of the explanatory power of the ’FinCom’ index. If
language or region dummies are replaced by topography, as in the estimations
in table A.21, the estimated coefficients for the index are all negative, and six
of eight significantly different from zero.
There are strong indications that measured institutional influence on adminis-
tered prices might be driven by other cantonal variables. Estimating standard
errors for cluster samples confirms this impression, as seen in table A.22. No
’FinCom’ coefficient remains significant. Interestingly, four out of eight coef-
ficients for tax remain significantly positive. On the other hand, the ’FinCom’
index is the only index measuring the strength of financial control in Switzer-
land. Other measures would first have to be constructed for municipalities
to verify these results. Direct democracy, measured by the presence of town
meetings and parliaments, has almost never shown any significant relation to
administered prices, despite being constantly positive.
The section is closed with a remark about what is not implemented in this sub-
section. One contribution of Eichenberger and Schelker (2007) is the frame-
work of institutional competition between finance commissions or audit and
the government. In their index for institutional competition, the cantonal
percentage of town meetings is multiplied by the strength of finance com-
missions as an indicator for institutional competition. With municipalities and
not cantons as observations, an interaction term between the binary dummy
(1: town meeting, 0: parliament) and the ’FinCom’ index can be created.
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Then, the relative effect of strong finance commissions in municipalities with
town meetings could be estimated. As in this project, administered prices, and
not institutional competition, are focused on, this is an open area for further
research.
4.3.5 No sign of capitalisation in rents
Section 4.3 closes with a discussion of the influence of administered prices
on municipalities via capitalisation. Fiscal variables, namely debts and the
height of tax rates, influence municipalities’ ground or house prices, as well
as rents. A wide spectrum of literature exists on how fiscal decisions influ-
ence municipalities, mostly based on Oates (1969). In the Swiss context,
Feld and Kirchgässner (1997) analysed the influence of tax rates on rents.
Stadelmann (2009) did the same for house prices. The following analysis tests
whether administered prices (now as explanatory variable) have an impact on
rents. No significant influence is found.
In model specification (4.7), the dependent variable is ’Rent’. As before,
the additional costs for water supply and sewer water services are excluded.
As the main explanatory variable, the different administered price indexes are
used, namely the administered price index (API), the API without electricity
(API−e), electricity (EL), waste management (WM), sewer water (SW) and
water supply (WS).
As complementary explanatory variables, ’Tax’, as well as the set of economic
and demographic municipality characteristics M, are included. In M, popula-
tion size and the seven municipality type dummies are included. Due to the de-
pendence of rents on apartment quality, ’Constructions’ are added, to include
an indicator for building quality. This is the average number of buildings under
construction during 2010 and 2011 per inhabitant of a municipality.
log(Rentj ) = β0 + β1log(APj ) + β2log(Taxj) + βkMj + uj (4.7)
The estimation results for specification (4.7) are summarised in table 4.9. In
estimations (1) to (4), the API as well as the API−e are used as explana-
tory variables. In estimations (2) and (4), ’Construction’ is set aside. In
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estimations (5) to (8), price indexes of the single services are used, and con-
struction activity is always included. As database a subsample containing 271
municipalities is used for all estimations. All municipalities with construction
activity, water supply or waste management price equal to zero are excluded.
The estimations are again OLS, and the residual distributions are observed by
Jarque-Bera tests.
This is the moment to address a few words to the endogeneity of explana-
tory variables. Up to now, the administered prices have been the dependent
variables. There are neither theoretical nor empirical hints that administered
prices might systematically influence any of the other variables used so far.
Therefore, this was never discussed. ’Rent’, on the other hand, might influ-
ence ’Tax’, ’Construction’ or ’Population’. Surprisingly, in the capitalisation
literature, it is predominantly assumed that ’Rent’ does not influence ’Popula-
tion’, ’Construction’ or ’Tax’. This assumption is also made for the following
estimations, although it is not free of doubt.
The interpretation of the estimations for capitalisation of administered prices
on rents is very straightforward, as can be verified in table 4.9. With the ex-
ception of electricity, no service capitalises negatively in rents. The coefficients
for services in six estimations do not significantly differ from zero. Water sup-
ply capitalises positively in rents. Important for the results mentioned above
is, that all other control variables behave as expected. Most importantly, in
all estimations, tax burden capitalises significantly negative in rents (at the
5% level). This result is consistent with capitalisation literature. Construction
activity’s influence on rents is significantly positive. The higher the construc-
tion activity, the higher the building quality and subsequent rents. As already
mentioned, other dependences have to be considered, such as incentives to
construct buildings in municipalities with a low tax burden or in city centres.
Through the independence assumption from above, this issue - which is clearly
important - will not be further discussed. Finally, all coefficients for munic-
ipality dummies, as well as population size, are estimated to be significantly
different from zero.
The overall estimation performance evaluated by adjusted R-squared and Jarque-
Bera tests can be characterised as follows. The adjusted R-squared are above
50%, which is high compared to the results of the previous subsections. The
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Table 4.9: Capitalisation of administered prices
(1) Rent (2) Rent (3) Rent (4) Rent (5) Rent (6) Rent (7) Rent (8) Rent
Constant 4.732∗∗∗ 4.987∗∗∗ 4.760∗∗∗ 4.953∗∗∗ 5.607∗∗∗ 4.908∗∗∗ 4.958∗∗∗ 4.871∗∗∗
(0.318) (0.322) (0.268) (0.276) (0.387) (0.362) (0.249) (0.255)
log(Tax) −0.333∗∗∗ −0.356∗∗∗ −0.336∗∗∗ −0.361∗∗∗ −0.300∗∗∗ −0.320∗∗∗ −0.328∗∗∗ −0.332∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.041) (0.039) (0.040) (0.037) (0.036) (0.039) (0.037)
log(Population) 0.095∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Suburban 0.150∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
High-income 0.359∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050)
Peri-urban 0.190∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.038) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036)
Tourist 0.162∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043) (0.041)
Industrial 0.059∗ 0.054 0.057 0.052 0.059∗ 0.061∗ 0.059∗ 0.061∗
(0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Agronomic 0.080∗∗ 0.076∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.029) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025)
Constructions 3.903∗∗∗ 3.800∗∗∗ 3.420∗∗∗ 3.817∗∗∗ 3.841∗∗∗ 3.846∗∗∗
(0.945) (0.941) (0.978) (0.966) (0.940) (0.941)
log(API) 0.065 0.053
(0.062) (0.063)
log(API−e ) 0.068 0.071
(0.041) (0.043)
log(EL) −0.144∗
(0.071)
log(WM) 0.013
(0.057)
log(SW) 0.014
(0.023)
log(WS) 0.044∗
(0.022)
N 271 271 271 271 271 271 271 271
adj. R-squared 0.574 0.551 0.578 0.557 0.580 0.572 0.573 0.579
Jarque-Bera 13.952∗∗∗ 11.161∗∗ 17.644∗∗∗ 14.721∗∗∗ 19.753∗∗ 16.751∗∗∗ 15.581∗∗∗ 9.463∗∗
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of ’Rent’. All price indexes, namely API (administered price index), API−e (API without electricity), EL
(electricity), WM (waste management), SW (sewer water) and WS (water supply) are used as explanatory variables. All coefficients are estimated by
OLS, and significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (hc3) are reported in
parentheses below every estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared and Jarque-Bera tests with null hypothesis ’normal residual
distribution’ are in the second part of the table.
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characteristic variables for municipalities explain rents much better than admin-
istered prices. The main problems with this analysis are the residual distribu-
tions. All Jarque-Bera tests indicate that residuals are not normally distributed,
so all p-values are not valid, and the results in general have to be interpreted
carefully.
So far, no influence of administered prices on rents has been detected. De-
spite the fact that water supply prices capitalise positively - which cannot be
explained - electricity prices capitalise significantly negative. This could be be-
cause it is by far the most expensive price in the index. The explanatory power
of the estimations is sufficient, and not as low as before. Nevertheless, maybe
with other specifications, significant coefficients could be detected. In a first
step, different construction activity variables are used. Secondly, regions are
added as before because maybe regional effects are again present.
In table A.23, ’Constructions ongoing’ is replaced by ’Constructions finished’
(CF) and ’Building applications’ (BA) in 2010 and 2011. Again, both variables
are per capita. By adding these variables, a larger time interval is considered
for construction activity. All finished constructions could have been started
before 2010. And applications are maybe still under construction in 2012. The
application variable also captures the demand for the construction of buildings
in a municipality. The key results do not change. Administered prices do
not capitalise, whereas tax burden still does. ’Constructions finished’ is in
all but one estimation significantly positive. On the other hand, the building
applications from 2010 and 2011 have positive estimated coefficients, but they
are not significantly different from zero.
In the second modification, in table A.24, regions are added. Also in this
modification, the most important results remain the same as in the genuine
approach. Tax burden still capitalises, but administered prices do not. The
change is that it is not the municipality type dummies that have significant
coefficients, but the regions.
Overall, it can be summarised that administered prices for the underlying ser-
vices do not capitalise significantly on rents. Intuitively, two explanations can
be offered for this result. Firstly, compared to the amounts paid for taxes, the
amounts for government services are low for most households. Secondly, the
perception of several single and committed spendings might be weak compared
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to one as large and general as taxes. However, if households were perfectly
rational, every Swiss franc spent should capitalise negatively. But this cannot
be observed. Perhaps the intuition of Feld et al. (2003) can be used here. If
a household sees what money is spent on, it ’accepts’ it more than if it is just
’lost’ tax money.
If more services were included in the index, maybe capitalisation could be
detected. Nevertheless, the index includes the most expensive services in terms
of household spendings on a communal level. Another important issue related
to capitalisation is that administered prices are independent of income but
dependent on the consumption of services. Therefore, households with high
incomes are much more aware of the tax burden than administered price levels.
They are mobile and can afford to pay high rents. Thus, their willingness to
pay for a rent in a municipality with low tax burden end up influencing the
rents. The administered prices analysed affect households maximally by a
small, four-digit CHF amount per year. Income taxes for average incomes are
usually higher. Therefore, households that are mobile and can afford high rents
do not care very much about administered prices. In the end, high administered
prices are not necessarily bad. It could also indicate that cost transparency is
given in a municipality, and every household pays only for its consumption, but
not via taxes for the consumption of other households.
Contrariwise, low-income households pay lower taxes, but still consume basic
services and have to pay for them. The expenditures for basic services of
low-income households with many members can be a serious financial burden.
But low-income households, which are affected much more by administered
prices, are less mobile. Because of the smaller budgets for rents and mobility,
households with a low income are not able to influence the rents. Thus,
contrary to tax rates, the mechanisms of capitalisation in rents should not
work with administered prices, as is confirmed by the empirical results.
4.4 Summary and outlook
This section contains three parts. The main findings are summarized in 4.4.1.
After the summary, two outlooks follow. Based on the findings in the empir-
ical section, one possible role of administered prices in fiscal competition is
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discussed in 4.4.2. Finally, the idea of a cost-of-living index for Swiss munici-
palities is outlined in 4.4.3.
4.4.1 Summary
Administered prices for basic services are measured and compared among the
324 largest Swiss municipalities in 2012. An index to measure service prices
is developed. The index measures the total price or cost of all services for
a representative Swiss household. The index shows that the prices for ba-
sic services vary considerably across municipalities. That is to some extent
surprising because services are of a similar quality across all municipalities,
communal governments administer the prices and the benefits and cost recov-
ery principles should be respected. To discuss the observed price differences,
administered service prices are related to municipality characteristics. Munic-
ipalities with relatively low tax burden and strong finance commissions tend
to show lower service prices. To what extent these results are dependent on
omitted cantonal variables is an open issue for further research.
Index for administered prices of basic services in Swiss municipalities
In section 4.2, a consumption profile-based index for administered prices in
municipalities is constructed. Due to tariff plans, prices for three different
household consumption profiles are used to determine representative service
prices. In the resulting API for the 324 largest Swiss municipalities, a majority
of municipalities have API values between 80 and 120 points. Assuming that
services are approximately of a similar quality across all municipalities, the
extreme values in the index come as a surprise.
Whereas in the complete API, the spread is between 62 and 152 points, exclud-
ing electricity widens it to 38 to 180 points. Therefore, in the most expensive
municipality, a similar basket of services costs about 4.5 times more than in
the most favourable one. High administered prices are not necessarily bad,
keeping in mind that cost recovery and benefits principle allow providers to
charge the cost incurred. In a few municipalities, waste management or wa-
ter supply services are financed fully or at least partially by other revenue.
The price level differences between municipalities are discussed in section 4.3.
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For this purpose, the administered price indexes are related to municipality
characteristics.
Positive relation between tax burden and administered prices
The most robust result is that municipalities with relatively high tax burden also
show high service prices. One interpretation could be that municipalities are
either financially sound or need to generate revenue wherever they are able to.
Keep in mind that it is not known how much of the revenue out of administered
prices for specific services is going to the municipalities. The focus of this
analysis is on the burden for households, and prices are described descriptively.
Very low adjusted R-squared values indicate that the basic model is not capable
of explaining the differences in price levels very well. Other explanations for
differences could be the quality of services, the efficiency of providers, or the
intrinsic motivation of communal administrations. Additionally, prices can be
affected by long-term decisions, such as creating reserves for depreciations or
new infrastructure investments. Indicators for omitted variable biases do exist,
especially for variables related to cantons.
No hint of economies of scale and capitalisation
No evidence was found for economies of scale or capitalisation of administered
service prices. The absence of economies of scale in prices does not mean that
in the production process none are given. This is quite a surprising result, but
it is confirmed in a previous study. On the other hand, it seems obvious -
assuming that households are neither fully rational nor completely informed -
that administered prices do not capitalise in rents. The main reason is most
likely the independence of income and therefore the relatively small amount to
pay.
Uncertain institutional influence
The analysis of institutional or financial control in municipalities did yield inter-
esting, but not fully reliable, results. Direct democracy on a communal level
only has significant influence on the communally organised services of water
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supply and sewer water. Including the potential strength of finance commis-
sions increases the explanatory power of the model and shows that munici-
palities with strong financial control have slightly lower administered prices.
However, not all estimations and specifications confirmed this result with sig-
nificant coefficients. Because the ’FinCom’ index assigns identical values for
all municipalities within a canton, the result is not robust towards specification
modifications, and omitted variable biases are likely present.
Price setting mechanism remains a black box
Finally, the price-setting behaviour for basic services remains a black box. By
relating the administered prices to municipality characteristics, some intuitions
about how these prices are distributed over different municipalities can be pro-
vided. But key variables, such as production and administration efficiency, are
very complicated to observe or instrument. The analysis dealing with admin-
istered prices is closed with two outlooks. As previously mentioned, in section
4.4.2, a somewhat hypothetical discussion about a possible role of adminis-
tered prices in fiscal competition is outlined. In section 4.4.3, a very basic
concept for a cost-of-living index for Swiss municipalities is presented.
4.4.2 Fiscal competition through administered prices?
To what extent might administered price levels play a role in fiscal competition?
Based on the most important findings from this chapter, a possible role of
administered prices in fiscal competition will be presented. The results show
that administered prices cannot replace tax rates as a major instrument, but
rather complement them in order to attract high-income households and deter
those with low income. The discussion begins with a summary of the most
important findings. Then, the incentives of municipalities, low- and high-
income households will be discussed.
Firstly, user charges and administered prices should fulfil the cost recovery
and benefits principle. Controlling the implementation of these principles is
difficult. They do not imply any measure for production efficiency or competi-
tiveness of prices. Secondly, competition for public services does not play any
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role in municipalities. Local monopolies are standard. Inter-communal compe-
tition is also non-existent. All service prices are administered on a communal
level. Households are not aware of AP-levels because they do not care if the
income is high and, if it is low, relocation seems very costly just to avoid high
administered prices. Thirdly, administered prices are dependent on consump-
tion and independent of income, so they can be compared to lump-sum taxes.
Relatively, lump-sum taxes affect low- and medium-income households much
more than high-income households. Administered prices especially burden large
households with many members. Finally, no indication is found that adminis-
tered prices capitalise in rents. As long as administered prices do not increase
significantly, they probably will not have any influence on rents.
After outlining the initial position, the role of the players, their incentives and
costs will be discussed. In this simplified framework, the players are municipal-
ities and low- and high-income households.
Households try to minimise the aggregated cost of living. They have to make
efforts to compare financial impacts of municipalities on their budget. Moving
to a different municipality causes mobility cost. Households with high income
are mainly concerned about (income) tax. Low-income households are not
that influenced by taxes, but rather by rents and to some extent administered
prices.
Municipalities, on the other hand, try to attract as many high-income house-
holds as possible to maximise revenue. The main tool to attract high-income
households are low income tax rates, which may lead to high rents via capi-
talisation. If a municipality is able to engage in this strategy, it has the basic
setting for attracting high-income households and deterring low-income ones
(due to high rents). Additionally, municipalities can try to avoid low rents by
refusing construction applications for low rent-apartments. Low tax rates may
motivate additional investments in buildings and constructions, and overall a
municipality should be fine in this limited context.
If, for whatever reason, this strategy cannot be utilised by a municipality, or
the mechanics of capitalisation do not work, administered prices might come
into play. High tax rates alone do not bother low-income households, as often
they do not have to pay much or even any income tax. What might hurt the
budgets of low-income households is an increase in the price for government
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services, because of its lump-sum tax characteristics. Additionally, the income
tax burden could be reduced again through the higher revenue. Subsequently,
the municipality can attract more high-income households.
Both the benefits and the cost recovery principles have to be respected. A
municipality theoretically should not abuse administered prices for fiscal com-
petition. Municipalities with very high API values exist for other reasons, but
as of yet this has not been an issue. Another important observation in the
empirical section is that high-income municipalities systematically have higher
administered price levels. These mechanics might already work to some extent:
breaking progressive tax systems by adding more lump-sum revenue, resulting
in reduced revenue generation through progressive income tax.
To what extent this strategy is used by municipalities or could be applicable
can be analysed in further studies. The amounts that have to be paid for basic
services right now do not seem large enough (at least in most municipalities)
to deter households. Of the underlying 324 municipalities, 21 have an API
below 80 index points, and 20 have one above 120. If a great number of
municipalities uses administered prices in the way discussed here, the standard
deviation of the index increases. This might provoke public attention, followed
by interference from politics and the courts.
In this outlook, the extent to which administered prices could be used in fiscal
competition was discussed. The concept above is hypothetical and should
illustrate that, especially for low income households, administered prices can
be a serious burden. Considering that rents in Swiss cities continuously rise,
this issue could be addressed.
4.4.3 Cost-of-living index for Swiss municipalities
The approach presented in part 4.2 measures costs for government services
in Swiss municipalities. This idea could be extended to overall cost-of-living
indexes for municipalities. Cost-of-living indexes for cities around the world
already exist. They usually include consumption goods, but often exclude all
government-related spendings such as taxes and fees. Across Swiss municipal-
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ities, price differences between consumption goods and services also exist.12
However, the differences in spendings for these goods and services (except
for gastronomy) between different municipalities have only a limited impact.
Contrariwise, prices for government services, health care, rents and tax rates
differ significantly and constitute a large part of a household’s spendings. How
can an index for cost of living be constructed such that the most important
spendings of a household are included?
There are two basic methods that could be pursued for this construction.
One is to create a random sample across households or citizens, including the
quantities and quality of consumed goods and corresponding prices. Based
on these data, either standard index formulas can be applied or a hedonic
approach could be chosen. The problem is the very high cost of collecting
these data. A sufficiently large random sample for each considered municipality
is costly. Again, a second possibility is to work with fixed consumption profiles
of households.
The consumption profiles in this analysis allow us to estimate prices for gov-
ernment services and rents. To add the most important financial aspect, the
communal and cantonal income tax burden, the profiles have to be comple-
mented by income. This results in a multidimensional profile for a household,
containing the number of members, flat, income and service-specific consump-
tion. For health care, the age of the people in the household should also be
added. For the profiles and its dimensions, single distributions across Switzer-
land are known. The cost for an average or different specific households could
be estimated. All basic data, including prices, are available. The main problem
is that the joint frequency distributions of consumption between the individual
dimensions of the profiles are often unknown. They need to be approximated
or estimated.
Creating a cost-of-living index for Swiss municipalities would provide a key
variable to compare the municipalities. It would put tax rates or rents in a
complete context, including all other major spendings. Standard consumption
12Service prices, for example, for hair cuts, or gastronomy prices, vary widely. Even more
importantly, consumption goods in stores have different prices across different municipality
types. But for these goods, the differences are often compensated by higher quality. For
example, the goods in food stores of a high-income municipality or a city centre are probably
more expensive, but they usually are of better quality. Therefore, price differences for standard
goods certainly exist, but these could probably be explained by quality differences.
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goods could probably be neglected because their prices should not differ too
much across municipalities. Based on such an index, the attractiveness of
municipalities could be evaluated on a completely new level. As a side-product
of the creation of such an index, online price-comparison portals could support
household decision making by comparing different municipalities according to
income, desired flat and people living in it. This tool could be extended with
various features, such as time needed to go to work by car or public transport.
As a result, households could compare municipalities precisely with regards to
their preferences.
Chapter 5
General summary
The general summary consists of two parts. The most important results of
each analysis and the important issues for further research are summarised
in section 5.1. In the second section, 5.2, the general insights of all three
projects are combined and implemented in simple heuristics. They support the
decision making process in the selection of the optimal method for analysing
a new system of specific tariff plans.
5.1 Key results
The general contribution of this thesis is the suggested solutions to problems
with price measurement, particularly in how to compare service providers that
offer (multiple) tariff plans. It is shown how prices can be compared efficiently
among several tariff plans from different providers. This issue rarely finds
a place in the scientific literature. Technical manuals of statistical offices or
other organisations, if available, predominantly suggest the use of consumption
profiles to compare service prices.
Though all analysed prices result from tariff plans, the three projects are quite
independent, and thus the major contributions are contained in the specific
applications. For mobile communication services and public transport, two
innovative index concepts are suggested and empirically tested. In the con-
text of administered prices, standard consumption profiles are used to compare
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service prices. There, the relevant contribution is the economic analysis of ser-
vice prices in Swiss municipalities. The most important findings and issues for
further research of each project are summarised below. To avoid redundancy
with the general introduction in chapter 1 and the summaries of each specific
chapter, this section focuses only on the most important points.
Hedonic price indexes for mobile communication
By applying hedonic price indexes to compare tariff plans of mobile commu-
nication providers, all characteristics of the extremely diverse contracts are
consistently implemented in the price comparison. The presently used con-
sumption profile methods are not capable of doing so, and they ignore major
characteristics, which results in biased price comparisons.
As this is a first application of hedonic price indexes for mobile communication,
different model specifications are estimated with several methods. Because
consumption is dependent on the tariff plans, the double-imputed indexes use
symmetric index formulas to treat all providers equally. All resulting indexes
indicate that Swisscom has significantly lower implicit prices than Orange for
the given sample. This contradicts official statistics. Possible reasons are
that Orange consumers are not in efficient tariff plans, Swisscom offers more
attractive tariff plans for students or Orange adapts its tariff plans to the
consumption profiles of the Federal Office of Communications. For further
research, non-parametric model specifications might be particularly interesting
to improve the prediction accuracy. Additionally, several practical issues give
rise to important open questions, such as determining optimally the discount
on the phone price.
The kilometer price index for public transport
The kilometer price index for public transport describes the implicit price for
an averagely consumed kilometer with a specific provider. The concept is
straightforward and easily communicable to a broad public. Currently used
price indexes for public transport in Switzerland use profiles and compare ex-
plicit prices of tickets. These methods are undocumented, and they suffer
from the same problems as all other indexes based on profiles.
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In the results, the presented kilometer price index estimates implicit price in-
creases to be lower than the other methods do. In years without any tariff
change, implicit prices may even fall, which is not perceived at all by the pub-
lic. More than 50% of all kilometers are travelled by people possessing a GA
travelcard. Though its explicit price has been raised significantly, the implicit
kilometer price increased by only 4% between 2007 and 2011. The major rea-
son for this observation is that consumers travel more with the same GA tariff
plan, mainly because the quality and speed of connections increased. These
increases are implemented in the index and consequently result in lower implicit
kilometer prices. Ticket types with smaller weights in the index contributed
more to the general implicit price increase measured by the KMI, even though
their explicit prices were not raised that much. In further applications of this
concept, one should mainly invest in the data structure and, separate first-
and second-class tickets into different accounts.
Administered prices of basic services in Swiss municipalities
Prices for electricity, waste management, water supply and sewer water ser-
vices are paid by every household each year. A representative two-person
household pays in average slightly more than 1′000 Swiss francs for these four
services. The services are provided by local monopolists, and the prices are
administered by governments. Because the prices for four different services
among 324 Swiss municipalities are compared, the profile method is applied.
Three standardised households are used to determine the profiles and mea-
sure service prices for different consumption intensities. The resulting index
shows significant differences in service prices across municipalities. Because
the prices are administered and should respect the benefits as well as the cost
recovery principles, these differences are analysed.
The service price differences are explained by several municipality character-
istics. The most robust result is that municipalities with a high tax burden
usually also show high service prices. In addition, the municipalities in cantons
with strong financial control tend to show lower administered prices. Both
results are heavily dependent on cantonal clusters and should be interpreted
cautiously. There is no sign that economies of scale result in lower service
prices or that these service prices capitalise in rents. This analysis provided
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an alternative perspective on user charges, which generate part of non-tax
government revenue. In further research, particularly the cantonal variables
omitted in the estimations should be investigated and discussed. To compare
municipalities with regard to several fiscal and financial variables from a house-
hold perspective, a cost-of-living index, including tax rates, rents, education
and healthcare costs could be constructed. As a result, municipalities could be
evaluated precisely by including these important variables jointly. Additionally,
this concept could be used to create a website to support household deci-
sion making about where to live, according to household type, income and
workplace.
5.2 Heuristics to select the optimal method
Which method should be applied to analyse prices from a specific new system
of tariff plans? This question is answered by summarising the most important
general insights of all three projects combined. As a result, the choice is mainly
dependent on three factors, namely the characteristics of the tariff plans, the
purpose of the analysis and the available data.
Problems caused by tariff plans
Tariff plan systems pose problems in standard price statistics when trying to
compare service providers. That services can be purchased via different tariff
plans is the central issue. This results in different costs or prices for the
consumption of identical services. Additionally, complex and diverse tariff plan
specifications, such as flat rates or special discounts, often pose immense
problems because the resulting service prices are independent of consumption.
The aim of a price comparison should be to compare implicit prices for actually
consumed services, not to compare explicit prices that are not related to actual
consumption. The presented approaches analyse prices resulting from tariff
plans by adjusting price indexes for actual quantities consumed, corresponding
quality and prices paid.
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Identifying explicit and implicit prices
For this purpose, explicit and implicit prices have to be identified and distin-
guished for the given tariff plans and providers. When implicit unit prices can
be identified and estimated, several price index concepts are applicable. If
implicit unit prices cannot be identified or estimated, the use of consumption
profiles is required. Determining service prices for consumption profiles is al-
most always a feasible solution. The downside is, as discussed throughout the
entire thesis, that the resulting prices may lack important aspects of the tariff
plans, which results in questionable rankings of provider prices. For example,
in the mobile communication project, the profiles did not allow the inclusion
of the discounts for students, which are a significant component of the service
prices.
Selecting the optimal method
If implicit unit prices can be estimated, the choice of the optimal method is
dependent on the purpose of the analysis, the characteristics of the tariff plans
and the available data (or the budget for sampling). If the purpose is a simple
measure that has to be stable and easily communicated, a standard price index
formula, as in the public transport chapter, is preferable. If a more extensive
analysis is planned, or if the characteristics of the tariff plans are complex (for
example, when different units are contained in a service, such as in mobile
communication), the hedonic approach is very promising. However, in reality,
sampling cost or available data are usually the limiting factors.
Data as resource and constraint
If data of single observations are not available or the general quality is inferior, it
may be difficult or even impossible to estimate implicit unit prices. In this case,
one has to rely again on consumption profiles. Despite all of their problems,
consumption profiles have two major advantages. First, if tariff plans for
several services are analysed, as in chapter 4, the other approaches can result in
overly complicated price comparisons. The results may be difficult to interpret
or be influenced by the limiting assumptions that were needed to obtain them.
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The second advantage of fixed consumption profiles is that the corresponding
prices can be determined under any circumstances, especially when no data is
available and the budget to generate new data is limited.
Data from service providers
As in chapter 3, which addressed public transport, data about aggregated rev-
enue and consumption from providers might be available. Or even better, they
could have consumer-specific observations on hand; for example, mobile com-
munications service providers have monthly phone bills. The advantage of this
scenario is obviously that the cost of data generation is minimal. The down-
side is that aggregated consumption is usually estimated, and these estima-
tions may contain problems. Additionally, the data are provided by the provider
whose prices are analysed, so there may be conflicts of interests.
Accuracy of the three applied methods
In this thesis, only three methods were presented. There is no need to men-
tion that other approaches exist for comparing prices resulting from tariff plans.
From the applied methods, the hedonic price indexes yield theoretically accu-
rate results if the model is specified correctly. However, the method requires
good data quality. Additionally, the approach requires a sufficiently large sam-
ple. Moreover, the concept for public transport results in a theoretically unbi-
ased and accurate estimator for the price of an averagely travelled kilometer.
The problem is again on the data side. If one cannot ensure that the estima-
tion quality of aggregated revenue and consumption is good, profiles may be
a more reliable and stable measure for comparing prices.
Therefore, these two concepts are theoretically accurate estimators for provider
prices. However, they depend heavily on data quality and are quite sensitive.
The third approach, the profile method, is the opposite. Theoretically, it is
not necessarily an unbiased estimator. It is applied for basic services because
there is only one tariff per municipality and service. In this case, no strict
assumptions about the consumer behaviour are required. The profile method
is theoretically not very elegant. But practically, it is very robust towards data
because prices for profiles can always be collected and compared. To sum up,
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if data quality is bad, using a ’fancy’ method might yield less accurate results
than profiles do.
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A.1 Mobile communication
A.1.1 Average unit prices and the constant
In the estimations of subsection 2.3.2, the constant is always significantly dif-
ferent from zero. The constant can be interpreted as the basic subscription
price for a certain provider, but it does not correspond to a consumption unit.
The constant is always relatively large. In contrast, the estimated coefficients
are marginal unit prices that are often estimated smaller than expected or not
significantly different from zero. This is caused by the structures of contracts
for students, which contain flat rates for calls, text messages and data. Con-
tracts with high fixed cost and no marginal cost do obviously influence the
magnitude of the constant upwards. In this part of the appendix, average
unit prices are estimated to evaluate how the invoiced amount is distributed
in average on consumed units. To obtain average unit prices, models without
a constant are estimated.
The average invoiced amount is about 55 Swiss francs (CHF), whereas the
constants are estimated between 25 and 52 CHF in the linear specifications.
Average unit prices from providers are presented by estimating all model spec-
ifications with a suppressed constant. The invoiced amount is regressed ex-
clusively on consumed units. As a result, the coefficients can be interpreted as
average unit prices. In the linear specification, they are scaled in CHF. How-
ever, suppressing the constant has econometric consequences. All estimated
coefficients are biased, so the estimates give only an idea of the magnitude of
an average unit price. The adjusted R-squared no longer denotes the propor-
tion of variance explained compared to a model containing only a constant. It
is compared to white noise, which explains the high adjusted R-squared.
All estimations are carried out again and reported in the following tables:
• Table A.3: Specifications with single variables
• Table A.4: Specifications with grouped variables
• Table A.5: Specifications without influential observations, grouped vari-
ables
• Table A.6: Specifications without influential observations, single vari-
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ables
• Table A.7: Model estimation for index construction
The estimations with grouped variables are used to describe the prices. The
descriptions should give an idea of the range of average unit prices from both
providers. Generally, Orange’s prices are more sensitive to estimation vari-
ants.
• The average minute price (without roaming) is estimated between 0.03
and 0.11 CHF.
• An average text message costs between 0.06 and 0.12 CHF.
• A megabyte costs from 0.02 to 0.05 CHF.
• Roaming minute unit prices are estimated at between 0.12 and 1.21
CHF.
• Not enough observations contain roaming text messages, so their unit
prices widely depend on the specification and estimation method. This
also holds for roaming data.
• The phone discount coefficient is estimated at between 0.75 and 1.67
CHF.
The phone discount is the most interesting variable in these estimations with
a suppressed constant. It is quite stable over all estimations. Because the
variable is scaled in CHF, the coefficient can be interpreted as how much of
the discount is paid back to the provider per month. A coefficient of 1 would
signify that the discount is paid back exactly. The estimated coefficients are
around 1 when there is no constant in the model specification. This indicates
that the fixed cost could be explained by a consumption unit, namely the phone
discount, which corresponds to the reality of mobile communication contracts.
Discounts on phones are usually linked to the magnitude of the fixed cost of
a contract.
The principle goal of a hedonic price index is to obtain accurate and unbiased
predictions. Therefore, specifications with constants are used in chapter 2.
Whether the phone discount can replace the constant, and reasonable pre-
dictions can still be obtained, is an open question. Certainly, suppressing the
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constant shows that the phone discount variable is able to explain much more
than was apparent in the genuine estimations.
In both of the following tables, indexes are constructed based on linear models
with grouped variables and a suppressed constant, see table A.7. The results
can be compared to those in subsection 2.3.3. The specifications with the
biased unit prices tend to estimate rather high relative price levels, see tables
A.1 and A.2. How this result should be interpreted is an issue for further
research.
Table A.1: Indexes with base period t
Fisher Törnqvist
M S O M S O
Q3.12 100.00 99.95 109.99 100.00 99.99 102.96
Q4.12 100.00 97.63 146.71 100.00 95.92 115.57
Q1.13 100.00 98.31 131.09 100.00 99.01 130.26
Note: Swisscom (S) and Orange (O) prices are compared to the entire
sample or market (M). All price comparisons are made within one of
the quarterly periods, Q3.12, Q4.12 and Q1.13. The Fisher index is
reported on the left and the Törnqvist index on the right.
Table A.2: Indexes with base period 0
Fisher Törnqvist
M S O M S O
Q3.12 100.00 99.95 109.99 100.00 99.99 102.96
Q4.12 78.36 76.50 114.96 87.27 83.71 100.85
Q1.13 81.38 80.00 106.68 90.63 89.73 118.05
Note: Swisscom (S) and Orange (O) prices are compared to the entire
sample or market (M). All price comparisons are relative to the entire
market (M) in Q3.12, thus price development over time is observable.
The Fisher index is reported on the left and the Törnqvist index on the
right.
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Table A.3: Specifications with single consumption variables
lin S lin O log S log O BC S BC O dmp S dmp O
Minutes fix net 0.129∗∗ −0.047 0.010∗∗∗ −0.002 0.023∗∗∗ −0.007 1.537 3.335
(0.039) (0.060) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (1.385) (2.498)
Minutes mobile on 0.004 0.072 0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.005∗ 0.014∗ −0.457 −0.321
(0.013) (0.045) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (1.103) (1.998)
Minutes mobile off 0.007 0.546∗∗∗ −0.013∗ 0.015∗∗ −0.021 0.055∗∗∗ 4.754∗∗ 9.031∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.084) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.012) (1.448) (2.212)
SMS 0.066∗∗ 0.057 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 2.728∗ 1.137
(0.024) (0.036) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (1.294) (1.904)
MMS 0.255 0.823 −0.017 0.010 −0.018 0.046 4.361∗ 16.710∗∗∗
(0.407) (1.445) (0.026) (0.081) (0.062) (0.204) (1.883) (4.824)
MB 0.023∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 5.068∗∗∗ 3.539∗∗
(0.002) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.602) (1.135)
CH minutes roaming 0.046 0.077 −0.002 −0.004 −0.002 −0.001 4.084 2.081
(0.033) (0.324) (0.002) (0.018) (0.005) (0.046) (2.368) (3.592)
CH SMS roaming 0.183 1.099∗∗∗ 0.053∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.100∗ 0.125∗∗∗ −5.507∗∗ 6.348∗
(0.321) (0.211) (0.021) (0.012) (0.049) (0.030) (2.018) (2.851)
Roaming minutes 2.066∗∗∗ 5.006∗∗∗ 0.069∗ 0.044 0.230∗∗ 0.287∗ 14.385∗∗∗ 11.051∗
(0.483) (0.874) (0.031) (0.049) (0.074) (0.124) (2.991) (4.568)
Roaming SMS 0.551∗∗ 0.637 0.034∗∗ 0.012 0.088∗∗ 0.048 7.129∗∗∗ 5.989
(0.176) (0.516) (0.011) (0.029) (0.027) (0.073) (1.799) (4.895)
Roaming MMS 19.311∗ −45.464 0.770 −2.716 2.368 −7.228 5.625 12.450
(9.268) (28.739) (0.596) (1.609) (1.421) (4.067) (10.042) (25.166)
Roaming MB 0.945∗∗ 1.155∗∗ −0.005 0.016 0.014 0.085 16.256∗∗∗ 16.708∗∗∗
(0.284) (0.418) (0.018) (0.023) (0.044) (0.059) (4.575) (4.521)
Phone discount 1.550∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ −0.250 −0.441
(0.204) (0.213) (0.013) (0.012) (0.031) (0.030) (0.201) (0.238)
N 215 115 215 115 215 115 215 115
adj. R-squared 0.852 0.872 0.827 0.880 0.846 0.885 0.906 0.898
Reset 73.556∗∗∗ 45.088∗∗∗ 388.851∗∗∗ 275.911∗∗∗ 277.346∗∗∗ 146.289∗∗∗ 1.796 12.522∗∗∗
Jarque-Bera 87.358∗∗∗ 1.084 3.576 1.594 3.284 0.699 416.536∗∗∗ 73.710∗∗∗
Breusch-Pagan 66.376∗∗∗ 30.391∗∗ 48.729∗∗∗ 14.721 57.136∗∗∗ 14.213 48.315∗∗∗ 39.693∗∗∗
Note: The dependent variable in all estimations is the monthly invoiced amount. Different model specifications are estimated, as indicated in the
header: lin (Linear), log (Semi-log), BC (Box-Cox) and dmp (Decreasing marginal price). All coefficients are estimated by OLS for Swisscom (S) and
Orange (O). Significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Estimated standard errors are reported in parentheses below every
estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared, RESET test with null hypothesis ’well specified’, Jarque-Bera test with null hypothesis
’normal residual distribution’ and stud. Breusch-Pagan test with null hypothesis ’no heteroscedasticity’ are in the second part of the table.
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Table A.4: Specifications with grouped consumption variables
lin S lin O log S log O BC S BC O dmp S dmp O
Minutes 0.030∗∗ 0.062∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 2.423∗ 8.278∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.025) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (1.035) (1.916)
Text messages 0.061∗∗∗ 0.116∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 2.221 2.896
(0.018) (0.046) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (1.220) (2.067)
MB 0.024∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 5.219∗∗∗ 2.180
(0.002) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.588) (1.279)
Roaming minutes 0.122∗∗∗ 1.208∗∗∗ 0.000 0.016 0.004 0.055∗ 10.910∗∗∗ 10.985∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.258) (0.002) (0.012) (0.003) (0.024) (1.945) (2.643)
Roaming text 0.751∗∗∗ −0.140 0.044∗∗∗ −0.013 0.088∗∗∗ −0.031 5.675∗∗ 1.733
(0.178) (0.640) (0.011) (0.029) (0.021) (0.059) (1.704) (4.922)
Roaming MB 1.300∗∗∗ 1.979∗∗∗ 0.000 0.032 0.022 0.102∗ 17.569∗∗∗ 26.837∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.522) (0.018) (0.023) (0.034) (0.048) (4.240) (4.598)
Phone discount 1.667∗∗∗ 0.749∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ −0.224 −0.423
(0.202) (0.262) (0.013) (0.012) (0.024) (0.024) (0.204) (0.243)
N 215 115 215 115 215 115 215 115
adj. R-squared 0.833 0.774 0.811 0.865 0.826 0.856 0.895 0.870
Reset 40.971∗∗∗ 33.663∗∗∗ 314.589∗∗∗ 189.415∗∗∗ 252.089∗∗∗ 113.972∗∗∗ 2.481 2.583
Jarque-Bera 362.233∗∗∗ 13.675∗∗ 1.576 2.153 0.418 1.184 444.834∗∗∗ 86.641∗∗∗
Breusch-Pagan 15.583∗ 41.736∗∗∗ 60.851∗∗∗ 11.313 50.160∗∗∗ 12.916∗ 27.926∗∗∗ 27.504∗∗∗
Note: The dependent variable in all estimations is the monthly invoiced amount. Different model specifications are estimated, as indicated in the
header: lin (Linear), log (Semi-log), BC (Box-Cox) and dmp (Decreasing marginal price). All coefficients are estimated by OLS for Swisscom (S) and
Orange (O). Significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Estimated standard errors are reported in parentheses below every
estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared, RESET test with null hypothesis ’well specified’, Jarque-Bera test with null hypothesis
’normal residual distribution’ and stud. Breusch-Pagan test with null hypothesis ’no heteroscedasticity’ are in the second part of the table.
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Table A.5: Removing influential observations, grouped variables
lin S lin O log S log O BC S BC O dmp S dmp O
Minutes 0.036∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 2.494∗∗∗ 8.523∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.024) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.664) (1.293)
Text messages 0.075∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 2.502∗∗ 3.980∗∗
(0.018) (0.035) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.802) (1.493)
MB 0.027∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 4.282∗∗∗ 0.984
(0.003) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.404) (0.901)
Roaming minutes 0.153∗∗∗ 0.920∗∗ 0.000 0.032 0.003 0.088∗ 7.757∗∗∗ 6.836∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.318) (0.002) (0.018) (0.003) (0.035) (1.553) (2.001)
Roaming text 0.967∗∗∗ −0.782 0.081∗∗∗ −0.036 0.159∗∗∗ −0.038 4.084∗∗∗ 0.154
(0.277) (1.359) (0.020) (0.032) (0.038) (0.167) (1.069) (6.471)
Roaming MB 0.881 6.969∗∗∗ −0.014 0.081 0.003 0.295 20.887∗∗∗ 27.668∗∗∗
(0.829) (1.312) (0.035) (0.082) (0.035) (0.160) (3.769) (3.615)
Phone discount 1.528∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.050 −0.295
(0.181) (0.193) (0.013) (0.012) (0.024) (0.023) (0.140) (0.171)
N 196 101 201 108 201 106 193 98
adj. R-squared 0.858 0.849 0.844 0.871 0.856 0.871 0.941 0.934
Reset 46.784∗∗∗ 30.215∗∗∗ 453.230∗∗∗ 215.809∗∗∗ 290.452∗∗∗ 139.408∗∗∗ 1.238 7.725∗∗
Jarque-Bera 9.488∗∗ 1.958 3.862 3.256 1.085 1.781 19.304∗∗∗ 0.574
Breusch-Pagan 2.917 4.971 31.772∗∗∗ 10.036 22.144∗∗ 9.869 3.010 4.613
Note: The dependent variable in all estimations is the monthly invoiced amount. Different model specifications are estimated, as indicated in the
header: lin (Linear), log (Semi-log), BC (Box-Cox) and dmp (Decreasing marginal price). All coefficients are estimated by OLS for Swisscom (S) and
Orange (O). Significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Estimated standard errors are reported in parentheses below every
estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared, RESET test with null hypothesis ’well specified’, Jarque-Bera test with null hypothesis
’normal residual distribution’ and stud. Breusch-Pagan test with null hypothesis ’no heteroscedasticity’ are in the second part of the table.
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Table A.6: Removing influential observations, single variables
lin S lin O log S log O BC S BC O dmp S dmp O
Minutes fix net 0.155∗∗∗ −0.010 0.011∗∗∗ −0.002 0.021∗∗∗ −0.004 2.198∗ 1.329
(0.029) (0.071) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.877) (1.525)
Minutes mobile on 0.005 0.149∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.002 0.017∗∗ −0.142 1.617
(0.010) (0.045) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.721) (1.198)
Minutes mobile off 0.028 0.538∗∗∗ −0.008 0.021∗∗∗ −0.011 0.051∗∗∗ 4.522∗∗∗ 8.851∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.090) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.924) (1.334)
SMS 0.123∗∗∗ 0.039 0.013∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.009∗ 1.651 3.414∗∗
(0.023) (0.032) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.885) (1.213)
MMS 0.139 1.879 0.004 0.018 0.014 0.324 2.571∗ 10.138∗∗
(0.313) (3.553) (0.026) (0.084) (0.047) (0.619) (1.202) (3.437)
MB 0.025∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 5.063∗∗∗ 1.461
(0.003) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.414) (0.740)
CH minutes roaming 0.017 0.200 −0.002 −0.006 −0.004 −0.019 6.935∗∗∗ 1.056
(0.039) (0.573) (0.003) (0.034) (0.006) (0.069) (1.769) (2.227)
CH SMS roaming 0.257 1.663∗∗∗ 0.069∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.093∗ 0.170∗∗∗ −4.663∗∗∗ 8.593∗∗∗
(0.233) (0.435) (0.029) (0.024) (0.042) (0.047) (1.307) (1.770)
Roaming minutes 2.949∗∗∗ 1.451 0.063 −0.007 0.234 0.121 7.954∗∗ 2.582
(0.830) (2.065) (0.067) (0.077) (0.127) (0.227) (2.399) (2.954)
Roaming SMS 0.673∗∗ −0.379 0.055∗ 0.004 0.081∗ 0.008 4.722∗∗∗ 5.729
(0.203) (1.276) (0.023) (0.032) (0.031) (0.060) (1.150) (4.076)
Roaming MMS 21.987 −67.380 1.075 −5.374∗ 3.020 −10.952∗ 10.841 19.083
(17.559) (46.627) (1.037) (2.175) (1.904) (4.372) (6.279) (14.401)
Roaming MB 0.212 2.100 −0.031 0.046 −0.074 0.096 8.822∗ 16.472∗∗∗
(0.787) (3.057) (0.062) (0.064) (0.118) (0.138) (4.307) (3.389)
Phone discount 1.276∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.100 −0.066
(0.164) (0.189) (0.013) (0.012) (0.025) (0.023) (0.141) (0.149)
N 191 99 195 106 193 104 196 100
adj. R-squared 0.894 0.888 0.853 0.885 0.867 0.893 0.949 0.958
Reset 47.419∗∗∗ 40.752∗∗∗ 536.498∗∗∗ 229.876∗∗∗ 348.727∗∗∗ 153.304∗∗∗ 2.126 5.881∗∗
Jarque-Bera 0.841 0.128 5.268 0.673 4.189 0.257 20.544∗∗∗ 0.048
Breusch-Pagan 16.236 14.643 32.992∗∗ 12.386 30.608∗∗ 14.001 17.882 11.123
Note: The dependent variable in all estimations is the monthly invoiced amount. Different model specifications are estimated, as indicated in the
header: lin (Linear), log (Semi-log), BC (Box-Cox) and dmp (Decreasing marginal price). All coefficients are estimated by OLS for Swisscom (S) and
Orange (O). Significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Estimated standard errors are reported in parentheses below every
estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared, RESET test with null hypothesis ’well specified’, Jarque-Bera test with null hypothesis
’normal residual distribution’ and stud. Breusch-Pagan test with null hypothesis ’no heteroscedasticity’ are in the second part of the table.
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Table A.7: Model estimation for index construction
Q3.12 M Q3.12 S Q3.12 O Q4.12 M Q4.12 S Q4.12 O Q1.13 M Q1.13 S Q1.13 O
Minutes 0.032 0.028 0.076∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.034∗ 0.089∗ 0.027 0.023 0.097∗
(0.021) (0.025) (0.034) (0.016) (0.015) (0.039) (0.016) (0.015) (0.044)
Text messages 0.187∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.114 0.093∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.082 0.039 0.017 0.071
(0.042) (0.053) (0.065) (0.026) (0.024) (0.078) (0.025) (0.021) (0.070)
MB 0.023∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.011∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.005) (0.006) (0.016) (0.004) (0.003) (0.014) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012)
Roaming minutes 1.629∗∗∗ 2.395∗∗∗ 0.713 0.131∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 3.039∗∗∗ 0.003 0.085 0.187
(0.426) (0.504) (0.738) (0.038) (0.034) (0.787) (0.048) (0.048) (0.267)
Roaming text 0.161 0.236 −0.472 0.744 0.968∗ −1.557 1.257∗∗∗ 1.059∗∗∗ 6.300
(0.256) (0.258) (0.790) (0.427) (0.377) (1.876) (0.323) (0.264) (7.602)
Roaming MB 1.792∗ 1.027 6.391∗∗ 0.961∗∗ 1.091∗∗∗ 1.648 5.833∗∗∗ 2.406 3.008
(0.712) (0.709) (1.827) (0.288) (0.309) (0.864) (1.085) (1.254) (10.197)
Phone discount 1.191∗∗∗ 0.963∗ 0.713 1.318∗∗∗ 1.614∗∗∗ 0.472 2.108∗∗∗ 2.318∗∗∗ 1.552∗∗
(0.255) (0.369) (0.380) (0.198) (0.283) (0.359) (0.239) (0.308) (0.458)
N 109 66 43 151 99 49 75 50 23
adj. R-squared 0.807 0.849 0.809 0.798 0.858 0.795 0.861 0.894 0.943
Note: The dependent variable in all estimations is the monthly invoiced amount. All estimations are for a quarter (Q) and a provider: Entire market
(M), Swisscom (S) and Orange (O). Significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Estimated standard errors are reported in
parentheses below every estimate. The number of observations (N) and the adjusted R-squared are reported in the second part of the table.
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A.1.2 Comparison to official statistics
With the OECD profile method, see Federal Office of Communications (2013),
minimal cost contracts for specified consumption profiles are compared across
providers and over time. These consumption profiles contain a certain num-
ber of calls, divided among types, as well as a certain number of SMS sent.
Data traffic (until 2013), roaming and discounts on phone prices are not in-
cluded.
To compare the official statistics to the hedonic indexes, consumption profiles
must first be adjusted. Because it is not the number of minutes called that is
used, but rather call frequencies, these frequencies have to be transformed into
amounts. Based on the underlying data, an average call is approximately 2.5
minutes long. The number of calls is therefore multiplied by 2.5. Additionally,
MB were added to the consumption profiles according to the distribution of
the underlying sample, as shown in table A.8.13 The values chosen correspond
to the quartiles of the sample from this project, with roughly 100 MB equal
to the first, 250 to the second or median and 500 to the third quartile. The
quantities of MB used by the Federal Office of Communications (2013) do not
line up at all with the distribution in this sample. Roaming units and phone
discounts are excluded to maintain the possibly highest level of similarity to the
genuine profiles of the Federal Office of Communications (2013).14
After defining consumption profiles, two strategies to predict prices using
the so-called characteristics method are considered. With the characteristics
method, unit prices are estimated as they are for double-imputation. Then,
prices are not predicted for all observations, but only for a predefined con-
sumption vector.
As a first possibility, estimations can be made based on observations within a
certain consumption intensity. Recall that unit prices are dependent upon con-
sumption intensities. Therefore, for small, medium and strong consumption,
unit prices are estimated separately. A second possibility is to estimate overall
13In the latest price comparison, the Federal Office of Communications (2013) added MB
to the profiles because this is recommended in the most recent manual of the OECD (2012).
Before 2013, the quantity of MB in all profiles was equal to zero.
14An indicator for the phone discount could be easily added to the OECD consumption
profiles. This would make the price comparisons much more realistic. Additionally, a separate
roaming profile could be constructed.
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Table A.8: Complemented consumption profiles
Small Medium Large
Minutes 75 100 300
Text 100 140 225
MB 100 250 500
Roaming minutes 0 0 0
Roaming text 0 0 0
Roaming MB 0 0 0
Phone discount 0 0 0
Sources: Federal Office of Communications (2013), extended.
unit prices using all observations for every provider to then predict invoiced
amounts. In this analysis, the first method does not yield reasonable results.
The second method does to some extent, but they are not very reliable.
For the first strategy, profile-specific unit prices are estimated as shown in table
A.9. The sub-samples to estimate unit prices were formed as follows. For the
small consumption profile, all observations with fewer than 100 minutes and
250MB were selected, so they showed less consumption than with the medium
profile. SMS were not used as constraint, first because the number used for
the profiles seems very high relative to the sample distribution. Secondly, three
constraints would be too restrictive, and only few observations would be left.
For the estimation of the prices for the medium profile, all observations with
minutes and MB consumption between the small and large profiles are selected.
In the sub-sample for the large profile, all observations with more minutes and
MB than in the medium profile are included. The linear specification with
grouped variables is used.
Surprisingly, estimating according to consumption profiles and not time periods
yields worse estimation results. This is surprising because in a given consump-
tion interval, prices might be related more linearly to consumption. However,
similarly, this could have been expected because the number of observations is
quite small in most estimations. Many coefficients are estimated as negative
or not significant.
Due to the poor estimation quality, the resulting indexes obtain unrealistic
results, as shown in table A.10. Prices are predicted for the predefined con-
sumption profiles in table A.8 above. This way of creating an index by pre-
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Table A.9: Profile-specific model estimation
M small S small O small M medium S medium O medium M large S large O large
Constant 37.273∗∗∗ 31.272∗∗∗ 30.863∗∗ 39.312∗∗∗ 24.314∗ 46.459∗∗∗ 44.608∗∗∗ 34.041∗∗∗ 66.993∗∗∗
(5.411) (6.041) (9.380) (6.872) (10.214) (8.059) (6.797) (8.842) (18.620)
Minutes 0.144 0.164 0.308∗ 0.067∗ 0.089∗ 0.083∗ −0.004 0.006 0.008
(0.079) (0.101) (0.130) (0.028) (0.035) (0.041) (0.015) (0.019) (0.028)
Text messages 0.010 0.048 0.111 0.004 −0.007 −0.010 −0.004 −0.049 0.034
(0.057) (0.075) (0.083) (0.012) (0.013) (0.025) (0.031) (0.038) (0.054)
MB −0.022 0.022 −0.062 −0.011 −0.030 0.006 0.020∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.030) (0.033) (0.051) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.015)
Roaming minutes 0.573∗∗∗ 2.544∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗ 0.089∗∗ −0.014 0.983∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.039 0.788
(0.160) (0.445) (0.287) (0.028) (0.235) (0.270) (0.187) (0.186) (0.552)
Roaming text 0.160 0.127 −1.838 −0.013 0.187 −1.538 −0.671 0.132 −2.507
(0.194) (0.168) (1.715) (0.355) (0.302) (2.141) (1.128) (1.053) (6.784)
Roaming MB −17.645∗ −102.142∗∗∗ 1.618 3.518∗∗∗ 6.790 3.395∗∗∗ 1.895∗∗∗ 1.630∗∗∗ 6.050∗∗∗
(6.913) (19.191) (8.120) (0.813) (9.771) (0.804) (0.457) (0.441) (1.554)
Phone discount 0.112 −0.891∗ 0.196 0.371∗ 1.561∗∗∗ −0.335 0.152 0.601 −0.691
(0.214) (0.370) (0.317) (0.187) (0.348) (0.228) (0.300) (0.514) (0.398)
N 118 69 45 123 58 65 110 60 50
adj. R-squared 0.282 0.553 0.236 0.509 0.788 0.334 0.641 0.799 0.270
Note: The dependent variable in all estimations is the monthly invoiced amount. All OLS estimations are for small, medium or large consumption profiles
and a firm: Entire market (M), Swisscom (S) and Orange (O). Significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Estimated
standard errors are reported in parentheses below every estimate. The number of observations (N) and the adjusted R-squared are reported in the
second part of the table.
APPENDIX A. APPENDIX 158
dicting prices for constructed consumption vectors is called the characteristics
method.
Table A.10: Predicted invoiced amounts in CHF, profile-specific prices
Small Medium Large
Market 46.93 43.92 52.58
Swisscom 50.58 24.60 36.37
Orange 58.90 54.87 74.14
The predicted prices are lower for the medium profile for all three providers.
This result cannot be justified. It indicates negative marginal unit prices, which
is not realistic. Roaming and especially the discount on phones are not in the
consumption vector, and this may have disturbed this attempt to use the
characteristics method. The main problem is the estimations of unit prices
and the resulting coefficients. A larger sample might help a great deal.
The second strategy is to estimate unit prices that are not dependent on con-
sumption intensities. The problem with this approach is that unit prices are
heavily dependent on the contract and on the consumption intensity. Pre-
dicting prices for specific consumption profiles with overall unit prices is odd.
Because the ’better’ strategy above yields unrealistic results, this second ap-
proach is nevertheless carried out. The unit prices used to predict invoiced
amounts are reported in table 2.7. The prices for the entire market in the
three quarters are estimated separately and are not reported.
In the results, seen in table A.11, prices now increase as expected, along
with consumption intensity. Orange prices are predicted to be about 25% to
30% above the average. Swisscom prices are around 8% to 9% lower. The
indexes of the Federal Office of Communications (2012) report Orange prices
to be lower for the low and medium consumption profiles, whereas Swisscom
prices are lower for the large consumption profile. This difference may have
been caused by several factors. However, the OECD method cannot include
demographic discounts in contracts, such as those as for students. This could
be the main reason that Swisscom is also cheaper in the low-consumption
profiles in this analysis.
The main problem with using the characteristics method in this analysis is the
small sample size. Because only a few observations contain roaming units, the
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Table A.11: Predicted invoiced amounts in CHF, constant unit prices
Small Medium Large
Market 43.29 46.62 53.72
Swisscom 39.08 42.66 49.06
Orange 56.17 58.52 67.50
corresponding estimated coefficients obtain extreme values. The consumption
profiles do not contain any roaming units. To create hedonic price indexes with
the characteristics method, two requirements have to be fulfilled. Firstly, the
sample size needs to be much larger. Secondly, profiles have to contain values
for all consumption units used in the specification of the hedonic function.
Otherwise, the predicted invoiced amounts are not reliable.
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A.2 Administered prices
A.2.1 API for 324 municipalities
Table A.12 shows a complete list of the administered price indexes with and
without electricity for every municipality (API, API−e), calculated as shown in
subsection 4.2.3. Additionally, the indexed prices for every service are reported,
namely electricity (EL), waste management (WM), sewer water (SW) and
water supply (WS). These four indexes are the prices for an average household,
as described in subsection 4.2.2. The arithmetic mean of all indexes is equal
to 100 points. The indexes are for 2012.
Table A.12: Complete API
Municipality Canton API API−e EL WM SW WS
1 Lugano TI 61.56 38.44 86.96 0.00 28.61 86.67
2 Oberentfelden AG 71.93 65.16 79.36 0.00 109.49 81.29
3 Spreitenbach AG 72.32 67.45 77.67 101.83 59.38 42.46
4 St. Moritz GR 72.34 40.86 106.93 0.00 85.64 32.70
5 Stans NW 72.91 53.84 93.86 0.00 122.92 32.27
6 Fislisbach AG 73.91 69.17 79.12 111.00 53.98 44.54
7 Collombey-Muraz VS 74.69 39.92 112.89 0.00 59.38 58.07
8 Gland VD 75.01 46.88 105.92 0.00 64.78 73.53
9 Dielsdorf ZH 75.33 68.99 82.29 105.30 35.37 69.60
10 Volketswil ZH 76.80 71.81 82.29 123.04 52.21 42.71
11 Risch ZG 77.12 60.40 95.48 0.00 95.61 81.67
12 Au (SG) SG 77.15 65.19 90.28 87.42 51.28 58.38
13 Schlieren ZH 78.22 74.52 82.29 105.28 75.06 43.81
14 Bernex GE 78.65 69.54 88.66 0.00 75.25 131.49
15 Carouge (GE) GE 78.65 69.54 88.66 0.00 75.25 131.49
16 Chêne-Bougeries GE 78.65 69.54 88.66 0.00 75.25 131.49
17 Lancy GE 78.65 69.54 88.66 0.00 75.25 131.49
18 Meyrin GE 78.65 69.54 88.66 0.00 75.25 131.49
19 Onex GE 78.65 69.54 88.66 0.00 75.25 131.49
20 Thônex GE 78.65 69.54 88.66 0.00 75.25 131.49
21 Vernier GE 78.65 69.54 88.66 0.00 75.25 131.49
22 Bremgarten (AG) AG 80.10 68.53 92.80 108.70 64.78 33.24
23 Savièse VS 80.15 68.58 92.86 86.22 53.75 67.25
24 Conthey VS 80.32 68.89 92.86 89.80 51.78 66.83
25 Monthey VS 80.36 71.79 89.77 96.33 53.18 67.78
26 Chêne-Bourg GE 80.44 72.96 88.66 0.00 84.97 131.49
27 Collonge-Bellerive GE 80.44 72.96 88.66 0.00 84.97 131.49
28 Genève GE 80.44 72.96 88.66 0.00 84.97 131.49
29 Le Grand-Saconnex GE 80.44 72.96 88.66 0.00 84.97 131.49
30 Plan-les-Ouates GE 80.44 72.96 88.66 0.00 84.97 131.49
31 Versoix GE 80.44 72.96 88.66 0.00 84.97 131.49
32 Veyrier GE 80.44 72.96 88.66 0.00 84.97 131.49
33 Brig-Glis VS 80.58 70.41 91.74 112.85 54.77 45.68
34 Uzwil SG 81.74 73.17 91.15 85.96 86.37 46.45
35 Ascona TI 81.96 62.58 103.26 71.24 32.39 86.58
36 Bassersdorf ZH 81.99 81.72 82.29 109.96 65.12 71.93
37 Sierre VS 82.36 66.98 99.26 99.88 62.45 39.64
38 Nürensdorf ZH 82.84 83.34 82.29 119.70 64.17 68.35
39 Visp VS 82.91 71.09 95.88 125.78 40.00 50.98
40 Oberuzwil SG 83.31 72.78 94.88 85.77 49.16 85.47
41 Chur GR 83.61 67.67 101.11 100.11 40.49 65.14
42 Kaiseraugst AG 83.74 75.50 92.80 111.01 80.97 34.84
43 Dietikon ZH 83.82 85.22 82.29 108.14 73.39 75.49
Sources: Own estimations, based on Price Control (2012) and Federal Electricity Comission (2012).
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Municipality Canton API API−e EL WM SW WS
44 Suhr AG 83.92 78.77 89.58 112.85 55.06 70.89
45 Buochs NW 84.25 75.51 93.86 104.14 97.25 24.08
46 Martigny VS 84.52 65.77 105.12 93.12 68.14 36.44
47 Rümlang ZH 84.97 88.12 81.51 145.01 45.36 78.39
48 Schwyz SZ 85.00 79.57 90.97 128.21 55.17 58.18
49 Küttigen AG 85.08 79.34 91.38 60.15 88.66 88.11
50 Bussigny-près-Lausanne VD 85.22 64.82 107.62 0.00 76.87 115.34
51 Kirchberg (SG) SG 85.95 75.37 97.56 86.28 77.54 62.36
52 Sion VS 85.95 79.66 92.86 145.40 50.58 46.56
53 Bellinzona TI 85.97 66.91 106.90 93.44 41.66 68.10
54 Domat/Ems GR 86.14 69.29 104.64 162.86 24.29 26.07
55 Crissier VD 86.17 62.36 112.33 0.00 37.79 149.87
56 Buchs (AG) AG 86.24 81.57 91.38 119.82 72.88 53.47
57 Zermatt VS 86.36 81.00 92.25 90.79 77.71 74.94
58 Wünnewil-Flamatt FR 86.58 67.32 107.74 120.94 81.09 0.00
59 Aarau AG 86.77 82.58 91.38 107.14 63.21 79.36
60 Blonay VD 87.10 63.63 112.89 41.22 27.10 124.86
61 Einsiedeln SZ 87.14 91.55 82.29 99.24 74.04 102.86
62 Kreuzlingen TG 87.19 87.44 86.91 109.56 75.60 78.50
63 Losone TI 87.23 56.75 120.72 125.37 47.04 0.00
64 Neuenhof AG 87.47 84.71 90.50 120.18 70.18 65.61
65 Kloten ZH 87.56 93.67 80.84 96.27 73.42 112.92
66 Regensdorf ZH 87.82 92.85 82.29 163.28 40.74 79.92
67 Freienbach SZ 88.07 90.79 85.09 132.94 84.91 55.84
68 Giubiasco TI 88.16 71.10 106.90 68.92 53.72 91.93
69 Wettingen AG 88.19 90.09 86.10 116.15 80.58 74.79
70 Yverdon-les-Bains VD 88.23 65.42 113.30 0.00 80.97 112.75
71 Wil (SG) SG 88.33 89.48 87.07 86.28 98.31 83.14
72 Oberengstringen ZH 88.35 93.87 82.29 119.44 70.18 94.32
73 Hergiswil (NW) NW 88.48 83.58 93.86 126.49 70.58 55.55
74 Glarus GL 88.65 87.16 90.28 111.30 81.84 69.25
75 Neuhausen am Rheinfall SH 89.23 86.06 92.71 123.01 56.14 82.05
76 St. Margrethen SG 89.28 81.80 97.50 79.14 91.82 73.62
77 Bad Ragaz SG 90.08 89.11 91.15 106.29 53.91 110.17
78 Chiasso TI 90.27 73.18 109.05 103.98 48.58 69.48
79 Wollerau SZ 90.40 95.23 85.09 134.92 76.32 76.70
80 Epalinges VD 90.48 65.21 118.23 0.00 45.88 149.87
81 Malters LU 90.52 76.97 105.40 96.47 69.27 66.14
82 Rheinfelden AG 90.67 88.73 92.80 111.01 102.71 51.87
83 Reinach (BL) BL 90.71 79.60 102.91 89.14 81.51 68.20
84 Gossau (ZH) ZH 90.71 98.04 82.66 92.32 113.97 86.51
85 Egg ZH 90.72 98.39 82.29 117.67 64.78 115.65
86 Dietlikon ZH 90.82 103.33 77.08 144.40 67.28 101.88
87 Bagnes VS 91.04 87.29 95.16 75.01 138.84 43.88
88 Ecublens (VD) VD 91.15 71.87 112.33 0.00 64.78 149.87
89 Widnau SG 91.15 81.01 102.29 87.10 53.98 104.12
90 Sissach BL 91.20 77.89 105.83 115.86 59.38 60.62
91 Willisau LU 91.24 68.10 116.66 82.14 73.36 48.70
92 Seuzach ZH 91.47 99.83 82.29 140.80 63.73 98.54
93 Renens (VD) VD 91.72 72.96 112.33 0.00 64.78 153.22
94 Muttenz BL 91.87 81.83 102.91 89.14 102.57 52.36
95 Embrach ZH 92.02 100.87 82.29 135.57 70.18 99.91
96 Rapperswil-Jona SG 92.24 87.30 97.66 127.28 75.25 61.12
97 Buchs (ZH) ZH 92.31 101.42 82.29 156.86 73.30 77.38
98 Weinfelden TG 92.42 88.41 96.84 107.82 64.78 94.81
99 Baden AG 92.52 89.52 95.81 88.84 59.38 122.62
100 Meggen LU 92.74 74.80 112.46 101.30 66.22 58.07
101 Wohlen (AG) AG 92.75 89.41 96.43 102.05 72.88 94.80
102 Arth SZ 92.76 89.38 96.47 124.69 71.69 73.83
103 Capriasca TI 92.89 81.06 105.88 64.74 59.03 120.74
104 Schübelbach SZ 92.93 83.40 103.40 129.63 59.88 63.44
105 Rolle VD 93.30 75.46 112.89 0.00 133.65 86.78
106 Wetzikon (ZH) ZH 93.39 104.65 81.03 101.46 127.94 82.72
107 Muri (AG) AG 93.42 85.81 101.78 147.74 62.42 50.31
108 Locarno TI 93.75 69.21 120.72 76.22 45.88 87.43
109 Wangen-Brüttisellen ZH 93.77 101.38 85.40 142.07 75.04 89.87
110 Küssnacht (SZ) SZ 93.78 79.42 109.55 127.03 46.07 68.67
111 Villmergen AG 93.85 87.44 100.89 130.75 43.19 92.61
Sources: Own estimations, based on Price Control (2012) and Federal Electricity Comission (2012).
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Municipality Canton API API−e EL WM SW WS
112 Frutigen BE 93.94 77.91 111.56 124.16 71.46 39.54
113 Schaffhausen SH 93.99 87.63 100.97 110.69 72.33 81.50
114 Bonstetten ZH 94.09 104.83 82.29 147.20 89.99 79.32
115 Reinach (AG) AG 94.13 97.86 90.04 119.70 91.77 83.02
116 Ingenbohl SZ 94.41 80.63 109.55 134.50 53.98 56.55
117 Gaiserwald SG 94.42 92.86 96.14 95.76 46.36 140.02
118 Lausanne VD 94.54 72.96 118.23 0.00 64.78 153.22
119 Gränichen AG 94.80 94.82 94.78 143.65 58.18 86.41
120 Herzogenbuchsee BE 94.85 81.75 109.24 80.96 91.77 71.74
121 Münchenstein BL 95.55 88.86 102.91 93.62 93.12 79.62
122 Zell (ZH) ZH 95.70 107.91 82.29 110.58 98.40 115.54
123 Niederhasli ZH 95.76 108.02 82.29 134.36 89.41 102.25
124 Unterseen BE 95.82 75.65 117.98 118.27 107.17 0.00
125 Steinhausen ZG 95.93 96.20 95.62 126.18 79.69 84.60
126 Aigle VD 95.96 80.56 112.89 121.29 53.98 69.25
127 Le Mont-sur-Lausanne VD 96.04 75.84 118.23 0.00 72.95 153.22
128 Obersiggenthal AG 96.07 97.71 94.26 124.47 43.19 130.16
129 Diepoldsau SG 96.20 90.00 103.01 94.82 75.58 100.80
130 Bottmingen BL 96.24 90.17 102.91 88.81 86.37 95.59
131 Colombier (NE) NE 96.40 86.07 107.74 55.47 102.57 98.31
132 Montreux VD 96.43 81.44 112.89 0.00 120.51 119.17
133 Vevey VD 96.43 81.44 112.89 0.00 120.51 119.17
134 Fehraltorf ZH 96.47 108.71 83.01 150.57 84.07 94.23
135 Orbe VD 96.55 70.77 124.86 56.45 82.06 72.66
136 Lutry VD 96.55 86.27 107.84 0.00 67.57 190.88
137 Davos GR 96.69 83.90 110.74 97.66 83.62 70.72
138 Affoltern am Albis ZH 96.69 109.80 82.29 126.50 95.30 109.03
139 Prilly VD 96.81 77.31 118.23 46.64 37.79 149.87
140 Bubikon ZH 96.86 114.75 77.21 133.08 134.96 75.06
141 Langnau am Albis ZH 96.89 110.18 82.29 118.99 67.48 147.47
142 Oberglatt ZH 96.97 107.74 85.14 140.91 80.97 104.05
143 Hinwil ZH 96.98 110.36 82.29 109.14 134.96 85.09
144 Nyon VD 97.41 82.41 113.88 59.29 107.96 77.57
145 Untersiggenthal AG 97.43 100.98 93.53 139.29 74.98 91.42
146 Luzern LU 97.48 89.35 106.41 106.50 64.78 99.00
147 Möhlin AG 97.67 102.11 92.80 111.01 124.16 69.68
148 La Tour-de-Peilz VD 97.98 84.40 112.89 0.00 132.66 115.15
149 Sargans SG 98.01 104.25 91.15 123.20 102.33 87.76
150 Brugg AG 98.08 100.26 95.68 137.61 80.97 84.43
151 Altendorf SZ 98.14 89.13 108.04 147.22 64.18 59.06
152 Nendaz VS 98.15 82.23 115.65 43.11 139.65 58.78
153 Littau LU 98.40 91.11 106.41 125.17 75.58 74.47
154 Zürich ZH 98.45 128.66 65.27 111.35 159.08 112.89
155 Oftringen AG 98.48 95.82 101.39 113.97 102.75 70.58
156 Lachen SZ 98.63 96.30 101.18 140.32 86.37 63.87
157 Laufen BL 98.68 90.90 107.23 116.90 91.77 64.51
158 Allschwil BL 98.96 95.36 102.91 102.52 78.27 106.72
159 Thalwil ZH 99.11 114.43 82.29 101.62 125.42 115.15
160 Bulle FR 99.39 98.02 100.89 142.26 71.77 82.92
161 Bischofszell TG 99.40 91.74 107.81 85.96 116.43 70.86
162 Dornach SO 99.61 96.61 102.91 132.75 79.57 79.54
163 Urdorf ZH 99.78 115.70 82.29 113.42 116.06 117.54
164 Baar ZG 99.80 100.68 98.83 126.66 63.96 114.74
165 Uetikon am See ZH 99.92 112.24 86.39 122.66 53.98 164.71
166 Neftenbach ZH 100.04 116.20 82.29 114.85 50.04 188.69
167 Küsnacht (ZH) ZH 100.72 114.14 85.97 92.68 118.13 130.88
168 Aadorf TG 100.84 109.82 90.97 112.98 111.60 104.82
169 Pully VD 101.02 83.38 120.41 0.00 118.69 127.04
170 Uster ZH 101.06 115.21 85.52 101.08 113.73 130.63
171 Appenzell AI 101.12 103.30 98.73 103.89 121.33 83.34
172 Flawil SG 101.21 105.59 96.39 85.96 122.91 106.20
173 Pfäffikon ZH 101.38 116.40 84.88 92.06 161.95 91.26
174 Arlesheim BL 101.46 100.15 102.91 100.42 97.17 103.09
175 Gossau (SG) SG 101.56 108.02 94.47 86.28 114.47 122.36
176 Wädenswil ZH 101.59 119.16 82.29 109.60 121.04 126.51
177 Winterthur ZH 101.64 116.09 85.77 120.06 114.26 114.18
178 Richterswil ZH 101.85 119.67 82.29 164.77 106.50 89.66
179 Zug ZG 102.13 108.19 95.48 126.66 94.69 104.62
Sources: Own estimations, based on Price Control (2012) and Federal Electricity Comission (2012).
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180 Eschenbach (SG) SG 102.53 95.26 110.52 115.42 101.24 69.08
181 Mels SG 102.61 102.32 102.93 115.03 96.61 96.02
182 Dürnten ZH 102.67 116.98 86.95 74.83 188.94 80.86
183 Pratteln BL 102.77 101.56 104.10 111.01 108.04 85.33
184 Saint-Prex VD 102.82 93.65 112.89 0.00 140.68 134.76
185 Dübendorf ZH 102.86 114.95 89.58 134.76 105.70 105.50
186 Chavannes-près-Renens VD 103.10 94.71 112.33 71.26 64.78 149.87
187 Aesch (BL) BL 103.18 103.43 102.91 100.70 107.96 101.22
188 Morges VD 103.25 94.48 112.89 0.00 160.99 115.46
189 Thal SG 103.30 103.97 102.57 98.89 98.50 114.82
190 Kriens LU 103.34 100.54 106.41 110.24 73.86 119.75
191 Wartau SG 103.69 102.67 104.81 138.31 165.66 0.00
192 Emmen LU 103.71 95.74 112.46 117.71 86.37 84.30
193 Rothrist AG 103.90 103.14 104.75 105.82 113.14 89.75
194 Köniz BE 104.02 97.16 111.56 111.25 77.48 104.55
195 Fribourg FR 104.07 100.74 107.74 119.55 85.89 98.29
196 Sursee LU 104.08 96.46 112.46 93.92 105.61 89.10
197 Opfikon ZH 104.13 115.55 91.58 127.45 118.56 100.65
198 Hünenberg ZG 104.15 107.58 100.38 126.66 82.60 115.77
199 Uetendorf BE 104.22 97.54 111.56 113.69 83.04 97.32
200 Payerne VD 104.23 101.04 107.74 109.49 105.63 87.83
201 Meilen ZH 104.32 111.66 96.26 108.40 107.68 119.14
202 Aarburg AG 104.39 110.44 97.73 90.24 161.95 74.82
203 Oberriet (SG) SG 104.54 115.48 92.52 110.38 155.46 77.49
204 Herisau AR 104.72 117.07 91.15 87.71 124.16 138.18
205 Belp BE 104.87 98.91 111.42 130.55 76.52 92.01
206 Binningen BL 105.23 107.33 102.91 98.06 97.22 127.30
207 Zumikon ZH 105.32 126.29 82.29 98.76 145.47 132.64
208 Frauenfeld TG 105.41 107.51 103.10 117.72 91.77 114.43
209 Burgdorf BE 105.69 111.30 99.53 131.61 106.96 96.08
210 Wald (ZH) ZH 105.85 121.82 88.31 92.47 140.35 130.63
211 Steffisburg BE 105.86 99.77 112.54 121.49 97.17 81.31
212 Hombrechtikon ZH 105.92 127.42 82.29 141.32 172.74 65.07
213 Igis GR 105.96 78.94 135.63 145.18 40.49 55.44
214 Maur ZH 106.06 127.71 82.29 90.48 140.06 150.87
215 Cham ZG 106.12 115.81 95.48 126.18 106.41 115.77
216 Fällanden ZH 106.14 120.73 90.12 126.64 113.56 122.66
217 Oberwil (BL) BL 106.55 109.87 102.91 88.81 121.30 118.20
218 Heimberg BE 106.67 102.22 111.56 121.75 98.38 87.22
219 Horgen ZH 106.69 128.26 82.99 123.84 124.32 136.85
220 Altdorf (UR) UR 106.74 98.59 115.70 103.98 127.40 62.33
221 Amriswil TG 106.80 109.54 103.78 85.96 147.74 91.56
222 Marly FR 106.84 106.02 107.74 178.30 80.97 62.18
223 Bülach ZH 107.16 129.80 82.29 91.49 166.78 127.54
224 Kirchberg (BE) BE 107.27 111.93 102.15 132.91 125.29 77.02
225 Biasca TI 107.31 95.11 120.72 127.40 69.92 90.60
226 Buchrain LU 107.39 102.79 112.46 124.41 113.31 70.28
227 Therwil BL 107.47 111.61 102.91 111.01 118.76 104.52
228 Männedorf ZH 107.67 130.18 82.94 92.94 133.23 163.37
229 Frenkendorf BL 107.67 109.84 105.29 111.39 129.56 87.10
230 Langnau im Emmental BE 107.72 104.23 111.56 95.22 122.88 92.97
231 Münsingen BE 107.92 113.17 102.15 108.25 107.64 123.94
232 Villars-sur-Glâne FR 108.11 108.45 107.74 123.99 121.55 79.13
233 Unterägeri ZG 108.19 119.75 95.48 126.18 81.54 154.56
234 Düdingen FR 108.30 108.81 107.74 125.98 129.56 69.68
235 Uznach SG 108.42 112.81 103.61 106.55 135.48 94.56
236 Echallens VD 108.45 104.41 112.89 87.66 118.27 105.91
237 Bolligen BE 108.46 105.78 111.41 104.07 85.68 129.07
238 Kilchberg (ZH) ZH 108.58 132.52 82.29 142.87 134.96 119.75
239 Nidau BE 108.62 93.28 125.46 114.31 107.96 56.90
240 Kerns OW 108.68 104.41 113.37 136.53 118.76 57.50
241 Thun BE 108.77 104.71 113.22 127.94 90.04 97.73
242 Birsfelden BL 108.79 114.14 102.91 119.88 113.54 109.17
243 Solothurn SO 108.97 117.89 99.17 115.28 113.36 125.33
244 Sirnach TG 109.09 115.28 102.29 118.87 94.80 133.79
245 Olten SO 109.10 126.58 89.88 105.45 149.67 122.45
246 Rothenburg LU 109.10 106.05 112.46 114.64 84.47 120.86
247 Birmensdorf (ZH) ZH 109.21 133.73 82.29 124.13 109.65 169.02
Sources: Own estimations, based on Price Control (2012) and Federal Electricity Comission (2012).
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248 Zollikofen BE 109.28 107.20 111.56 108.88 117.58 94.37
249 Derendingen SO 109.45 108.71 110.26 101.96 134.96 87.10
250 Schwarzenburg BE 109.81 108.22 111.56 115.23 115.43 93.60
251 Reiden LU 109.96 107.68 112.46 101.23 138.06 81.32
252 Wittenbach SG 110.08 120.81 98.29 95.14 171.67 91.24
253 Porrentruy JU 110.31 109.17 111.56 138.97 24.29 171.29
254 Teufen (AR) AR 110.32 127.77 91.15 130.55 107.96 146.34
255 Gelterkinden BL 110.84 115.89 105.29 124.34 118.76 104.52
256 Walenstadt SG 111.36 102.62 120.96 132.86 112.76 62.09
257 Rüschlikon ZH 111.41 137.92 82.29 119.93 140.95 152.29
258 Menziken AG 111.61 131.25 90.04 125.95 178.14 86.01
259 Altstätten SG 112.01 115.91 107.74 88.38 181.13 72.71
260 Zuchwil SO 112.17 110.08 114.47 120.16 150.50 56.73
261 Wattwil SG 112.37 124.62 98.92 109.96 149.51 112.19
262 Urtenen-Schönbühl BE 112.53 113.69 111.25 105.65 106.38 129.43
263 Ittigen BE 112.64 113.62 111.56 111.33 121.28 107.63
264 Delémont JU 112.73 110.83 114.82 141.77 59.38 135.87
265 Liestal BL 112.82 119.67 105.29 122.39 113.36 123.79
266 Würenlos AG 112.88 122.32 102.51 119.44 161.95 82.50
267 Adligenswil LU 113.13 113.74 112.46 103.39 126.84 109.77
268 Balsthal SO 113.31 107.15 120.09 117.01 82.60 123.90
269 Fully VS 113.79 102.78 125.89 83.81 162.33 57.29
270 Hochdorf LU 113.80 124.41 102.15 112.32 138.55 121.03
271 Romanshorn TG 114.14 132.74 93.71 97.60 156.05 142.08
272 Illnau-Effretikon ZH 114.32 143.48 82.29 123.50 188.94 114.16
273 Ebikon LU 114.36 116.10 112.46 135.71 132.26 79.52
274 Riehen BS 114.69 119.23 109.72 99.94 129.69 126.86
275 Val-de-Travers NE 114.97 109.83 120.62 83.07 137.65 106.11
276 Adliswil ZH 115.03 144.83 82.29 159.91 145.75 129.07
277 Oberägeri ZG 115.04 132.84 95.48 126.18 142.77 128.68
278 Ruswil LU 115.18 117.66 112.46 119.39 142.50 89.23
279 Rüti (ZH) ZH 115.21 136.69 91.62 129.81 150.61 128.46
280 Lenzburg AG 115.35 127.63 101.87 153.41 109.46 121.94
281 Peseux NE 115.39 125.94 103.80 128.63 97.17 154.24
282 Horw LU 115.63 118.52 112.46 106.17 97.50 153.22
283 Goldach SG 115.75 135.42 94.14 111.31 105.27 191.45
284 Rorschacherberg SG 115.99 119.76 111.85 113.50 115.01 131.00
285 Sumiswald BE 116.05 126.38 104.70 125.75 158.83 92.09
286 Wohlen bei Bern BE 116.07 120.17 111.56 129.29 119.18 112.32
287 Alpnach OW 116.27 118.91 113.37 153.88 129.56 73.23
288 Zofingen AG 116.28 122.23 109.73 131.68 97.17 139.93
289 Bern BE 116.48 143.96 86.28 148.75 132.66 151.44
290 Spiez BE 116.77 121.51 111.56 120.71 148.10 93.69
291 Windisch AG 116.82 131.40 100.81 145.97 142.33 105.37
292 Lyss BE 117.77 122.06 113.06 129.03 137.85 98.23
293 Ostermundigen BE 117.97 123.81 111.56 105.50 149.14 114.48
294 Basel BS 118.18 125.89 109.72 98.80 129.69 148.34
295 St. Gallen SG 118.29 133.41 101.68 98.65 112.17 190.31
296 Erlenbach (ZH) ZH 118.54 140.91 93.96 114.13 126.25 182.89
297 Sarnen OW 118.58 123.32 113.37 143.52 114.29 113.27
298 Ollon VD 118.67 122.07 114.94 0.00 195.71 162.40
299 Wallisellen ZH 118.69 147.25 87.32 134.29 159.31 146.97
300 Grenchen SO 118.88 123.43 113.89 106.16 113.36 151.18
301 Münchenbuchsee BE 118.97 127.06 110.08 153.44 148.57 78.10
302 Biel/Bienne BE 119.41 126.30 111.84 99.47 145.75 131.64
303 Rorschach SG 119.61 134.62 103.12 101.35 115.93 187.30
304 Bellach SO 119.99 125.01 114.47 137.99 94.47 145.16
305 Neuenkirch LU 121.22 129.20 112.46 110.93 172.10 100.96
306 Langenthal BE 121.24 136.17 104.82 105.09 175.53 124.28
307 Châtel-Saint-Denis FR 121.29 133.62 107.74 129.24 165.47 103.66
308 Muri bei Bern BE 122.11 131.70 111.56 127.22 165.32 99.92
309 Worb BE 122.66 127.88 116.93 135.14 107.96 142.20
310 Grabs SG 122.85 130.16 114.81 125.89 158.23 104.16
311 Neuchâtel NE 122.96 124.64 121.13 103.84 113.36 157.13
312 Moutier BE 123.22 128.42 117.51 109.62 121.64 154.12
313 Herrliberg ZH 123.50 163.75 79.27 150.95 161.95 178.22
314 La Chaux-de-Fonds NE 123.72 126.09 121.13 122.28 127.85 127.91
315 Stäfa ZH 123.86 153.44 91.38 109.70 149.70 200.29
Sources: Own estimations, based on Price Control (2012) and Federal Electricity Comission (2012).
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316 Arbon TG 124.57 147.36 99.54 113.89 198.15 125.50
317 Trimbach SO 124.77 129.03 120.09 112.66 150.06 122.45
318 Saanen BE 127.64 142.28 111.56 123.09 159.29 142.78
319 Buchs (SG) SG 129.06 141.96 114.89 124.34 168.13 131.05
320 Interlaken BE 129.48 139.94 117.98 129.71 186.96 99.39
321 Murten FR 133.75 154.93 110.49 159.73 179.80 123.48
322 Bex VD 134.31 151.94 114.94 154.72 191.12 107.06
323 Zollikon ZH 136.59 169.79 100.11 125.39 212.96 166.84
324 Le Locle NE 151.72 179.57 121.13 121.21 134.96 284.71
Sources: Own estimations, based on Price Control (2012) and Federal Electricity Comission (2012).
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Figure A.2: Service price distribution within and across cantons. Distributions for every
service and canton are plotted by box-plots. The bold bar indicates the median of every
canton, the boxes the interquartile range, dashed lines the first and fourth quartile. Single
points are outliers. Very small cantons, such as Glarus (GL) have only one municipality
with 5’000 or more inhabitants, so only the median is plotted. In small cantons with only
a few large municipalities, the box captures all observations. In Geneva (GE), all prices are
administered at nearly identical levels and plotted in a box.
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Table A.13: Economies of scale with modified specification
(1) API (2) API−e (3) API (4) API−e (5) EL (6) WM (7) SW (8) WS
Constant 4.678∗∗∗ 4.820∗∗∗ 4.598∗∗∗ 4.670∗∗∗ 4.520∗∗∗ 4.765∗∗∗ 4.890∗∗∗ 4.324∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.101) (0.055) (0.077) (0.049) (0.079) (0.129) (0.144)
Population 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Agglomeration −0.013 −0.092 0.020 −0.026 0.073∗∗ −0.005 −0.163∗ 0.047
(0.029) (0.051) (0.028) (0.039) (0.023) (0.038) (0.067) (0.075)
Agglomeration2 0.000 0.011∗ −0.003 0.005 −0.012∗∗∗ 0.002 0.016∗ 0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
Suburban −0.027 −0.067 −0.021 −0.060 0.016 −0.049 −0.007 −0.108
(0.027) (0.048) (0.029) (0.044) (0.022) (0.043) (0.077) (0.081)
High-income 0.036 0.040 0.059 0.066 0.021 −0.084 0.196 0.109
(0.038) (0.065) (0.041) (0.067) (0.032) (0.058) (0.100) (0.106)
Peri-urban −0.049 −0.084 −0.054 −0.083 −0.021 −0.158∗ −0.081 −0.071
(0.037) (0.070) (0.039) (0.059) (0.034) (0.080) (0.121) (0.100)
Tourist −0.033 −0.123 −0.008 −0.057 0.046 −0.175 0.052 −0.116
(0.069) (0.135) (0.063) (0.091) (0.037) (0.108) (0.158) (0.178)
Industrial 0.003 −0.061 0.045 0.015 0.069∗ 0.006 −0.040 0.060
(0.042) (0.073) (0.040) (0.063) (0.035) (0.067) (0.113) (0.106)
Agronomic −0.001 −0.138 0.032 −0.079 0.134∗∗ −0.119 0.008 −0.185
(0.081) (0.161) (0.072) (0.145) (0.041) (0.096) (0.245) (0.181)
French −0.071∗∗∗ −0.210∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.065 0.068∗∗∗ −0.173∗ −0.151∗ 0.171∗∗
(0.021) (0.036) (0.029) (0.050) (0.016) (0.073) (0.059) (0.052)
Italian −0.158∗∗ −0.410∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗ −0.323∗∗∗ 0.062 −0.235∗ −0.723∗∗∗ −0.027
(0.054) (0.097) (0.038) (0.062) (0.034) (0.097) (0.109) (0.088)
N 324 324 281 281 324 285 324 320
adj. R-squared 0.087 0.207 0.036 0.110 0.323 0.122 0.138 0.108
Jarque-Bera 0.711 8.714∗ 2.015 2.477 6.380∗ 29.150∗∗∗ 13.722∗∗ 37.529∗∗∗
F-Statistic 0.858 2.462 0.6814 2.549 31.368∗∗∗ 1.068 1.962 5.299∗∗
Note: The estimations are on the logarithm of different dependent variables, as indicated in the header: API (administered price index), API−e (API
without electricity), EL (electricity), WM (waste management), SW (sewer water) and WS (water supply). All coefficients are estimated by OLS, and
significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (hc3) are reported in parentheses
below every estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared and Jarque-Bera tests with null hypothesis ’normal residual distribution’ are
in the second part of the table. The F-test is for the joint hypothesis that agglomeration and population size mutually do not show significant impact
on the dependent variable.
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Table A.14: Economies of scale dependent on topography
(1) API (2) API−e (3) API (4) API−e (5) EL (6) WM (7) SW (8) WS
Constant 4.703∗∗∗ 4.829∗∗∗ 4.520∗∗∗ 4.492∗∗∗ 4.592∗∗∗ 5.162∗∗∗ 4.511∗∗∗ 3.711∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.292) (0.134) (0.218) (0.168) (0.206) (0.426) (0.351)
log(Population) −0.005 −0.021 0.017 0.018 0.011 −0.054∗ 0.026 0.086∗
(0.016) (0.030) (0.014) (0.023) (0.017) (0.021) (0.044) (0.037)
Agglomeration −0.012 0.005 −0.013 0.007 −0.036∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗ −0.037 0.020
(0.007) (0.013) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.023) (0.019)
Suburban −0.017 −0.071 0.003 −0.039 0.051∗ −0.065 0.004 −0.049
(0.028) (0.051) (0.027) (0.046) (0.022) (0.043) (0.086) (0.076)
High-income 0.053 0.058 0.095∗ 0.121 0.050 −0.097 0.251∗ 0.217∗
(0.043) (0.079) (0.039) (0.070) (0.035) (0.059) (0.118) (0.105)
Peri-urban −0.039 −0.101 −0.025 −0.077 0.027 −0.202∗ −0.095 0.013
(0.041) (0.083) (0.038) (0.064) (0.035) (0.091) (0.136) (0.102)
Tourist −0.016 −0.043 0.002 0.009 −0.004 −0.201 0.201 0.027
(0.063) (0.123) (0.063) (0.104) (0.039) (0.133) (0.185) (0.169)
Industrial 0.011 0.048 0.017 0.056 −0.035 0.044 0.099 0.035
(0.031) (0.056) (0.032) (0.054) (0.028) (0.051) (0.114) (0.082)
Agronomic 0.035 0.032 0.040 0.032 0.029 −0.097 0.274 −0.077
(0.069) (0.140) (0.069) (0.141) (0.043) (0.100) (0.227) (0.159)
Midland 0.001 −0.030 −0.000 −0.017 0.029 −0.053 −0.020 0.020
(0.023) (0.038) (0.022) (0.034) (0.018) (0.033) (0.061) (0.049)
Alps 0.118∗∗ 0.092 0.100∗ 0.062 0.147∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.116 0.228
(0.040) (0.070) (0.040) (0.067) (0.019) (0.049) (0.182) (0.133)
Jura −0.036 −0.123∗ −0.044 −0.123∗∗ 0.043∗ −0.019 −0.243∗∗ −0.180∗∗
(0.027) (0.048) (0.025) (0.041) (0.020) (0.040) (0.078) (0.064)
N 324 324 281 281 324 285 324 320
adj. R-squared 0.058 0.043 0.069 0.091 0.231 0.053 0.058 0.142
Jarque-Bera 0.175 12.119∗∗ 2.248 4.393 3.547 145.142∗∗∗ 9.803∗∗ 17.934∗∗∗
Note: The estimations are on the logarithm of different dependent variables, as indicated in the header: API (administered price index), API−e (API
without electricity), EL (electricity), WM (waste management), SW (sewer water) and WS (water supply). All coefficients are estimated by OLS, and
significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (hc3) are reported in parentheses
below every estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared and Jarque-Bera tests with null hypothesis ’normal residual distribution’ are
in the second part of the table.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
A
.
A
P
P
E
N
D
IX
170
Table A.15: Economies of scale and regions
(1) API (2) API−e (3) API (4) API−e (5) EL (6) WM (7) SW (8) WS
Constant 4.537∗∗∗ 4.337∗∗∗ 4.502∗∗∗ 4.366∗∗∗ 4.742∗∗∗ 5.118∗∗∗ 3.945∗∗∗ 3.742∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.217) (0.129) (0.202) (0.124) (0.181) (0.368) (0.381)
log(Population) −0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 −0.009 −0.073∗∗∗ 0.055 0.074
(0.014) (0.023) (0.014) (0.021) (0.013) (0.019) (0.039) (0.039)
Agglomeration −0.004 −0.002 0.001 0.007 −0.008 0.020 −0.031 0.043∗
(0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.012) (0.023) (0.021)
Suburban −0.028 −0.068 −0.023 −0.073 0.019 −0.112∗∗ 0.009 −0.048
(0.027) (0.045) (0.026) (0.040) (0.018) (0.040) (0.080) (0.083)
High-income 0.048 0.062 0.064 0.062 0.027 −0.174∗∗ 0.254∗ 0.203
(0.038) (0.062) (0.039) (0.061) (0.029) (0.056) (0.106) (0.108)
Peri-urban −0.040 −0.094 −0.035 −0.086 0.017 −0.231∗∗ −0.065 0.013
(0.035) (0.068) (0.034) (0.053) (0.023) (0.080) (0.129) (0.107)
Tourist 0.002 −0.020 0.003 −0.001 0.014 −0.153 0.195 −0.095
(0.054) (0.116) (0.041) (0.064) (0.033) (0.094) (0.150) (0.169)
Industrial 0.024 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.018 −0.007 0.122 0.078
(0.032) (0.055) (0.034) (0.056) (0.022) (0.059) (0.114) (0.092)
Agronomic 0.027 −0.019 0.029 −0.030 0.066 −0.173 0.209 −0.109
(0.078) (0.145) (0.075) (0.141) (0.054) (0.100) (0.219) (0.160)
Espace Midland 0.227∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.081
(0.022) (0.038) (0.034) (0.055) (0.019) (0.086) (0.072) (0.071)
North-west 0.093∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.053 0.180∗∗ −0.049∗ 0.262∗∗ 0.180∗ −0.221∗∗
(0.025) (0.038) (0.037) (0.057) (0.021) (0.089) (0.075) (0.069)
Zurich 0.121∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗ 0.067 0.326∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ −0.029
(0.023) (0.035) (0.037) (0.058) (0.020) (0.093) (0.077) (0.065)
East 0.103∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.076∗ 0.208∗∗∗ −0.040 0.208∗ 0.140 −0.041
(0.028) (0.052) (0.037) (0.061) (0.021) (0.086) (0.091) (0.085)
Central 0.104∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.081∗ 0.193∗∗ −0.009 0.356∗∗∗ 0.088 −0.186∗
(0.028) (0.047) (0.038) (0.059) (0.022) (0.085) (0.077) (0.084)
Ticino −0.031 −0.139 −0.020 −0.106 0.050 0.031 −0.552∗∗∗ −0.113
(0.056) (0.100) (0.046) (0.080) (0.038) (0.124) (0.131) (0.099)
N 324 324 281 281 324 285 324 320
adj. R-squared 0.283 0.377 0.231 0.285 0.531 0.242 0.177 0.147
Jarque-Bera 1.315 46.140∗∗∗ 0.047 0.140 1.793 49.201∗∗∗ 34.055∗∗ 28.648∗∗∗
Note: The estimations are on the logarithm of different dependent variables, as indicated in the header: API (administered price index), API−e (API
without electricity), EL (electricity), WM (waste management), SW (sewer water) and WS (water supply). All coefficients are estimated by OLS, and
significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (hc3) are reported in parentheses
below every estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared and Jarque-Bera tests with null hypothesis ’normal residual distribution’ are
in the second part of the table.
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Table A.16: Tax rates and rents, controlled for scale effects
(1) API (2) API−e (3) API (4) API−e (5) EL (6) WM (7) SW (8) WS
Constant 6.353∗∗∗ 6.015∗∗∗ 5.721∗∗∗ 4.660∗∗∗ 3.675∗∗∗ 6.075∗∗∗ 0.212 1.059
(0.429) (0.795) (0.470) (0.827) (0.370) (0.972) (1.318) (1.349)
log(Tax) 0.218∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ −0.096 0.576∗∗∗ 0.334∗
(0.051) (0.084) (0.049) (0.079) (0.036) (0.070) (0.124) (0.135)
log(Rent) −0.054 −0.159 0.084 0.124 0.020 −0.081 0.305 0.263
(0.060) (0.127) (0.070) (0.128) (0.046) (0.168) (0.198) (0.209)
log(Population) 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.006 −0.061∗∗ 0.047 0.064
(0.014) (0.026) (0.014) (0.022) (0.016) (0.021) (0.038) (0.040)
Agglomeration −0.006 0.022 −0.011 0.013 −0.038∗∗∗ 0.027∗ −0.027 0.035
(0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.012) (0.022) (0.021)
Suburban −0.002 −0.059 0.005 −0.057 0.068∗∗ −0.101∗ 0.020 −0.046
(0.027) (0.048) (0.027) (0.044) (0.022) (0.043) (0.078) (0.082)
High-income 0.116∗∗ 0.138 0.107∗∗ 0.096 0.098∗∗ −0.149∗ 0.269∗ 0.179
(0.041) (0.078) (0.040) (0.071) (0.034) (0.064) (0.114) (0.119)
Peri-urban −0.035 −0.095 −0.031 −0.090 0.029 −0.230∗∗ −0.070 −0.001
(0.039) (0.077) (0.038) (0.062) (0.033) (0.080) (0.129) (0.106)
Tourist −0.001 −0.005 −0.031 −0.045 −0.007 −0.186 0.132 −0.114
(0.051) (0.097) (0.052) (0.078) (0.039) (0.117) (0.168) (0.172)
Industrial 0.014 0.063 0.008 0.040 −0.038 0.005 0.084 0.059
(0.032) (0.058) (0.031) (0.055) (0.024) (0.060) (0.115) (0.090)
Agronomic −0.007 −0.038 −0.015 −0.067 0.015 −0.118 0.106 −0.194
(0.074) (0.151) (0.068) (0.142) (0.036) (0.091) (0.249) (0.166)
French −0.082∗∗∗ −0.213∗∗∗ −0.028 −0.110∗ 0.054∗∗ −0.159∗ −0.248∗∗∗ 0.102
(0.023) (0.043) (0.029) (0.050) (0.016) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070)
Italian −0.113∗ −0.389∗∗∗ −0.062 −0.284∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ −0.268∗∗ −0.654∗∗∗ 0.043
(0.053) (0.097) (0.034) (0.065) (0.032) (0.099) (0.119) (0.087)
N 324 324 281 281 324 285 324 320
adj. R-squared 0.220 0.260 0.126 0.148 0.348 0.139 0.180 0.131
Jarque-Bera 0.614 6.889∗ 0.604 1.507 4.708 27.655∗∗∗ 15.043∗∗∗ 27.272∗∗∗
Note: The estimations are on the logarithm of different dependent variables, as indicated in the header: API (administered price index), API−e (API
without electricity), EL (electricity), WM (waste management), SW (sewer water) and WS (water supply). All coefficients are estimated by OLS, and
significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (hc3) are reported in parentheses
below every estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared and Jarque-Bera tests with null hypothesis ’normal residual distribution’ are
in the second part of the table.
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Table A.17: Tax rates, rents and regions
(1) API (2) API−e (3) API (4) API−e (5) EL (6) WM (7) SW (8) WS
Constant 6.349∗∗∗ 6.107∗∗∗ 6.032∗∗∗ 5.447∗∗∗ 3.536∗∗∗ 6.874∗∗∗ 1.374 0.950
(0.449) (0.903) (0.430) (0.718) (0.301) (0.948) (1.320) (1.547)
log(Tax) 0.170∗∗∗ 0.116 0.142∗∗ 0.109 0.217∗∗∗ −0.275∗∗ 0.408∗∗ 0.248
(0.051) (0.088) (0.047) (0.080) (0.032) (0.087) (0.140) (0.151)
log(Rent) −0.019 −0.082 0.087 0.082 0.016 −0.247 0.239 0.543∗
(0.060) (0.137) (0.060) (0.101) (0.043) (0.142) (0.172) (0.230)
Suburban −0.018 −0.056 −0.021 −0.063∗ 0.028 −0.030 −0.070 −0.058
(0.017) (0.030) (0.017) (0.028) (0.014) (0.029) (0.052) (0.057)
High-income 0.084∗∗ 0.108 0.066∗ 0.072 0.060∗ −0.048 0.143 0.102
(0.032) (0.060) (0.033) (0.056) (0.027) (0.054) (0.083) (0.096)
Peri-urban −0.037 −0.095 −0.038 −0.083 0.024 −0.123 −0.157 −0.037
(0.027) (0.055) (0.026) (0.043) (0.018) (0.066) (0.106) (0.077)
Tourist 0.018 −0.010 −0.007 −0.019 0.043 −0.096 0.175 −0.283
(0.046) (0.102) (0.038) (0.060) (0.031) (0.101) (0.155) (0.178)
Industrial 0.027 0.023 0.023 0.010 0.035 0.026 0.119 −0.089
(0.028) (0.050) (0.029) (0.052) (0.018) (0.054) (0.102) (0.081)
Agronomic −0.004 −0.058 0.004 −0.061 0.045 −0.110 0.156 −0.252
(0.084) (0.149) (0.078) (0.144) (0.052) (0.088) (0.243) (0.143)
Espace Midland 0.185∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.024 0.348∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.146
(0.028) (0.057) (0.034) (0.057) (0.019) (0.080) (0.081) (0.097)
North-west 0.091∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.064 0.195∗∗∗ −0.044∗ 0.248∗∗ 0.218∗∗ −0.110
(0.029) (0.054) (0.036) (0.059) (0.021) (0.081) (0.083) (0.094)
Zurich 0.120∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.072∗ 0.341∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.079
(0.024) (0.042) (0.035) (0.058) (0.018) (0.086) (0.075) (0.071)
East 0.105∗∗ 0.227∗∗ 0.095∗ 0.223∗∗∗ −0.023 0.151 0.229∗ 0.069
(0.035) (0.075) (0.039) (0.064) (0.024) (0.079) (0.101) (0.128)
Central 0.152∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.242∗∗ −0.108
(0.031) (0.056) (0.039) (0.065) (0.022) (0.083) (0.088) (0.104)
Ticino 0.003 −0.130 0.020 −0.072 0.103∗∗ −0.034 −0.425∗∗ 0.034
(0.058) (0.105) (0.050) (0.086) (0.039) (0.125) (0.149) (0.121)
N 324 324 281 281 324 285 324 320
adj. R-squared 0.324 0.389 0.255 0.288 0.594 0.247 0.189 0.147
Jarque-Bera 1.973 27.792∗∗∗ 0.184 0.025 10.660∗∗ 24.050∗∗∗ 30.316∗∗∗ 33.787∗∗∗
Note: The estimations are on the logarithm of different dependent variables, as indicated in the header: API (administered price index), API−e (API
without electricity), EL (electricity), WM (waste management), SW (sewer water) and WS (water supply). All coefficients are estimated by OLS, and
significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (hc3) are reported in parentheses
below every estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared and Jarque-Bera tests with null hypothesis ’normal residual distribution’ are
in the second part of the table.
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Table A.18: Tax rates and rents, robust for cantonal clusters
(1) API (2) API−e (3) API (4) API−e (5) EL (6) WM (7) SW (8) WS
Constant 6.517∗∗∗ 5.493∗∗∗ 6.052∗∗∗ 4.266∗∗∗ 4.620 5.229∗∗∗ 1.000 0.317
(0.754) (1.245) (0.687) (1.238) (0.889) (1.449) (1.657) (2.131)
log(Tax) 0.211 0.277 0.202 0.296 0.127 −0.069 0.542∗ 0.424
(0.112) (0.149) (0.112) (0.155) (0.110) (0.095) (0.220) (0.268)
log(Rent) −0.069 −0.046 0.044 0.208 −0.139 −0.033 0.245 0.504∗
(0.074) (0.164) (0.056) (0.158) (0.108) (0.234) (0.182) (0.246)
Suburban −0.017 −0.033 −0.021 −0.041 0.003 −0.011 −0.062 −0.041
(0.021) (0.033) (0.020) (0.032) (0.020) (0.034) (0.053) (0.072)
High-income 0.097∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.104∗ 0.036 −0.033 0.170∗ 0.149∗
(0.028) (0.052) (0.030) (0.050) (0.025) (0.053) (0.078) (0.074)
Peri-urban −0.052∗ −0.079 −0.059∗∗ −0.082∗ −0.028 −0.122∗ −0.162 −0.031
(0.023) (0.049) (0.021) (0.041) (0.023) (0.050) (0.089) (0.053)
Tourist 0.001 −0.064 −0.023 −0.082 0.064 −0.171 0.131 −0.265
(0.044) (0.101) (0.046) (0.068) (0.044) (0.121) (0.154) (0.147)
Industrial 0.019 0.001 0.021 0.003 0.042∗ 0.004 0.099 −0.085
(0.039) (0.064) (0.037) (0.065) (0.019) (0.043) (0.105) (0.102)
Agronomic −0.002 −0.098 −0.003 −0.104 0.092∗∗∗ −0.117∗ 0.120 −0.334∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.123) (0.057) (0.109) (0.035) (0.052) (0.222) (0.069)
French −0.078∗ −0.232∗∗∗ −0.023 −0.120 0.084∗∗∗ −0.169 −0.230∗∗∗ 0.066
(0.036) (0.066) (0.043) (0.065) (0.058) (0.099) (0.063) (0.120)
Italian −0.115∗∗∗ −0.383∗∗∗ −0.068∗ −0.279∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ −0.253∗∗∗ −0.664∗∗∗ 0.062
(0.031) (0.046) (0.031) (0.045) (0.030) (0.034) (0.066) (0.093)
N 324 324 281 281 324 285 324 320
adj. R-squared 0.223 0.254 0.125 0.148 0.253 0.118 0.180 0.115
Note: The estimations are on the logarithm of different dependent variables, as indicated in the header: API (administered price index), API−e (API
without electricity), EL (electricity), WM (waste management), SW (sewer water) and WS (water supply). All coefficients are estimated by OLS, and
significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. The standard errors are in parentheses below every estimate and corrected for
heteroscedasticity with cluster variable ’canton’. The number of observations (N) and adjusted R-squared are reported in the second part of the table.
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Table A.19: Single institutions
(1) API (2) API−e (3) API (4) API−e (5) EL (6) WM (7) SW (8) WS
Constant 5.989∗∗∗ 5.017∗∗∗ 6.347∗∗∗ 5.599∗∗∗ 3.711∗∗∗ 5.126∗∗∗ 2.177∗∗∗ 3.772∗∗∗
(0.223) (0.353) (0.202) (0.278) (0.186) (0.196) (0.424) (0.487)
Parliament 0.017 0.013 0.023 0.025 0.019 −0.014 −0.006 0.128∗
(0.018) (0.035) (0.018) (0.029) (0.016) (0.031) (0.058) (0.059)
Accounts audit 0.047∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.032 0.062 −0.001 0.035 0.204∗ 0.017
(0.021) (0.036) (0.021) (0.034) (0.018) (0.036) (0.079) (0.070)
Business audit −0.013 −0.078∗ −0.013 −0.076∗ 0.063∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗ 0.029 −0.159∗∗
(0.018) (0.030) (0.019) (0.030) (0.015) (0.032) (0.067) (0.058)
External audit −0.062 −0.113 −0.135∗∗ −0.194∗ −0.023 −0.130 −0.138 −0.176
(0.038) (0.070) (0.047) (0.079) (0.023) (0.086) (0.137) (0.140)
Finance commission −0.004 0.028 0.086 0.121 −0.008 0.165 0.201∗ −0.096
(0.038) (0.068) (0.048) (0.081) (0.024) (0.091) (0.095) (0.133)
log(Tax) 0.254∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ −0.078 0.497∗∗∗ 0.164
(0.046) (0.073) (0.042) (0.058) (0.039) (0.041) (0.089) (0.101)
Suburban −0.026 −0.047 −0.021 −0.035 −0.003 −0.027 −0.064 0.022
(0.019) (0.031) (0.018) (0.030) (0.016) (0.033) (0.053) (0.059)
High-income 0.062∗ 0.106∗ 0.071∗ 0.122∗ 0.003 −0.078 0.194∗ 0.290∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.051) (0.032) (0.056) (0.027) (0.046) (0.078) (0.083)
Peri-urban −0.048 −0.075 −0.040 −0.050 −0.026 −0.131 −0.160 0.080
(0.031) (0.055) (0.029) (0.045) (0.028) (0.074) (0.111) (0.084)
Tourist 0.005 −0.021 0.012 −0.001 0.026 −0.108 0.195 −0.147
(0.046) (0.097) (0.041) (0.057) (0.034) (0.101) (0.141) (0.165)
Industrial 0.025 0.011 0.027 0.009 0.044∗ 0.014 0.099 −0.051
(0.031) (0.056) (0.031) (0.055) (0.021) (0.058) (0.106) (0.075)
Agronomic −0.021 −0.146 −0.005 −0.127 0.109∗∗∗ −0.124 0.051 −0.359∗
(0.079) (0.167) (0.075) (0.156) (0.031) (0.096) (0.261) (0.157)
French −0.018 −0.083 0.070∗ 0.047 0.050∗ −0.047 −0.013 0.297∗∗
(0.032) (0.053) (0.035) (0.056) (0.020) (0.074) (0.109) (0.091)
Italian −0.031 −0.173 0.060 −0.053 0.094∗ −0.031 −0.427∗ 0.183
(0.064) (0.112) (0.054) (0.094) (0.042) (0.129) (0.173) (0.143)
N 324 324 281 281 324 285 324 320
adj. R-squared 0.282 0.337 0.206 0.245 0.277 0.198 0.202 0.157
Jarque-Bera 1.635 9.695∗∗ 0.042 0.103 2.379 26.481∗∗∗ 14.854∗∗∗ 32.843∗∗∗
Note: The estimations are on the logarithm of different dependent variables, as indicated in the header: API (administered price index), API−e (API
without electricity), EL (electricity), WM (waste management), SW (sewer water) and WS (water supply). All coefficients are estimated by OLS, and
significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (hc3) are reported in parentheses
below every estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared and Jarque-Bera tests with null hypothesis ’normal residual distribution’ are
in the second part of the table.
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Table A.20: Institutional control in regions
(1) API (2) API−e (3) API (4) API−e (5) EL (6) WM (7) SW (8) WS
Constant 6.195∗∗∗ 5.530∗∗∗ 6.556∗∗∗ 5.951∗∗∗ 3.615∗∗∗ 5.368∗∗∗ 3.011∗∗∗ 4.491∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.392) (0.200) (0.335) (0.130) (0.305) (0.488) (0.614)
Parliament 0.022 0.028 0.026 0.032 0.012 −0.022 −0.002 0.165∗∗
(0.017) (0.032) (0.016) (0.028) (0.011) (0.030) (0.059) (0.059)
FinCom −0.002 −0.010 0.001 −0.006 0.008 −0.011 0.010 0.012
(0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.016) (0.007) (0.015) (0.032) (0.031)
log(Tax) 0.180∗∗∗ 0.155 0.107∗∗ 0.075 0.211∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗ 0.293∗∗ −0.011
(0.046) (0.086) (0.042) (0.070) (0.028) (0.063) (0.105) (0.132)
Suburban −0.013 −0.051 −0.011 −0.049 0.030∗ −0.044 −0.060 0.005
(0.017) (0.029) (0.018) (0.028) (0.014) (0.033) (0.055) (0.061)
High-income 0.087∗∗ 0.100∗ 0.095∗∗ 0.104∗ 0.067∗∗ −0.109∗ 0.197∗ 0.282∗∗
(0.029) (0.045) (0.032) (0.052) (0.023) (0.051) (0.079) (0.086)
Peri-urban −0.025 −0.080 −0.022 −0.062 0.031 −0.141 −0.157 0.059
(0.028) (0.054) (0.028) (0.045) (0.018) (0.073) (0.117) (0.088)
Tourist 0.023 −0.009 0.010 −0.002 0.049 −0.124 0.192 −0.199
(0.050) (0.114) (0.038) (0.061) (0.030) (0.096) (0.146) (0.172)
Industrial 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.022 0.040∗ 0.021 0.117 −0.029
(0.029) (0.052) (0.030) (0.054) (0.018) (0.057) (0.111) (0.078)
Agronomic 0.005 −0.047 0.011 −0.053 0.051 −0.111 0.148 −0.208
(0.084) (0.152) (0.078) (0.143) (0.051) (0.089) (0.238) (0.172)
Espace Midland 0.193∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.034 0.339∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗ 0.115
(0.027) (0.051) (0.034) (0.055) (0.019) (0.084) (0.091) (0.096)
North-west 0.107∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.071 0.209∗∗∗ −0.044∗ 0.253∗∗ 0.162∗ −0.141
(0.025) (0.043) (0.037) (0.059) (0.019) (0.088) (0.081) (0.077)
Zurich 0.136∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.091∗ 0.366∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.128
(0.023) (0.043) (0.035) (0.058) (0.018) (0.086) (0.081) (0.077)
East 0.124∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.094∗ 0.231∗∗∗ −0.023 0.182∗ 0.151 0.002
(0.027) (0.054) (0.037) (0.062) (0.020) (0.087) (0.096) (0.098)
Central 0.173∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗ 0.186∗ −0.110
(0.028) (0.049) (0.038) (0.063) (0.020) (0.086) (0.086) (0.103)
Ticino 0.009 −0.095 0.000 −0.082 0.088∗ 0.017 −0.510∗∗∗ −0.162
(0.054) (0.097) (0.049) (0.086) (0.038) (0.131) (0.134) (0.099)
N 324 324 281 281 324 285 324 320
adj. R-squared 0.326 0.388 0.253 0.289 0.595 0.232 0.181 0.136
Jarque-Bera 2.042 40.442∗∗∗ 0.018 0.119 10.699∗∗ 31.357∗∗∗ 35.772∗∗∗ 39.747∗∗∗
Note: The estimations are on the logarithm of different dependent variables, as indicated in the header: API (administered price index), API−e (API
without electricity), EL (electricity), WM (waste management), SW (sewer water) and WS (water supply). All coefficients are estimated by OLS, and
significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (hc3) are reported in parentheses
below every estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared and Jarque-Bera tests with null hypothesis ’normal residual distribution’ are
in the second part of the table.
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Table A.21: Institutional control and topography
(1) API (2) API−e (3) API (4) API−e (5) EL (6) WM (7) SW (8) WS
Constant 6.974∗∗∗ 6.802∗∗∗ 6.176∗∗∗ 4.658∗∗∗ 4.156∗∗∗ 5.119∗∗∗ 1.897 1.618
(0.354) (0.681) (0.382) (0.712) (0.337) (1.045) (1.118) (1.001)
Parliament −0.026 −0.112∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.047 0.061∗∗∗ −0.076∗ −0.168∗∗ 0.085
(0.017) (0.031) (0.017) (0.029) (0.013) (0.034) (0.056) (0.049)
FinCom −0.030∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗ −0.019∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.044 −0.018
(0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.012) (0.025) (0.022)
log(Tax) 0.146∗∗ 0.140 0.156∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ −0.110 0.481∗∗∗ 0.247∗
(0.047) (0.084) (0.043) (0.069) (0.040) (0.081) (0.125) (0.111)
log(Rent) −0.096∗ −0.169 0.071 0.232∗ −0.062 0.057 0.151 0.408∗∗
(0.045) (0.092) (0.054) (0.106) (0.043) (0.155) (0.147) (0.152)
Suburban −0.007 −0.037 −0.010 −0.042 0.029 0.001 −0.084 −0.055
(0.020) (0.037) (0.020) (0.032) (0.018) (0.031) (0.061) (0.057)
High-income 0.104∗∗ 0.159∗ 0.079∗ 0.089 0.048 −0.046 0.152 0.153
(0.034) (0.065) (0.032) (0.060) (0.033) (0.058) (0.094) (0.095)
Peri-urban −0.045 −0.113 −0.042 −0.099 0.021 −0.129 −0.248∗ 0.000
(0.034) (0.069) (0.032) (0.053) (0.027) (0.083) (0.117) (0.081)
Tourist 0.004 −0.023 −0.020 −0.060 0.029 −0.207 0.168 −0.132
(0.049) (0.097) (0.049) (0.086) (0.032) (0.129) (0.170) (0.178)
Industrial 0.023 −0.006 0.029 0.007 0.057∗ 0.001 0.073 −0.049
(0.030) (0.056) (0.031) (0.056) (0.024) (0.057) (0.109) (0.075)
Agronomic −0.007 −0.076 0.002 −0.064 0.062 −0.145 0.137 −0.186
(0.067) (0.139) (0.064) (0.135) (0.038) (0.092) (0.235) (0.158)
Midland 0.002 −0.028 −0.002 −0.028 0.033 −0.051 −0.038 −0.005
(0.020) (0.036) (0.021) (0.033) (0.018) (0.036) (0.062) (0.047)
Alps 0.082∗ 0.036 0.094∗ 0.067 0.131∗∗∗ 0.045 −0.150 0.220
(0.037) (0.070) (0.038) (0.070) (0.024) (0.055) (0.187) (0.128)
Jura −0.012 −0.133∗∗ −0.010 −0.111∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ −0.046 −0.186∗ −0.176∗∗
(0.024) (0.044) (0.024) (0.040) (0.019) (0.043) (0.073) (0.062)
N 324 324 281 281 324 285 324 320
adj. R-squared 0.210 0.167 0.170 0.146 0.312 0.082 0.128 0.170
Jarque-Bera 1.510 4.402 0.696 1.669 3.8692 102.861∗∗∗ 9.862∗∗ 24.742∗∗∗
Note: The estimations are on the logarithm of different dependent variables, as indicated in the header: API (administered price index), API−e (API
without electricity), EL (electricity), WM (waste management), SW (sewer water) and WS (water supply). All coefficients are estimated by OLS, and
significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (hc3) are reported in parentheses
below every estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared and Jarque-Bera tests with null hypothesis ’normal residual distribution’ are
in the second part of the table.
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Table A.22: Institutional control, robust for cantonal clusters
(1) API (2) API−e (3) API (4) API−e (5) EL (6) WM (7) SW (8) WS
Constant 6.214∗∗∗ 5.342∗∗∗ 6.499∗∗∗ 5.735∗∗∗ 3.857∗∗∗ 5.239∗∗∗ 2.714∗∗∗ 3.833∗∗∗
(0.451) (0.591) (0.404) (0.577) (0.378) (0.241) (0.790) (0.956)
Parliament 0.012 0.021 0.019 0.032 0.001 −0.009 0.013 0.135
(0.024) (0.044) (0.021) (0.033) (0.017) (0.032) (0.734) (0.083)
FinCom −0.024 −0.024 −0.024 −0.024 −0.026 −0.034 −0.012 −0.015
(0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.036)
log(Tax) 0.216∗ 0.270∗ 0.153 0.183 0.166∗ −0.092 0.410∗ 0.140
(0.095) (0.124) (0.084) (0.120) (0.080) (0.049) (0.165) (0.198)
Suburban −0.014 −0.026 −0.006 −0.011 −0.002 −0.006 −0.033 0.036
(0.024) (0.040) (0.026) (0.042) (0.027) (0.039) (0.058) (0.085)
High-income 0.083∗ 0.152∗ 0.100∗ 0.178∗ −0.002 −0.041 0.249∗ 0.340∗∗
(0.042) (0.075) (0.040) (0.077) (0.032) (0.040) (0.111) (0.122)
Peri-urban −0.042 −0.063 −0.036 −0.040 −0.028 −0.115 −0.136 0.076
(0.030) (0.054) (0.032) (0.055) (0.030) (0.067) (0.097) (0.079)
Tourist −0.007 −0.068 −0.019 −0.061 0.047 −0.184 0.154 −0.195
(0.047) (0.110) (0.044) (0.067) (0.033) (0.117) (0.147) (0.135)
Industrial 0.028 0.013 0.029 0.011 0.048∗ 0.006 0.100 −0.042
(0.040) (0.067) (0.041) (0.061) (0.020) (0.045) (0.106) (0.107)
Agronomic −0.007 −0.099 −0.006 −0.105 0.084∗ −0.136∗ 0.111 −0.298∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.136) (0.063) (0.116) (0.038) (0.053) (0.233) (0.075)
French −0.094∗ −0.250∗∗∗ −0.033 −0.136 0.064 −0.164 −0.196∗ 0.066
(0.038) (0.063) (0.049) (0.074) (0.053) (0.089) (0.085) (0.139)
Italian −0.087∗∗∗ −0.364∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗ −0.292∗∗∗ 0.166∗ −0.201∗∗∗ −0.678∗∗∗ −0.062
(0.026) (0.060) (0.019) (0.040) (0.047) (0.037) (0.093) (0.088)
N 324 324 281 281 324 285 324 320
adj. R-squared 0.240 0.260 0.157 0.145 0.256 0.134 0.170 0.093
Note: The estimations are on the logarithm of different dependent variables, as indicated in the header: API (administered price index), API−e (API
without electricity), EL (electricity), WM (waste management), SW (sewer water) and WS (water supply). All coefficients are estimated by OLS, and
significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. The standard errors are in parentheses below every estimate and corrected for
heteroscedasticity with cluster variable ’canton’. The number of observations (N) and adjusted R-squared are reported in the second part of the table.
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Table A.23: Capitalisation with different construction indicators
(1) Rent (2) Rent (3) Rent (4) Rent (5) Rent (6) Rent (7) Rent (8) Rent
Constant 4.770∗∗∗ 4.987∗∗∗ 4.786∗∗∗ 4.953∗∗∗ 5.738∗∗∗ 4.952∗∗∗ 4.999∗∗∗ 4.883∗∗∗
(0.334) (0.322) (0.281) (0.276) (0.402) (0.366) (0.262) (0.266)
log(Tax) −0.337∗∗∗ −0.356∗∗∗ −0.341∗∗∗ −0.361∗∗∗ −0.303∗∗∗ −0.325∗∗∗ −0.333∗∗∗ −0.336∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.038)
log(Population) 0.095∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Suburban 0.142∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
High-income 0.361∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.051) (0.051) (0.050)
Peri-urban 0.176∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.038) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036)
Tourist 0.157∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.044) (0.046) (0.045) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047) (0.045)
Industrial 0.052 0.054 0.050 0.052 0.052 0.054 0.051 0.053
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
Agronomic 0.069∗ 0.076∗∗ 0.077∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.071∗ 0.066∗ 0.084∗∗
(0.033) (0.029) (0.030) (0.026) (0.031) (0.034) (0.033) (0.029)
BA 0.650 0.668 0.584 0.632 0.640 0.649
(0.811) (0.797) (0.811) (0.817) (0.816) (0.804)
CF 1.593∗ 1.499∗ 1.095 1.481∗ 1.507∗ 1.729∗
(0.744) (0.722) (0.753) (0.755) (0.746) (0.729)
log(API) 0.065 0.053
(0.063) (0.063)
log(API−e ) 0.071 0.071
(0.042) (0.043)
log(EL) −0.163∗
(0.073)
log(WM) 0.013
(0.058)
log(SW) 0.014
(0.023)
log(WS) 0.049∗
(0.022)
N 271 271 271 271 271 271 271 271
adj. R-squared 0.557 0.551 0.561 0.557 0.565 0.555 0.556 0.564
Jarque-Bera 11.510∗∗ 11.161∗∗ 15.043∗∗∗ 14.721∗∗∗ 17.265∗∗ 13.690∗∗ 12.874∗∗ 7.645∗
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of ’Rent’. All price indexes, namely API (administered price index), API−e (API without electricity), EL (electricity), WM (waste management), SW (sewer water) and WS
(water supply) are used as explanatory variables. All coefficients are estimated by OLS, and significances are indicated as follows: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05. Heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors (hc3) are
reported in parentheses below every estimate. The number of observations (N), adjusted R-squared and Jarque-Bera tests with null hypothesis ’normal residual distribution’ are in the second part of the table. Building
applications ’BA’ and ’Constructions finished’ (CF) replace ’Constructions ongoing’.
A
.2.
A
D
M
IN
IS
T
E
R
E
D
P
R
IC
E
S
179
Table A.24: Capitalisation in regions
(1) Rent (2) Rent (3) Rent (4) Rent (5) Rent (6) Rent (7) Rent (8) Rent
Constant 6.213∗∗∗ 5.348∗∗∗ 6.277∗∗∗ 5.576∗∗∗ 5.734∗∗∗ 6.009∗∗∗ 6.064∗∗∗ 5.924∗∗∗
(0.517) (0.331) (0.490) (0.284) (0.448) (0.371) (0.350) (0.392)
log(Tax) −0.449∗∗∗ −0.368∗∗∗ −0.447∗∗∗ −0.361∗∗∗ −0.476∗∗∗ −0.369∗∗∗ −0.461∗∗∗ −0.457∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.044) (0.060) (0.044) (0.072) (0.044) (0.065) (0.066)
log(Population) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Suburban 0.117∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
High-income 0.320∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.038)
Peri-urban 0.106∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032)
Tourist 0.154 0.137∗ 0.154 0.137∗ 0.150 0.125∗ 0.149 0.163
(0.095) (0.060) (0.093) (0.060) (0.092) (0.059) (0.095) (0.096)
Industrial 0.076∗ 0.045 0.076∗ 0.047 0.072∗ 0.045 0.071∗ 0.075∗
(0.032) (0.027) (0.032) (0.027) (0.032) (0.027) (0.031) (0.033)
Agronomic 0.036 0.016 0.034 0.017 0.032 0.007 0.032 0.046
(0.059) (0.033) (0.057) (0.033) (0.063) (0.035) (0.063) (0.055)
Constructions 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Espace Midland −0.158∗∗∗ −0.049 −0.148∗∗ −0.042 −0.165∗∗∗ −0.013 −0.169∗∗∗ −0.169∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.033) (0.037) (0.035) (0.033)
North-west −0.195∗∗∗ −0.040 −0.186∗∗∗ −0.039 −0.192∗∗∗ −0.022 −0.201∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.044) (0.035) (0.044) (0.031) (0.037) (0.030) (0.028)
Zurich −0.106∗∗∗ 0.054 −0.091∗ 0.052 −0.088∗ 0.078∗ −0.115∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.046) (0.042) (0.047) (0.039) (0.038) (0.030) (0.028)
East −0.277∗∗∗ −0.148∗∗∗ −0.269∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗ −0.284∗∗∗ −0.276∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034)
Central −0.220∗∗∗ −0.050 −0.212∗∗∗ −0.046 −0.229∗∗∗ −0.026 −0.228∗∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.043) (0.037) (0.043) (0.036) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035)
Ticino −0.272∗∗∗ −0.124 −0.277∗∗∗ −0.121 −0.283∗∗∗ −0.106 −0.261∗∗∗ −0.282∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.082) (0.066) (0.082) (0.066) (0.076) (0.066) (0.069)
log(API) −0.024 0.079
(0.080) (0.055)
log(API−e ) −0.043 0.021
(0.064) (0.034)
log(EL) 0.107
(0.104)
log(WM) −0.055
(0.047)
log(SW) 0.023
(0.020)
log(WS) 0.058∗
(0.028)
N 324 281 324 281 324 285 324 320
adj. R-squared 0.667 0.690 0.669 0.688 0.669 0.689 0.669 0.676
Jarque-Bera 93.185∗∗∗ 49.277∗∗ 70.566∗∗∗ 50.7811∗∗∗ 86.375∗∗∗ 33.942∗∗∗ 102.834∗∗∗ 163.977∗∗∗
Note: See table A.23.
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